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This study seeks to evaluate the orientation of the 
Nigerian Federal Civil Service which today remains the fore¬ 
most legacy of the British colonial administration in Nigeria. 
As the principal organ of government, the administrative 
bureaucracy has been assigned the task of managing and 
achieving economic and social development in the country. 
But the bureaucracy suffers from some internal problems 
which give the impression that it has not undergone suffi¬ 
cient re-orientation necessary for its coming to grips with 
the complexities of its present responsibilities. 
Three methodological procedures were used to probe 
the orientation which the administrative bureaucracy has 
undergone since Nigeria's attainment of national independence. 
Firstly, by giving a descriptive history of the Nigerian 
Federal Civil Service it was possible to identify the speci¬ 
fic characteristics of the Colonial Civil Service which were 
bequeathed at independence to the organization. Secondly, 
an examination of the role of the Federal Civil Service in 
the economic and social progress of Nigeria was attempted. 
Lastly, the Federal Civil Servants' perspectives were in¬ 
corporated into the study in order to remove it from the 
realm of abstractions. This necessitated the administra¬ 
tion of a questionnaire survey which yielded some demographic 
as well as attitudinal data. A stratified random sample of 
300 civil servants drawn from six executive ministries was 
the most appropriate sampling method used in the circum¬ 
stances which the survey was conducted. Interviews with 
selected Nigerian scholars and private citizens who were 
regarded as knowledgeable about the Federal Civil Service 
also yielded useful information. 
The study produced some significant findings. The 
rules and regulations, procedural norms, and the structure 
of the Federal Civil Service were identified as some of 
the factors inherited from the colonial administration and 
still maintained by the independent administrative bureau¬ 
cracy. Besides, the study revealed that the passive atti¬ 
tude which the Nigerian civil servants and other Nigerians 
had for the Colonial Civil Service still prevails towards 
the indigenous Civil Service. This absence of strong iden¬ 
tification results in the citizens' limited involvement in 
the conduct of economic and social transformation. The 
lack of strong involvement itself is partly traceable to 
the nature of the Nigerian political culture which is more 
subject than participant. The passive attitude, neverthe¬ 
less, enforces elitism in the policies and administration 
of economic and social development of Nigeria. Other factors 
were noted in both the contextual and task environments as 
constraints and facilitators respectively on the effective¬ 
ness of the Civil Service. 
The survey confirmed the study's assumptions that the 
efficiency of the Federal Civil Service has not improved 
since independence. The continued use of rules, regulations, 
and operational norms as well as the structure inherited 
from the colonial bureaucracy are some of the factors mili¬ 
tating against its efficiency and effectiveness. It showed 
that the phenomenon of low citizen participation has in¬ 
creased during the military regime to exceed the level 
characteristic of the civilian regime. The structure which 
the survey findings indicate as one that would enhance the 
impact and efficiency of the administrative bureaucracy is 
a decentralized organization. 
In evaluating the orientation of the Federal Civil 
Service, the finding was that its performances do not re¬ 
flect a strong re-orientation necessary in the prosecution 
of its present goals. To have this orientation, the organi¬ 
zation must be staffed with men and women whose qualifica¬ 
tions, values, work attitudes, and identification with it 
can induce satisfactory job performance. The bureaucracy 
must settle for an administrative structure that is dynamic 
and which permits quick decision making and program imple¬ 
mentation. Equally important is the fact that the orienta¬ 
tion cannot proceed without a significant impact of a trust¬ 
ful, articulate, and participant citizenry on the administra¬ 
tive bureaucracy. 
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The problems which some emergent African countries 
have encountered because of their continued reliance on the 
colonial pattern of government have attracted my attention 
for some time. It is my contention that the unsuitability 
of the colonial model to the African situation can only be 
realized by making available findings of studies on the 
various institutions of government in some African states. 
This dissertation is an effort toward such an end. 
It focuses on the Nigerian Federal Civil Service as an in¬ 
stitutional legacy of the colonial government. An attempt 
is made to show7 how the management of economic and social 
development has run into problems because of the contra¬ 
dictions between the new goals of structural transformation 
of the economy, society, polity, and culture of Nigeria and 
the institution and methods employed in achieving them. Very 
often there is a tendency for arm-chair strategists to sug¬ 
gest the use of one foreign model in preference to the other. 
The efforts of the United States government in transplanting 
the U.S. public administration in some African territories in 
the fifties and early sixties met with colossal failure be¬ 
cause of the cultural and environmental differences between 
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the place of origin of the model and the location where the 
model was to be practiced. I submit that whether it is a 
capitalistic model or a socialist type, no foreign model 
of government, administration or even of economic and social 
development can fit completely into an African environment 
without being tailored to suit that particular environment. 
To this end, it is my hope that this study, in synthesizing 
available information which might not have invited the atten¬ 
tion of both students and practitioners of administration 
in developing countries, and, by adding a new set of infor¬ 
mation obtained through a survey, has presented the case of 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. 
Chapter I presents the problem, the purpose, and 
scope of the study as well as the hypothesis on which the 
study is based. In Chapter II the historical roots of the 
present day Nigerian Federal Civil Service are presented 
and the ills of the Colonial Civil Service inherited by its 
independent successor are noted. 
How efficiently and effectively the Federal Civil 
Service has performed its functions, and the development 
achievements and problems are considered in Chapter III. 
In Chapter IV some factors inside and outside the Civil 
Service which act as facilitators and constraints respec¬ 
tively on the administrative bureaucracy are examined. 
Chapter V presents the research design and methodol¬ 
ogy as well as the profile data of the civil servants in the 
viii 
survey which was conducted on the Federal Civil Service. 
While Chapter VI presents the findings of the survey, Chap¬ 
ter VII summarizes the study and the findings of the survey 
before presenting in the conclusion a futuristic look at 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. 
Naturally, in the course of assembling the already 
available but scattered information in addition to searching 
and presenting new data in this study, so many good people 
offered me some advice and assistance. As a budding scholar 
my intellectual debt is so great that I doubt my ability in 
thanking all my benefactors. I am sincerely indebted to 
my principal dissertation advisor, Professor Shelby F. Lewis. 
To her, I owe deep gratitude and admiration not only for her 
constructive advice and assistance in the preparation of 
this study, but also for her concern and understanding 
during my academic sojourn in the Department of Political 
Science. Like a good Samaritan she cared and lighted my 
flickering courage with hope and confidence. This work could 
not have been completed at this time, but for her encourag¬ 
ing words, "You can make it." 
My sincere appreciation also goes to Professors Law¬ 
rence E. Noble, Hamid M. Taqi, and William H. Boone for 
their thoughtful consideration, sound criticism, and helpful 
advice. These lady and gentlemen are receptive and tolerant 
of other's opinion without unnecessarily compromising stand¬ 
ards. If I had to go through this process again, they are 
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the Gamiliels at whose feet I would prefer to sit. Excellent 
help was rendered to me in the computation of the survey 
data. For this, Mr. Ernest B. Attah of the Department of 
Sociology, Atlanta University, and Mr. Grover Simmons, 
Director of Atlanta University Computer Center, deserve my 
thanks. To the many Nigerian civil servants who participated 
in the survey and assisted me in every way they could, I re¬ 
main grateful. Their cooperation was crucial to the success 
of this study. The situation under which the survey was 
conducted demands that they remain anonymous in these pages. 
A number of friends deserve mention too. In Nigeria, Messrs. 
George R. Akpan, A. Enime, 0. 0. Eddie, Ene T. Ibanga, and 
E. E. Odungide treated me with kindness and concern which 
greatly reduced the inconveniences I encountered in my field 
research. My friends here in the United States deserve my 
thanks too. They are Doctors Wallace McMichael, Gloria J. 
Braxton, and Dorothy Y. Yancey. They were in constant touch 
to give their encouragement. To my parents and family who 
have suffered the inconvenience of my long absence from home, 
I am particularly grateful for their sacrifice. 
Finally, I must mention the great debt I owe to Vir¬ 
ginia Wadsley who typed the drafts and final copy of this 
work. In spite of my importunity she never showed any signs 
of being inconvenienced but worked day and night to see that 




Statement of the Problem 
In contemporary sub-saharan African countries, the 
Civil Service, which is the administrative bureaucracy, oc¬ 
cupies an important position in the entire political system. 
This pre-eminence-*- comes in part from the fact that during 
the colonial rule which was above all else a matter of ad¬ 
ministration, the Civil Service was the principle organ. 
At the point of independence, the nationalists' political 
parties served as vehicles for mobilizing the vast human 
energies of the masses towards gaining self-rule but had no 
institutional cooperation with the colonial administrative 
bureaucracy. After independence, the legislatures emerged 
as essential institutions which gave expression to the 
requisites of participation and modernity. But with the 
emergence of military rule in most of the new states, both 
the party and legislature have suffered some fluctuations 
and even decline in their importance and influence. In such 
-^See David B. Abernethy, "Bureaucracy and Economic 
Development in Africa." The African Review, Vol. I, March 
1971. Four reasons for the importance of the present day 
African Civil Service are fully discussed. They are touched 
upon briefly here. 
1 
2 
states, the Civil Service generally survives as the institu¬ 
tion providing continuity because its technical competence 
makes it indispensable. 
Besides, the increasing importance of the Civil Ser¬ 
vice is under-scored by the uses to which it is put by the 
independent African states. The Colonial Civil Service not 
only administered the law but also formulated and interpreted 
it; in a word the Civil Service ruled. Its functions enabled 
the colonial governments to successfully extract from the 
colonies the much coveted financial and material resources 
which their controlling metropolitan powers needed. The 
Colonial Civil Service was therefore not designed to guide 
far-reaching development plans but was to maintain law and 
order as well as collect funds in the territories. Giving 
depth to this view, A. L. Adu notes that the colonial admin¬ 
istrative bureaucracy was, 
...geared to the rather negative policy of preventing 
trouble and bringing the Pax Britannica to all the 
dependent territories overseas .... Economic services 
were lacking in strength and purpose.... Development 
expenditure, except in isolated cases such as the 
construction of harbours, railways and telecommuni¬ 
cations between main centres, (to facilitate exploita¬ 
tion) was virtually unknown.1 
But significant alterations^ of categories of political 
role and status in independent African states have given rise 
to a re-definition of the purposes of the polity. The new 
aims now are, broadly stated, economic and social development 
^A. L. Adu, The Civil Service in New African States 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 15 (words in 
bracket supplied). 
3 
of the states. Significantly, the Civil Service which emerges 
as one of the foremost colonial legacies in the new African 
states has been assigned the task of achieving these new 
goals. 
The Colonial Civil Service structure, roles, rules, 
and procedures were not designed to foster the goals now pur¬ 
sued by African states but that of perpetuating colonial 
values. The problem facing independent African states today 
is not that of fitting the inherited Civil Service structure, 
roles, rules, and procedures to the newly set goals, but 
that of adjusting the model to cope with the new goals and 
the ever increasing demands on the states. Kingsley has 
noted that, 
It is characteristic of the new states, born in the 
twilight sleep of an expiring colonialism, that they 
come into the world equipped with a baffling and 
contradictory assemblage of modern and traditional 
limbs. They embark upon independence with an admin¬ 
istrative structure already in being...and with a 
functioning bureaucracy, however evident its inade¬ 
quacies to the new task.l 
If the processes tov/ards social and eocnomic transformation 
in these developing countries are to be quick and reliable, 
the administrative apparatus must be reshaped and rebuilt if 
necessary to give it greater consistency with the new goals. 
Scholarly literature on administration in developing 
countries has dealt extensively with measures which could 
^J. D. Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Develop¬ 
ment with Particular Reference to Nigeria," in Joseph La- 
Pa lombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 302. 
4 
resolve some of the dilemmas in the processes identified in 
the administration of development. Prominent among these 
measures is the building of suitable institutions or the 
re-structuring of existing ones. In his analysis of the 
requirements which developing nations must meet in their 
drive for economic and social development, Donald C. Stone 
observes that the kind of organization which the new states 
need in formulating and administering development programs 
must in structure and mode of operation differ significantly 
from the traditional organization which was used in the 
colonial days for the maintenance of law and order and the 
provision of routine services. Development, as noted by 
some scholars 
involves a structural transformation of the economy, 
society, polity and culture of a developing nation 
in such a way that permits the self-generating and 
self-perpetuating use and development of the people's 
potential. 
Professor Stone further notes that "the primary ob¬ 
stacles to development are administrative rather than econom¬ 
ic, and not deficiencies in natural resources.What de¬ 
veloping countries have to do to ensure that development 
efforts and processes do not prove dysfunctional is to pro¬ 
vide for administrative capability for, 
Ijames D. Cockroft, et al., Dependence and Underdevel¬ 
opment: Latin America's Political Economy (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. xvi. 
^Donald C. Stone, "Government Machinery Necessary for 
Development," Martin Kriesberg (ed.), Public Administration 
in Developing Countries (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1965), p. 53. 
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the preparation and execution of comprehensive de¬ 
velopment efforts are...dependent upon modernizing 
of a country's administrative apparatus, through 
both the reform of existing governmental machinery 
and the addition of new elements required for the 
new task.-*- 
Writing to correct a wrong assumption implicit in 
the United States' aid to developing states in the 50s and 
60s, David Brown expresses the view that it was not the sub¬ 
stance of the aid which could provide leverage for develop¬ 
ment. The key to development is the "will and commitment" 
of aid-receiving nations in correcting the structural flaws 
in their bureaucracies as well as filling the administrative 
void, he maintained. 
Besides, Brown notes that though self-development 
has been accorded recognition as crucial for developing 
nations, what has been less well understood, and, as a re¬ 
sult, given indifferent support is the fact that a country's 
ability to undertake successfully a self-improvement effort, 
whether in technical, economic, or military areas, depends 
in large part upon the ability of its government machinery 
to sustain these programs. He finally submits that "the 
development of administrative capability should proceed 
concurrently with, if not prior to, efforts in other direc¬ 
tions," and refers to administrative capability as a "common 
denominator" to all development efforts.2 
■*-Ibid. , p. 52. 
^David S. Brown, "The Key to Self Help: Improving 
the Administrative Capabilities of the Aid-Receiving Coun¬ 
tires," Public Administration Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 
1964), pp. 67-68. 
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Hilton Power adds to these admonitions by his view 
on the direction which the orientation of the inherited 
Civil Service should take. Succinctly, he discloses that, 
...the pursuit of modernity in a state... rests in 
part upon the ability of the Civil Service to be 
dynamic rather than static, willing to make in¬ 
novations and be flexible rather than overshadowed 
either by indigenous or cosmopolitan models.^ 
The suggestions for reorientation or modification of 
the inherited administrative apparatus in the developing 
nations stem from the awareness by scholars and public 
administrators of the incapability of this bureaucracy to 
effectively promote development programs. It has been ob¬ 
served that the structure, mode of operation, and the ethos 
of the inherited Civil Service have run into difficulties 
in the pursuit of entirely different goals. The Civil Ser¬ 
vice has been found to be lacking in precision, scientific 
method, and technical competence. It is slow and cumbersome 
in taking so long to develop and which it finds difficult 
to discard.2 
Downs, however, not supporting this characteristic 
of the bureaucracy, notes that the "powerful tendency to 
continue doing today whatever they did yesterday" is a 
^Hilton M. Power, "The British Civil Service: Its 
Present Methods of Recruitment and Their Implications for 
New States," in Nimrod Raphaeli, Readings in Comparative 
Public Administration (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), 
p. 134. 
2David S. Brown, "Modifying Bureaucratic Systems in 
Developing World," Asian Forum, Vol. VI, No. 1 (January- 
March, 1974), p. 5. 
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result of established process which represents an enormous 
previous investment in time, effort and money.1 This almost 
pervasive consideration of cost in past investments is one 
of the reasons which account for resistance to change by 
administrative bureaucracies. As a result, they become non- 
innovative, rely on precedents and stick to rules and regu¬ 
lations which guide the established processes.2 This is 
made even more necessary by the law and order rather than 
development orientation of the antecedent bureaucracy. 
Therefore, in the light of the preceding observations we 
hypothesize that the failure by the Nigerian Federal Civil 
Service to have a new orientation which is different from 
the colonial mood has hampered its effectiveness in dis¬ 
charging its functions regarding the economic and social 
development of Nigeria. 
Purpose and Scope of the Study 
Using the Nigerian Federal Civil Service as the em¬ 
pirical focus, this study will examine the orientation which 
has been given to the Service since the country attained its 
independence. It will seek also to evaluate the effect of 
-'-Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, 
Brown Company, 1976), p. 195. 
y 
These defects, among others like "procrastination and 
unwillingness to take responsibility or to give decisions" 
are closely related bureaucratic defects, due in the last 
resort to the hierarchical structure of a large-scale admin¬ 
istration. See, E. Strauss, The Ruling Servants (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961), p. 45. 
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such modifications on the operations of the administrative 
bureaucracy and its efforts in managing the economic and 
social development of the nation. 
The following delimitations are made in order to per¬ 
mit the study to address itself to the main problems already 
stated. The investigation focuses on the administrative 
bureaucracy of the central government of Nigeria. Though 
there are presently twenty civil services in Nigeria (nine¬ 
teen states' and one federal civil service), it is in the 
central civil service that Nigerians supposedly, from the 
nineteen states in the federation, and from a majority of 
the ethnic groups, with a variety of backgrounds, are repre¬ 
sented. As the administrative arm of the central govern¬ 
ment, the Civil Service is constitutionally given a major 
role in the development of Nigeria. The period to be 
covered by this study is limited too from 1951 when Niger¬ 
ians were "invited" by the colonial administrators to share 
in the administrative responsibilities with a view to the 
final taking over of the affairs of the country at inde¬ 
pendence to 1976. This selected time span is well deline¬ 
ated so as to give some scope for a brief survey of how the 
British personnel operated the Colonial Civil Service in 
Nigeria. 
After independence, the sole administrative respon¬ 
sibilities lay in the hands of Nigerians under a parliamen¬ 
tary system of government. In 1966, corruption, nepotism and 
inefficiency under the politicians allegedly compelled the 
9 
military to intervene and to perpetuate its rule till the 
present time. In a brief look then, the study covers the 
following periods: before independence (1951 to September 
1960); under the Nigerian parliamentary government (October 
1960 to January 1966); under the military rule (1966 to 1976). 
The emergence of administrative bureaucracy in Nigeria 
was rooted in the need which the British colonial government 
had for the various resources and the maintenance of law 
and order to facilitate the exploitation of those resources. 
The administration was subject to over-all control by the 
metropolitan power. It was not egalitarian in disposition, 
democratic or participatory in character but authoritarian. 
It was not sensitive to the needs and aspirations of Niger¬ 
ians but to those of the colonial office in London. This 
attitude necessarily limited the bureaucracy's activities, 
confining them to basic administrative services. It also 
helped in reinforcing some of the bureaucracy's tendencies 
such as the high degree of centralization, rigid adherence 
to legal precepts and rules, the relative small internal 
differentiation, a politically neutral civil service, im¬ 
personality, technical supremacy and loyalty to some ab¬ 
straction, the "public" (British) interest. 
On the attainment of independence, the Nigerian Fed¬ 
eral Civil Service assumed changes in personnel, goals, and 
activiites. The Nigerianization policy replaced the expa¬ 
triate members of the Colonial Civil Service with Nigerians. 
10 
This is now very visible. The goals have changed from the 
maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue 
to that of development. How well the new faces have done 
in managing development, what changes have been made in the 
Civil Service to make it capable of pursuing the new goals, 
why some of the changes are ineffective, and what is the 
future of the Civil Service, are some of the questions the 
bulk of this study attempts to answer. 
Certain objectives prompt my engaging in this study. 
Firstly, it has long been my desire to conduct an academic 
investigation into the workings of institutions of govern¬ 
ment in my country. With the decline in Britain's economy 
and consequently her prestige, Britain herself has sought 
to improve1 the performance of her government's administra¬ 
tive machinery. This study is my effort at finding out what 
Nigeria has done to the institutions and administrative 
processes which she inherited from Britain some sixteen 
years ago. 
Secondly, it is my contention that a civil service 
like the one under examination, which has served three dif¬ 
ferent types of governments—the colonial, the indigenous 
political, and the indigenous military—deserves a closer 
study than has been done on administrative bureaucracies in 
developing countries under civilian political rules. Such 
studies can yield valuable information on the problems and 
^See, Fulton Report: Lord Fulton, The Civil Service 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968), Vols. 1-5. 
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vicissitudes which in some cases attend a civil service, 
thereby contributing to what is already known about adminis¬ 
tration in developing countries. 
Finally, I feel that a study of an administrative 
bureaucracy in any developing country should rely to a great 
extent on organization theory to be meaningful and relevant 
in the field of comparative administration. This is what 
this study attempts in part to accomplish taking into account 
the broader issues raised by the "task" as well as the "con¬ 
textual" environments within which the administrative 
machinery operates. 
Approach to the Study 
The study uses three approaches. Firstly, by attempt¬ 
ing to answer such questions as, "how do...differences in 
social, cultural, historical or architectural environment 
affect the way in which administration is conducted? And 
how, in turn, does administrative action affect the society 
in which it plays a part?"-*- The study employs what Riggs 
terms, ecological approach. 
Ferrel Heady, explaining Riggs' application of a bio¬ 
logical term to the study of adminsitration, says, 
When Riggs and others speak of an ecological approach 
to the comparative study of administration, they are 
recommending that a systematic effort be made to 
relate public administration to its environment, in 
much the same way that the science of ecology is con¬ 
cerned with mutual relations between organisms and 
•^-Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration 
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 2. 
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their environment....The point is that bureaucracies, 
as well as other political and administrative institu¬ 
tions can be better understood if the surrounding 
conditions, influences, and forces that shape and 
modify them are identified.1 
This approach emphasizes the interdependence and interre¬ 
latedness of institutions with a broader system lying out¬ 
side them. It enables this study to identify for critical 
examination the sets of constraints and opportunities, re¬ 
sources, and demands, which ultimately condition the terms 
under which the civil servants act. 
Secondly, the empirical data obtained through a survey 
which I conducted on the Nigerian Federal Civil Service have 
been incorporated into the study. These data reveal useful 
first-hand information on the working of the Civil Service, 
the achievements and failures, as well as prospects for im¬ 
provements. This approach has added that element of con¬ 
creteness to the study thus saving it from relying on ab¬ 
stractions . 
Lastly, available published materials on the Nigerian 
Civil Service in particular, and on Nigeria in general, have 
yielded information that has filled the gaps left by the 
data which the survey generated. These published materials 
include, papers read in a number of conferences held at the 
Institutes of Administration in Ahmadu Bello and Ife Univer¬ 
sities, journals, Nigerian newspapers, magazines, government 
documents and books written by both Nigerian and foreign 
^Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative 
Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1961) , p. 24. 
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authors. The conference papers were particularly useful be¬ 
cause they reflected opinions of Nigerians, drawn from var¬ 
ious fields of endeavor, on different aspects of the Civil 
Service and the problems of development. The study benefits 
also from recorded and non-recorded discussions which I had 
with some intellectuals, former politicians as well as 
businessmen. Besides, available literature on comparative 
and development administration have provided an excellent 
source from which the study willingly draws. 
Definitions 
The following concepts which appear in this study are 
identified and defined. 
The term "effectiveness," as used in this study pur¬ 
ports to show the degree of goal achievement of the Civil 
Service. This includes subgoals as efficiency and even its 
survival as an organization. To determine the effectiveness 
of the Federal Civil Service, the study examines its major 
goals and their attainment, task attainment and how effec¬ 
tive its policy making is. Effectiveness should be relative 
to the organization's goals and an assessment period.^ 
"Efficiency" as a concept, relates input to output. 
A process or administration is thought to be efficient when 
its output unit has a satisfactory relationship to the re¬ 
sources expended to produce that output. Such resources 
^Robert Backoff, "Operationalizing Administrative 
Reform for Improved Governmental Performance," Administra¬ 
tion and Society, Vol. 6, May 1974, p. 97. 
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may include money, time, or man-hours. For the concept to 
be a useful criterion for evaluating organizational perfor¬ 
mance, the nature of the output must be unambiguous in terms 
of goals, and measureable in terms of the resources used as 
standard of measurement. 
"Development." In the Third World Countries, develop¬ 
ment requires social and cultural change as well as economic 
growth; that is, qualitative transformations must occur con¬ 
currently with quantitative increases. Gerhard Cohn and 
Theodore Geiger maintain that there is a reciprocal relation 
between "development" and "growth," and, "neither process 
is likely to continue for long or go very far without the 
other. Hence, "development" means change (plus growth). 
^-Gerhard Cohn and Theodore Geiger, "Country Program¬ 
ing as a Guide to Development," Development of the Emerging 
Countries: An Agenda for Research (Brookings Institution, 
Washington, D~ C., 1962) , p~. 42. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CIVIL SERVICE IN COLONIAL NIGERIA 
For a study of the present day Nigerian Federal Civil 
Service to be meaningful, it is essential to understand the 
historical roots of the Colonial Civil Service in Nigeria. 
This is because the nature of the colonial administration 
has to a great extent influenced the structure, modus oper- 
andi, training, and motivations of the post independent Civil 
Service in Nigeria. In looking at the nature of colonial 
administration, account should be taken of its environment, 
the organizational character of the Civil Service, the 
values shared by the personnel and some related events in 
the development of the administrative machinery. The period 
of colonial administration in Nigeria can be sub-divided 
into brief periods each indicating the social, political, 
or economic character of the time. The first of such was a 
period devoted in large part to the widening of the imperial 
outpost through "pacification" or military expeditions, 1886 
up to 1910. Between 1910 and 1925, attention was devoted to 
the establishment of administrative machinery for the country. 
With the setting tup of the Civil Service, economic develop¬ 
ment which was to follow was seriously disrupted by the 
15 
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depression of the thirties and World War II. The period 
between 1946 and 1950 was marked by the crescendo of awakened 
nationalism, the realization of the forces of democratic 
principles and the desire of Nigerians to be free to order 
their lives according to their likings. The next decade 
was marked by increased participation by Nigerians in the 
colonial administration and finally there was a period of 
transitional administration which culminated in the indepen¬ 
dence of the country in 1960. 
In order to treat concisely events touching mainly 
on the development of the Civil Service during the entire 
period, it will be useful to group the first three sub¬ 
periods under one long period, 1866-1945. This is because 
the paper intends to concentrate on the development of the 
Civil Service without treating in detail the military as¬ 
pect of the administration, the economic depression of the 
thirties, and World War II. However, where necessary, the 
effects which the characteristics of each sub-period had on 
the development of the Civil Service will be pointed out. 
The Development of the Colonial Nigerian Civil Service 
1886-1945 
Nigeria, as it is known today, was not a single terri¬ 
tory and was not administered as such in the early years of 
British control. Lagos was ceded to Britain in 1861, and 
in 1886 was separated from Gold Coast (Ghana) colony to be¬ 
come the colony of Lagos and was administered by the Colonial 
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Office in London. It had its own civil service. Besides, 
there was the Southern Protectorate of Nigeria which was 
controlled by the Colonial Office. This Protectorate had 
the following departments established to provide its own 
civil service functions: the departments for Public Works, 
Military, Forestry, Botanical, Judiciary, Medical and Sani¬ 
tary, Prisons, Treasury, Customs, Post Office, Marine, and 
Printing.-1- However, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria as 
a separate entity was short-lived. 
In 1906, the Protectorate was joined with the Colony 
of Lagos to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria. The two civil services were merged and the head¬ 
quarters of the departments were sited in a secretariat in 
Lagos. To facilitate administrative functions, the new 
territory was split into provinces under local headquarters 
which were manned by Provincial Commissioners who were an¬ 
swerable to the Colonial Governor in Lagos. These Provincial 
Commissioners were each assisted by a Divisional Secretary, 
a staff of District Commissioners and Assistant District 
Commissioners besides a representative of each department 
who was accountable to the Provincial Commissioner.^ Thus 
at this early stage there was in the southern part of Nigeria 
an official bureaucracy whose membership was based on liter¬ 
acy in English and the Western norms and culture. 
^-Colonial Reports, Southern Nigeria, 1899-1900 (Micro¬ 
filmed) , p. 27. 
^Colonial Reports, Annual, Southern Nigeria, 1898-1939. 
Report No. 554, (1906), (Microfilmed), pp. 89-90. 
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To the North of the Colony and Protectorate of South¬ 
ern Nigeria lay another vast territory which was administered 
by a British chartered company, the Royal Niger Company, 
whose interest was purely commercial. On January 1, 1900, 
the British government took over the administration of that 
part of Nigeria from the Royal Niger Company. One of the 
reasons for this action was the British government's desire 
to forestall the French competition which was active in the 
Niger area. The area so taken over was declared the Northern 
Nigerian Protectorate and Frederick Lugard was appointed its 
first High Commissioner. A machinery of government was es¬ 
tablished and a civil service came into being. 
It was not easy initially for the new administration 
to get enough staff for the work at hand. In his first re¬ 
port since declaring the area the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria, Frederick Lugard stated, 
...the inadeguate staff has hampered my efforts 
and thrown upon me, personally, so much detailed 
work that I have been unable to accomplish much 
in other directions as I otherwise might have 
done. 1 
It was difficult for Lugard to get an adequate supply of 
well qualified indigenous clerks. This was because Northern 
Nigeria, unlike the Southern Protectorate and Lagos Colony, 
had experienced little contact with the Christian missionaries 
who were the main agents of Western culture in the British 
-^-Colonial Reports, Annual, Northern Nigeria 1900-1901, 
(J^icro filmed) , p. TÔT! 
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colonies. To Lugard, it was, however, a pleasant relief 
because there were no pressures in the North as there were 
in the South for employment by the educated class. Lugard 
was to encounter these pressures when he became the Governor 
General of Nigeria in 1914. 
Meanwhile, Lugard through military conquests contin¬ 
ued to subjugate the recalcitrant emirates in the outlying 
areas of the North thereby extending the areas of the North¬ 
ern Protectorate. However, the Northern Protectorate re¬ 
mained an antithesis of the colony and Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria. Lugard and his fellow administrators saw 
fit to keep out the influence of Western culture in the 
Northern Protectorate and the result was that after so many 
years of British rule that area remained relatively back¬ 
ward. Characterizing the administration and developments in 
both Protectorates of the time, I. F. Nicolson observes 
that, 
...in Southern Nigeria as in Lagos, the administra¬ 
tive action taken was neither reluctant, nor hap¬ 
hazard, but remarkably rapid, professional and 
systematic, and justified by immediate success, both 
in financial terms and in terms of solid, measurable 
improvement in the condition and prosperity of the 
people....It was, for the South, something of a 
golden age as well as one of heroism where neces¬ 
sary, while for Northern Nigeria it was an age of 
heroism certainly, but an age of steel, not of gold, 
dominated by a machinery of government on the mili¬ 
tary rather than the civil pattern, turning its 
back on modernization.^ 
ll. F. Nicolson, "The Machinery of the Federal and 
Regional Governments," in Nigerian Government and Politics, 
John P. Mackintosh (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1966) , p. 146. 
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On January 1, 1914, the two administrations (Northern 
and Southern Protectorates) "...ceased to exist and were re¬ 
placed by a single Government of Nigeria, under a Governor- 
General, constituted under new Letters Patent and Orders-in- 
Council with a new seal and flag."l This was the amalgama¬ 
tion of Nigeria which was essential for two reasons. First, 
it was illogical to have a fiscal boundary between two con¬ 
tiguous territories owned by the same imperial power. Second, 
the administration of the Northern Protectorate was very 
much dependent on subventions from the Southern Protectorate 
and the British Treasury. Heaving a sigh of relief and 
humorously pronouncing his administrative best wishes on the 
unification of the two contiguous territories, the then 
Secretary of State is reported to have said in a speech at 
a colonial dinner in 1913 before the amalgamation, 
We have released Northern Nigeria from the leading 
strings of the Treasury. The promising and well- 
conducted youth is now on an allowance, "on his own" 
and is about to effect an alliance with a Southern 
lady of means. I have issued the special license 
and Sir Frederick Lugard will perform the ceremony. 
May the union be fruitful and the couple constant: 
The Nigerias are not designed to be a great "Trust" 
but a great Federation.2 
These wishes were in accordance with the British colonial 
policy that the colonies should generate the funds for their 
^Frederick Lugard, Colonial Reports, Annual, Nigeria 
1914, (Microfilmed), p. 14. 
^Annual Report Southern Nigeria 1913, p. 13. Cited 
in G. O. Olusanya, The Evolution of the Nigerian Civil Ser¬ 
vice 1861-1960. Humanities Monograph Series No. 2 (Lagos: 
Lagos University Library Press, 1975), p. 15. 
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administration and development. 
In spite of the amalgamation in 1914, and the cen¬ 
tralization of colonial Nigerian administration in Lagos as 
the headquarters, Lugard divided Nigeria into two regions, 
north and south, each containing a number of provinces. A 
lieutenant governor was in charge of each region and re¬ 
ported to Sir Frederick Lugard, the Governor. But in matters 
of policies, the administrations in the two regions pro¬ 
ceeded on the pattern followed prior to the unification. 
Indirect rule^- continued unperturbed in the north, while in 
the south, policies which favored changes in the traditional 
society were more acceptable and pursued. 
As a step towards the complete unification of the 
Nigerias, in 1913, the Customs, Marine and Railway Depart¬ 
ments of the Northern Protectorate were each amalgamated 
with corresponding departments of the Southern Protectorate 
and styled "combined" departments. Careful inquiries were 
made into spheres of administration and departmental organi¬ 
zation and changes were at once introduced in many. After 
^The Fulani Empire in Northern Nigeria offered favor¬ 
able conditions for the development of colonial administration 
by indirect rule. It was a centralized state with a hier¬ 
archical structure of emirate administration. Lugard and 
his Residents had only to advise the Emirs on what they wanted 
done. The Emirs then sent the instructions down the line and 
the process worked. The South, especially the Eastern flank 
of the country comprising egalitarian societies with no cen¬ 
tralized authorities like in the North proved an unfertile 
area for Indirect Rule. In the Western part of the country 
the colonial administrators had sometimes to intervene to 
bring some rebellious subordinate chiefs under the obas' 
(the Yoruba paramount chiefs) authority. 
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1914, and in spite of the division of Nigeria into the North- 
South administrative units, a coordinating central service 
was set up to provide the administrative staff essential for 
the governance of the whole country. This was the "secre¬ 
tariat" which was in Lagos. In it were located the adminis¬ 
trative heads of the technical departments and central head¬ 
quarters of the administrative field service. The Chief 
Secretary was at the head of the secretariat administration 
while the Governor, to whom he was answerable, was the offi¬ 
cial head of the colonial service. This was the nucleus of 
what, after a period of almost half a century, finally 
emerged as the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. However, it 
is worth noting that the continued administration of the 
North and South under separate principles after the amalga¬ 
mation did more evil than good. For as pointed out by Pro¬ 
fessor Olusanya, the sharp cultural difference enforced by 
the distinct and independent administrative development was 
in part responsible for the disagreement between the northern 
and southern officials as to the political character of Ni¬ 
geria in the development and contents of the Richards con¬ 
stitution. It was also responsible for the advocacy of dis¬ 
unity in which the northern officials engaged and which im¬ 
paired the growth of feeling of unity in Nigeria.^ 
After the administrative edifice had been set up, 
■'■Olusanya, Op. Cit. , p. 18. See also James S. Coleman, 
Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1963), pp. 46-47. 
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modest efforts were made towards economic development. Un- 
fortuantely, these attempts were severely hampered by the 
depression of the thirties and no sooner had the efforts 
been revived after the recovery than the disruption by the 
Second World War. These set-backs equally affected any sig¬ 
nificant development in the Civil Service limiting it to 
normal administrative operations. But in 1939, an impor¬ 
tant administrative action was taken by the division of the 
southern provinces into Eastern and Western groups using the 
River Niger as a natural line of demarcation. This division 
was to have major effects on the Federal Civil Service and 
the politics of Nigeria in the future years. 
The Organizational Character of the Colonial Civil Service 
One important factor which greatly influenced the 
development of the Nigerian Civil Service, especially in 
the post World War II years, was the organizational character 
of the colonial administration. Since the last decade of the 
19th century, racial discrimination was commonly practiced 
against natives in British colonial dependencies. The de¬ 
gree to which this social prejudice was carried out depended 
to a large extent on the leadership of the administration in 
the various dependencies. Philip Selznick has noted that "the 
task of leadership is not only to make a policy but to build 
it into the organization's social structure....This means 
shaping the 'character' of the organization, sensitizing it 
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to ways of thinking and responding...."^- Consequently, when 
personnel identify with such organization sharing perspec¬ 
tives on the aims and methods on which the organization oper¬ 
ates an "organizational character" is developed. 
In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that dis¬ 
crimination and racial segregation were institutionalized 
in British colonial administration. For example, Casely 
Hayford describing the creation of separate cemeteries for 
the whites and blacks in Gold Coast observes that: "A path, 
thirty-six ^eet wide, was marked between the European and 
the native cemeteries and the former beautifully fenced in 
with money contributed by the black folk."2 
In Nigeria, racial discrimination and policy of segre¬ 
gation were enforced in the colonial administration through 
the leadership and personality of Frederick Lugard. Lugard 
had an unmitigated and unconcealed dislike for the educated 
Nigerians. To him their "loud and arrogant conceit" was dis¬ 
tasteful and their lack of "natural dignity and courtesy" 
antagonizing. Attempts by the educated southern Nigerians 
who knew their rights and were ready to assert them were 
branded as "seditious and rotten to the core." Accordingly, 
it was Lugard's policy supported by his subordinates that 
educated Nigerians should be barred from occupying positions 
^-Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 63. 
2J. Casely Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound (Reprint) (London 
Frank Cass & Col, Ltd., 1969), p. 84. 
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of equality with the Europeans in the Civil Service no matter 
what their qualifications. Two reasons could be adduced for 
this policy. First, the colonial administrators felt the 
educated class in Nigeria was the brain behind political 
agitation and their "aspiration to greater participation in 
government (had) the ultimate aim of displacing the white 
administration."1 Second, color discrimination "...was the 
product not only of preconceptions regarding the inferiority, 
reinforced by a magnification of faults of educated Africans, 
but also of a firm conviction that peaceful colonial adminis¬ 
tration and the perpetuation of imperial rule were directly 
dependent on the doctrine of white superiority."2 
Segregation was not only openly asserted and offi¬ 
cially practiced in the Civil Service, hospitals and dwelling 
areas, but also in recreational facilities and places of 
worship. Today in Nigeria one can still see buildings which 
in those infamous days housed the European clubs and churches. 
Separateness with facilities would not have aroused so much 
resentment in Nigerians but it was the "qualitative differ¬ 
ences in the facilities provided for the two races which 
aroused the greatest hostility.In the north, Lugard saw 
to it that the alien natives, mainly southerners, lived in 
separate areas "sabongari" from the native population. In 
^Janies Coleman, Op. Cit♦ , p. 150. 
2Ibid., p. 152. 
2Ibid., p. 151. 
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his amalgamation report on "Restriction on Native Residents 
in a Township," he stated, 
The native quarters of a township, especially in the 
North, is reserved as far as possible for natives 
alien to the local population, whose business or em¬ 
ployment is closely associated with Europeans. It 
is not desired that local natives, even though em¬ 
ployed as carriers or labourers by Europeans, should 
be allowed to withdraw from the control of their own 
Native Administration and Native Courts by residing 
in a township.1 
Lugard's main idea was that of keeping the native Northerners 
from the "corrupting influence of the Southerners." Even 
today, after so many years, one can notice that the stranger 
elements in the North still live in areas not occupied by 
natives. This lack of association by the two groups also 
contributed to the differences in attitude and feelings of 
unity in the country as evidenced before and after independ¬ 
ence. 
Besides, the social effects generated by the policy 
of segregation, discrimination against educated Nigerians 
in the Civil Service produced in them poor attitudes towards 
government service. These attitudes have been carried over 
to the present day Civil Service and other government work 
in Nigeria. It was a status symbol to work in the government 
and the desire of many parents was to see their children em¬ 
ployed at the secretariat. Sir Anton Bertram, writing on 
the colonial service in the thirties, noted that, 
■J-See, A. H. M. Kirk-Green, Lugard and the Amalgamation 
of Nigeria (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 163. 
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The prestige that attaches to the government service 
in bureaucratically governed countries is immense. 
No ordinary resident of Great Britain can gain any 
conception of it. It is the ambition of every edu¬ 
cated young man, not possessed of other special quali¬ 
fications, to enter the government clerical service, 
if not by one of the permanent posts, then at least 
by one of the numerous incidental posts that are from 
time to time presenting themselves.1 
Those who were lucky to be employed were consigned to the 
lower grades in the service and had no opportunities of 
serving in the higher division. Consequently, they did not 
feel a sense of belonging and could not give their best to 
the service. Government service was styled "white man's 
work" and the saying, "It is not my father's work," which 
was in vogue, adequately summarized the feelings of Nigerian 
government employees. 
Robert Heussler^ has noted that the colonial adminis¬ 
tration was essentially authoritarian while its main aim was 
service. The spirit of the colonial administrators was that 
of noblesse oblige and the attitude underlying their service 
was that of condescending beneficence. As English gentlemen, 
most of whom had graduated from Oxford and Cambridge, they 
were not inclined to proselytize or even care what others 
thought or did. This attitude was soon to change. The post 
World War II period provided the compelling forces and the 
environment. 
1-Sir Anton Bertram, The Colonial Service (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1930), p. 5Ch 
Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of 
the British Colonial Service (Syracuse, New York : Syracuse 
University Press, 1963) , p"! 2 02. 
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The Civil Service in Immediate Post World War II Years, 
1945-1950 
The period following the end of World War II in the 
annals of colonial administration in Nigeria formed a water¬ 
shed between the era of administocracy and one of urgent 
social and political development. The Civil Service was 
immensely impoverished as a result of the War and besides 
was in need of urgent reforms and improvement. In the social 
and political life of the country, this period brought 
changes which the colonial administration could no longer 
keep back. 
The first direct effect of World War II on Nigerians 
was the awakening of the spirit of nationalism. For once, 
the misty prestige of the white man on which the Lugardian 
and subsequent administrations were anchored was seriously 
questioned and attacked. Having witnessed the sufferings 
and frailties of the white man in the fratricidal war, Ni¬ 
gerians came to realize that the white man with all his 
claims to superiority and civilization was not omnipotent or 
sacrosanct. That the brutality and folly of which the "na¬ 
tive races" were accused were attributes equally applicable 
to the "civilized race." But the contrast between the 
atrocities of the Nazis and the strength of the democratic 
nations spurred Nigerians on to desire that strength in 
democracy which could enable them to shake off the yoke of 
racial domination they were bearing.1 
■^Mackintosh, Op. Cit. , p. 161. 
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On a more positive note, Nigerians who fought side 
by side with the British in the Second World War, most of 
them illiterates, realized that there were Europeans who 
were different from the privileged colonial administrators, 
and who, like themselves, were private soldiers, boot blacks, 
and servants. Nigerian soldiers fought alongside with white 
soldiers of their rank. In the international scene, Nigeria 
became prominent as a link to allied defenses, supplier of 
goods needed during the war and provider of troops for some 
of the campaigns. Little wonder then that Meyer Fortes 
testified that "it may be that the war will prove to have 
been the outstanding instrument of social progress in West 
Africa for fifty years.Besides, the disaffection of Ni¬ 
gerians was strengthened by reports on the behavior and 
character of ordinary white men brought home by Nigerian 
students who then returned home from Europe and America. 
They were disillusioned, cynical and critical of all white 
pretensions. This attitude and developments contributed to 
the deflation and rapid collapse of the doctrine of white 
supremacy.2 
At this time the Colonial Civil Service was exper¬ 
iencing an acute shortage of staff recruited from Britain. 
Many British officials in the Colonial Service had been 
^•Meyer Fortes, "The Impact of the War on British West 
Africa," International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1945, 
pp. 2 06-19"! Cited in Michael Crowther, The Story of Nigeria 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 271. 
2 
James S. Coleman, Op. Cit., p. 107. 
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called up for service in different war theatres. The vacan¬ 
cies created by such exodus could not be filled after the 
war with new recruits from Britain because Britain needed 
all the manpower she could muster for post war reconstruc¬ 
tion. This difficulty was aggravated by the discontent 
among the European members of the Civil Service regarding 
poor financial rewards and other matters. As a result of 
representations made by the Governors of the West African 
British Colonies to the Secretary of State on the discon¬ 
tents, a commission headed by the Chief Justice of Gold 
Coast (Ghana) was set up. This was the Harragin Salaries 
Commission, 1945, named after the Chief Justice, Sir Walter 
Harragin. 
In effect, the Commission recommended structural 
changes which embraced grading, salaries, and other condi¬ 
tions of service in the four West African Colonial Civil 
Services. The classification of posts in the Civil Service 
as "European posts" for whites, and "African posts" for the 
blacks, was replaced by new categories of "Senior Service" 
and "Junior Service." Expatriate holders of positions in 
the Civil Service were entitled to "expatriation pay." The 
"Senior Service" personnel, mainly expatriates, were entitled 
to car allowances, first class travel, European style quarters 
with rent fixed at ten percent of their salaries. But for 
the African, the rewards from the Commission were shorter 
vacations, bicycles, and motorcycle allowances. Voluntary 
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retirement for all in the service was fixed at age forty- 
five while the pensionable salary was increased by ten per¬ 
cent. ^ 
For all its worth, nothing in the Harragin Commission's 
Report incensed Nigerians as the "expatriation pay" estab¬ 
lished solely for Europeans who were in the Colonial Service. 
Even with other privileges attached to the "Senior Service" 
posts which were dominated completely by Europeans, it was 
no less a bold attempt to perpetuate discrimination against 
Nigerians whose country produced the money of which they 
were deprived. The "expatriation pay" therefore provided 
a part of the political fuel which lit the fires of open re¬ 
sentment towards the colonial bureaucracy. 
Nigerians at this time were pressing for participa¬ 
tion in the government which ruled them but their demands 
met with impervious attitudes from the colonial administra¬ 
tion. The interwar years were marked by an almost total 
lack of dialogue between the colonial administration and the 
increasing educated Nigerians. To most of the British offi¬ 
cials there could be no such dialogue. Some of them, espec¬ 
ially those who were serving in the provincial administration, 
never concealed their contempt for the educated Nigerians.^ 
The reactions of the Nigerian press and the rising generation 
■*■1. F. Nicolson, Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 249. 
^Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1966), p. 267. 
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of nationalists were equally undisguised in exposing the 
evils and injustices perpetuated by the colonial administra¬ 
tion. 
Nevertheless, conscience was at work abroad and atti¬ 
tudes towards colonial problems were changing fast. Even in 
Britain concerns about some shortcomings of the colonial 
administration were voiced out. In 1946, the then colonial 
Governor-General, Sir Arthur Richards, proposed a new con¬ 
stitution for Nigeria which came into effect in January 1947. 
It was a solo effort at changing a system of government which 
he strongly felt was "unsuitable for expansion on the Niger¬ 
ian basis."1 But the peremptory manner in which the consti¬ 
tution was introduced brought the whole document and exercise 
under fierce fire of criticism. The constitution was singu¬ 
lar in its devolution of power to the regions through the 
creation of Regional Assemblies.^ sir Arthur Richards 
■'■Ralu Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 66. 
Regional Assemblies were set up in each regional capi¬ 
tal—in Kaduna for the Northern Region, in Ibadan for the 
Western Region, and in Enugu for the Eastern Region. To these 
Regional Assemblies were sent delegates from the native au¬ 
thorities. Each regional assembly in turn sent a delegation 
from its members to the Central Legislative Council. The 
Assemblies could debate regional matters and advise the 
Lieutenant Governor. They were barred from exercising con¬ 
trol over administration. The setting up of regional as¬ 
semblies was a substitute measure for the enlargement of 
the Legislative Council in Lagos to include Northern repre¬ 
sentation—a measure which was thoughtwould have worked to 
the disadvantage of most Northerners who had poor command 
of English. By using the Native Authorities as electoral 
units to higher councils the problem if illiteracy believed 
by officials to be a barrier to the "ballot box" system was 
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genuinely felt that such a measure would ensure maximum par¬ 
ticipation of all sections of the country in the Central 
Legislature but undoubtedly he was setting a stage for re¬ 
gionalism, ethnic rivalry and sectional politics which 
dominated Nigerian pre and post independent scenes. Not 
much time was given to trying the new constitutional pro¬ 
visions as was devoted to pouring vituperations on its var¬ 
ious inadequacies as well as on the already unpopular colon¬ 
ial rule. However, under the constitution, Northern and 
Southern Niaeria were integrated in a common Legislative 
Council for legislative purpose, a development plan to cover 
a ten year period was introduced but was frustrated by lack 
of qualified personnel because the Nigerian administrative 
service had been weakened during the war. A Department of 
Commerce and Industry was also set up.^ 
After a year and a few months the Richards constitu¬ 
tion, originally intended to last for nine years within 
which a review was to be made every three years, had earned 
its keep. With the appointment and arrival in Nigeria of 
a new Governor-General in 1948, a man more open to Nigerian 
opinion, the making of a new constitution was set in prog¬ 
ress. Two years were used for consultations and discussions 
solved. The Native Administration system, thus being demo¬ 
cratized was an accommodating media through which the edu¬ 
cated elements could get access to higher councils. See, 
John M. Osthemeir, Nigerian Politics (New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 23. See also, Kalue Ezera, 
Op Cit. 
^Michael Crowther, Op. Cit. , p. 276. 
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before the constitution was promulgated. During the period, 
agitation by nationalists^ for the employment of educated 
Nigerians in the administrative cadre of the service to en¬ 
sure meaningful participation in the government which was 
ruling them continued unabated. It therefore became obvious 
"that the system Lugard devised to keep the educated elite 
of the South away from power was the very thing which tried 
their patience too far and made them work hard for it."^ 
Consequently to make for the training and recruit¬ 
ment of Nigerians into the Senior Civil Service the new 
Governor-General appointed a special commission^ in May 
1948 to study the situation and make recommendations. In 
its report, the Commission agreed that non-Nigerians should 
not be recruited for any government post except where no 
Nigerian was available. 
a) That Public Service Board with non-official major¬ 
ities should be appointed to select candidates for 
senior service posts and for scholarship and train¬ 
ing schemes, 
b) That during the next three years 385 scholarships 
and training awards should be made bringing a total 
estimated cost of scholarship schemes during the 
period to £225,500, and 
1See, for example, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's speech in the 
course of the Debate on Appropriation Bill in the Legislative 
Council at Kaduna March 10, 1948 in A Selection from the 
Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nnamdi Azikiwe (Cambridge: Cam¬ 
bridge University Press, 1961), pp. 149-151. 
2john P. Mackintosh, Op. Cit., p. 155. 
Commission on the Recruitment and Training of Niger¬ 
ians for Services in the Government of Nigeria, Lagos, 1948. 
This commission was chaired by the new Chief Secretary, Mr. 
Hugh M. Foot, after whom the commission is sometimes referred. 
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c) That a special additional allocation of thirty 
scholarships should be made for women. 
These recommendations constituted a turning point in 
the "expatriatization," to borrow Professor Cole's2 word, 
and in the development and organization of the Colonial 
Nigerian Civil Service. It signalled the Nigerianization 
of the service—a process which evoked policies of sub¬ 
localization like "Northernization" and "Southernization." 
Table 1 shows the numerical strength of Nigerians in the 
"Senior Service" of some departments of the Civil Service 
in 1948. 
In 1948 a senior expatriate official was appointed 
the Civil Service Commissioner in the Secretariat. He was 
to deal with the personnel management functions of the Civil 
Service in the process of expansion and transformation. In 
this post he reported directly to the Chief Secretary, the 
Financial Secretary, and the Governor. To the nationalists, 
his appointment and function was seen as an attempt to re¬ 
tract the devolution of powers to regions which the Richards 
constitution had established. Any attempt at strict cen¬ 
tralization by the secretariat was vehemently opposed. 
^Some proposals put forth by the Foot Commission cited 
in Kalu Ezera, Op, Cit., pp. 86-87. It is significant that 
another author adds the fact that "special consideration 
should be given to applicants for scholarships and training 
courses from Northern Provinces." This obviously recognized 
the bad effect of Lugard's policy of shielding the Northern 
Provinces from the influence of Western education. See, I. 
F. Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 256. 
2Taylor Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition: Independent 
Nigeria," Public Administration, Vol. 38, Winter 1960, p. 331. 
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TABLE 1 
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF NIGERIANS AND EXPATRIATES IN 















Medical 622 75 303 244 
Administration 582 9 425* 148 
Agriculture 131 3 65* 63 
Education 384 12 84* 288 
Total figure for the entire Civil Service 3786 
Total positions held by Nigerians 245 
Total vacancies 1245 
From the above figures it could be estiamted that Europeans 
held 1590* positions. 
*These figures are each obtained from adding the totals for 
Nigerians in each department to those for vacancies in each 
department and subtracting the sum from the total figure for 
the Department or Establishment. 
SOURCE: The table is constructed with the data given in 
John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evan¬ 
ston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 168. 
However, the agency managed to survive an arduous six years 
of complaints, criticisms, and protests. To its credit stood 
the fostering of the training of Nigerians in universities 
and other institutions as recommended by the Foot Commission 
and the effective regionalization of the long standing unitary 
Civil Service in 1954. 
The Period of Transitional Administration 1951-1959 
When the MacPherson Constitution came into being it 
introduced the ministerial rule in 1951 at the center (Lagos) 
and in the regions. Structurally, the Civil Service was 
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still unitary and comprised the secretariat and the depart¬ 
ments. There were, therefore, no ministries to receive the 
Ministers who with other Nigerian politicians had expected 
a ministerial government of which the British pattern was 
a prototype. But it was the British colonial design to give 
the new Nigerian Ministers a certain measure of participation 
in running the government but no authority over any of the 
departments. The old practice of white supremacy was not 
completely dead and no white official was prepared to accept 
the intrusion of a Nigerian Minister into affairs of his 
department. 
The constitution permitted each Minister to initiate 
discussion on policy relating to matters under his portfolio 
but it was the Council of Ministers which ultimately could 
make policies. Nevertheless, it was the joint responsibil¬ 
ity of each Minister and the British head of the department 
to ensure that policies were carried out effectively.-^- The 
problem which arose out of this arrangement was that the 
Ministers, who had replaced the British professional heads 
of departments in the Legislature but were not in full con¬ 
trol of the departments under their portfolio, could not give 
full accounts of matters pertaining to those departments in 
the Legislature. The Ministers, therefore, were forced to 
ignore the Legal Department's advice of being "charged with 
■^This portion draws heavily from Kalu Ezera, Op. Cit. , 
p. 144. 
38 
responsibility for matters but not departments" and pro¬ 
ceeded by convention to set up separate ministries under 
themselves.1 Some senior administrative officers serving 
in the field were brought in to staff the newly created 
ministries. They were appointed permanent secretaries and 
assistant secretaries. So developed in the Nigerian Civil 
Service headquarters a structural pattern composed of two 
parallel units--the departments and the corresponding minis¬ 
tries—physically separated but "keeping parallel systems of 
files on the same subject."2 it is worth noting that this 
arrangement though later modified by the integration of de¬ 
partments into ministries introduced conflict into the re¬ 
lationship between the professionals and the administrators. 
At this time under the Macpherson Constitution, bit¬ 
ter rivalry between political parties which drew their sup¬ 
port and membership from each of the regions was in the 
ascendancy. The preclusion of Ministers from effective 
control of the departments under their portfolio was equally 
drawing a lot of resentment and agitation for complete Niger- 
ianization of the top echelons of the administrative machin¬ 
ery. This resulted in the appointment of the Phillipson- 
Adebo Commission which was to review the progress made towards 
Nigerianization since 1948, the year of the Foot Commission. 
^Eme 0. Awa, "The Development of Administrative Ma¬ 
chinery in a New State: The Case of Nigeria," International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 30, 1964, p. 167. 
2Ibid. 
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The Phillipson-Adebo Commission produced the "most penetrat¬ 
ing and lucid analysis on record of the problems of Nigerian- 
ization." However the report was published late in 1954 when 
other political developments had overshadowed it. The re¬ 
port showed that progress had been made in getting Nigerians 
into the senior service. Arithmetically the increase was 
from 246 in 1948 to 685 in 1952—a startling increase of 
180 percent. 
By 1953 inter-regional political tensions had reached 
unmanageable proportions. The Northern regions' opposition 
to the Western region's Motion for Nigeria's self-government 
in 1956 which was debated in the Central Legislature, the 
Kano riots of May 1953 and the resignation of the Action 
Group member from the Central Council of Ministers had ren¬ 
dered the Macpherson Constitution unworkable. These were 
signals to the British Government that no useful purpose 
could be served through foisting a "centripetal system of 
government on a centrifugal social order. 
In 1954, the government of Nigeria was federalized. 
The three then existing regions and the federal government 
shared powers under the Lyttleton Constitution. The unitary 
civil service which developed haphazardly since 1914 was re¬ 
gionalized. The politicians' pet desire of controlling the 
■^Robert S. Jordan, Government and Power in West Africa 
(New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1969), p. 160. 
Jordan explains that the consequences of such administrative 
actions as witnessed in colonial regime was the dependence 
upon military strength for the maintenance of law and order. 
Such actions in most situations precipitated riots and breaches 
of law as shown by events leading to the Kano riots of 1953. 
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regional machinery of government was satisfied. But for the 
Federal Civil Service, the effects of regionalization were a 
mixture of a little good with some disadvantages. Besides 
ending the over-strained and cumbersome system of central¬ 
ized control by the Civil Service Commission in Lagos, 
...the "regionalization" of government in 1954 had the 
effect of releasing, under party government in each re¬ 
gion, a pent-up reserve of energy, while at the centre, 
under an uneasy dyarchy of officials and Ministers from 
rival parties, there was instead an increase, in the 
complexity of government, taking place at the same time 
as a drying up of the normal, regional sources of ad¬ 
ministrative staff and a loss to the new regional ser¬ 
vices of East and West, of some of the most competent 
Nigerians.1 
Another development which affected the Federal Civil 
Service as well as the regional civil services seemed to 
have cushioned the impact of the regionalization on the 
services. Before 1954 the structure of the administrative 
service in Nigeria had a typical pattern where nearly all 
expatriates held positions in the "senior civil service" 
while most Africans like underlings found themselves in the 
"junior" service. Very few (expatriates or Africans) ever 
held middle management positions. The appointment of the 
Gorsuch Commission in 1954 which was asked to report to 
the federal as well as to the regional governments on the 
"structure and remuneration" of the new civil services was 
Cicolson, Op. Cit. , p. 2R3. 
Commission on the Public Services of the Governments 
of the Federation of Nigeria 1954-55. The Chairman was L. 
H. Gorsuch after whom the Commission and Report are sometimes 
referred. 
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the first attempt at giving the federal as well as the re- 
qional administrative bureaucracies "indigenous" structures. 
The Commission argued that, 
the time has come to look at both questions pri¬ 
marily in terms of a public service which is des¬ 
tined to be indigenous in composition at all levels. 
If any part of the structure has been shaped in the 
past by the influence of predominantly overseas re¬ 
cruitment or staffing, it cannot be taken for granted 
that that part should remain unchanged in the fabric 
of an indigenous service. Structure and remunera¬ 
tion alike should now be measured by the yardstick 
of Nigerian conditions and requirements, and be 
designed to attract the best of the men and women 
that Nigeria produces.^ 
An early report2 by a colonial Office Training Mis¬ 
sion in the same year, 1954, had made the following observa¬ 
tion on the structure of the Federal Civil Service. 
The normal organization is pyramidal in structure, 
the pyramid of posts which make up the structure 
is also a pyramid of gradually increasing duties 
and responsibilities....We feel that in Nigeria 
the pattern of organization militates against this. 
Too often, instead of being pyramidical it is like 
an hour-glass, broad at the bottom, narrow in the 
middle and broad at the top.^ 
The thrust of Gorsuch Commission's work was therefore 
to provide a structure of the service that would give middle 
management posts (executive grade) to the civil services. 
The "senior" and "junior" divisions provided for by the Foot 
Report were seen to have encouraged scholarship aspirants in 
llbid., par. 73, p. 35. 
^Report of the West Africa Survey Mission on the Train¬ 
ing of Civil Servants in Nigeria (Central Government). By 
Lt.-Col. J. Imrie, M.B.E. and Mr. D. G. Lee, September, 1954. 
3Ibid., p. 7. 
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the "junior" service (clerical and sub-clerical) to regard 
service in those grades as nothing more than a temporary 
expedient while the energies were concentrated on something 
higher.1 The absence of the executive grade therefore forced 
the administrative and professional officers "to devote far 
more of their time than should be necessary to routine exe¬ 
cutive work. 
The whole service was reclassified into five grades 
for both the administrative and professional groups as shown 












Fig. 1. Pyramidal structure of administrative and pro¬ 
fessional grades in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service as 
recommended by the Gorsuch Commission of 1954-55. 
SOURCE : Report of the Commission on the Public Services 
of the Governments of the Federation of Nigeria 1954-1955, 
p. 37. 
By offering this re-classification, the Gorsuch team 
had envisaged the obliteration of the concepts of "senior" 
status and "junior" status which conjured the image of two 
grades in the service. But with Nigerians themselves inher¬ 
iting the perquisites—status, quarters, motor cars and other 
^Gorsuch Report, Op. Cit., p. 37. 
^Ibid. 
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symbols assigned to the departing Europeans who occupied 
mainly the "senior" grades--the two concepts, and the images 
associated with them, remain till today ghosts incapable of 
beincr exorcised in the Federal as well as the regional (now 
state) civil services. 
Whatever might have been the merits of the Gorsuch 
Commission's recommendations regarding what the structure of 
the Federal Civil Service should be, one brief observation 
is in order. The structure which was recommended by the Com¬ 
mission, accepted by the governments, and finally used in 
the Civil Service was foreign and did not help in furthering 
the indigenous guality of the new Civil Service. L. H. 
Gorsuch, himself a British man, might have been partially 
influenced in his recommendation of the structural pattern 
for the new Civil Service by what at that time was operating 
in the British Civil Service.^ However, he did not even 
fully recommend the pattern used then in Britain. By 1954- 
1955 when the Commission made its recommendations, the levels 
of administrative posts in the structure of the British Civil 
Service were as shown in Figure 2. The structure "was funda¬ 
mentally the product of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report^ of 
1J. K. Akingbade. "Administrative Reform of the Civil 
Service: The Nigerian Experience," Quarterly Journal of Ad¬ 
ministration, Vol. VI, No. 3, April 1972, p. 246. 
^Lord Fulton, The Civil Service Vol. I Report of the 
Committee 1966-68 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1968), p. 64. The Fulton Commission notes that "one of the 
basic principles (of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report) was that 
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Fig. 2. Pyramidal structure of administrative grades 
in the British Civil Service by 1954-1955. 
SOURCE: G. A. Campbell, The Civil Service in Britain 
(London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 53. 
1853. The fact that the Gorsuch structure did not solve the 
problems in the Federal Civil Service will be shown when dis¬ 
cussing the reports of the Udoji and Williams Commission on 
the Niaerian Public Services. However, by the Gorsuch Com¬ 
mittee's failure to have recommended a level or more in 
between the Administrative and Superscale grades as was in 
use in the British Civil Service, a situation arose whereby 
graduates generally recruited into the service in the Admin¬ 
istrative grade found themselves, on their first promotion, 
in the Superscale posts. The result was that in such a 
period of rapid transition there were some "half-baked" 
superscale civil servants who earned salaries that were not 
intellectual from routine work, and on the separate recruit¬ 
ment and deployment of staff for each." This principle has 
been endorsed as regards initial recruitment by subsequent 
Royal Commissions and Committees of Inauiry. "Hence the 
division of the Service into upper and lower classes in the 
broad areas of work. The Administrative, Executive and 
Clerical classes are examples of these divisions...." 
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commensurate with their productivity in the service. This 
unleashed a lot of pathological tensions from specialist 
ranks where, in most cases, training took many years while 
promotion prospects were slow. 
Nevertheless, the Gorsuch Commission gave to Nigeria 
the benefit of organization in the Civil Service, emphasiz¬ 
ing "the importance of management training and clarity in 
the division of functions as between the Public Service Com¬ 
missions and the Establishment divisions. 
Three other factors are worth noting in the develop¬ 
ment of the Federal Civil Service during this period of 
transition. First, was the introduction of political con¬ 
siderations into decisions on Civil Service matters. Ni¬ 
gerians following the British practice had professed to the 
ideal of a politically "neutral" civil service. It has 
earlier been pointed out that the desire by Nigerians to 
control the machinery of government and the public service 
was made a hot political issue beginning immediately after 
World War II. At that time, when Nigeria was under a unitary 
constitution, all political attacks were directed at the 
British colonial personnel. "Nigerianization" then was a 
political aspiration, the development and realization of 
which were to the disadvantage of the expatriates who domi¬ 
nated the top levels of the public service. 
^Mackintosh, Op. Cit. , p. 178 
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With the introduction of the Lyttleton Constitution 
under which the country was federalized, the regions had 
their own public services. The issue of Nigerianization of 
the Federal Civil Service degenerated into messy political 
squabbles between the two major southern political parties 
and the main political party in the North. The North,which 
was educationally less privileged than the South, refused 
to support swift efforts at Nigerianization of the top 
echelons of the Federal Civil Service as it was clear that 
it was tantamount to "Southernization" of all its "senior" 
level positions since it was the Southerners who by then 
held all the junior posts. "Southernization" as such would 
have meant depriving the Northerners of a foothold in the 
Federal Civil Service where the opportunity exists for in¬ 
fluencing of policies on development in various areas of 
the country, on jobs, contracts, etc. 
Nicolson cites a striking example of weak control on 
the Federal Civil Service which came as a result of lack of 
agreement within a coalition government made up of British 
officials who, by 1955, were still responsible for Civil 
Service matters, and Southern and Northern Nigerian Minis¬ 
ters. In 1955, the House of Representatives demanded from 
the Council of Ministers a comprehensive statement and pro¬ 
posal for the speeding up of Nigerianization. There was 
basic agreement within the Council of Ministers on the need, 
"in the interest of the federation," to make the Federal 
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Public Service representative of a cross section of the 
Nigerian population. But the self interest of the parties 
in the Council of Ministers did not permit the drawing up of 
a dynamic policy for speeding up of Nigerianization as was 
the case in the Regions, whose executive councils comprised 
of members of the dominant parties. The expatriate officials 
wished the Nigerian government to honor the pledges given to 
them. The Southern Ministers pressed for rapid Nigerianiza¬ 
tion while their Northern colleagues were eager to hold back 
until Northerners could come up with suitable candidates for 
appointment. ^ 
This phenomenon of weak central control made it almost 
impossible for the Ministers to delegate authority to the 
officials some of whom had lost confidence and initiative. 
Secondly, in 1957, the office of Chief Secretary was 
abolished.^ with it ended the sharing of the headship of 
the service between the Governor-General and the Chief Sec¬ 
retary.^ In the same year the post of Prime Minister was 
established. The period before independence was one in 
which the Federal Civil Service had to deal with the problems 
of the exodus of expatriate officers and the staffing of 
the various positions which were vacant. Unfortunately it 
^Nicolson, Op. Cit. , p. 297. 
^Report of the Nigeria Constitutional Conferences 1957 
Cmnd. 207 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), 
par. 41. 
^Mackintosh, Op. Cit., p. 187. 
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had no good guidance from the uneasy coalition cabinet, and 
worse still, there was no full time Head of the Public Ser¬ 
vice to whom the officials could look for leadership and 
who could be held responsible for proper administration of 
a responsive service. This situation when compared with that 
in any of the regions left the Federal Civil Service at a 
disadvantage in carrying out its onerous responsibilities. 
The absence of an official Head of the Federal Civil 
Service and lack of clear delegation of authority from the 
strife-torn coalition cabinet created a situation where the 
Prime Minister, himself a politician, was drawn closely 
into supervising Civil Service matters. His appointment of 
a fellow Northerner as the Chairman of the Federal Public 
Service Commission, besides appointments of Northerners as 
Permanent Secretaries whose experience and gualifications— 
regardless of their personal gualities--would not have se¬ 
cured their appointments in the normal way, is seen as an 
indication of the extent to which the political imperative 
of increasing Northern representation prevented the effec¬ 
tive realization of the ideal of a nonpolitical Civil Ser¬ 
vice. 1 
Thirdly, once the old Secretariat was dissolved and 
the posts of Civil Secretary and Financial Secretary were 
abolished, it was easy to integrate the Departments with the 
Ministries. Housed under the same roof, and, keeping a 
llbid., p. 198. 
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common filing system, these two branches of the Civil Ser¬ 
vice became the professional and administrative divisions of 
each Ministry. The Ministry was to be headed henceforth by 
an administrator, styled the Permanent Secretary, while the 
technical or professional division within the ministry was 
to be headed by the professional doctor, educationists, 
agriculturists, engineer, or whatever the profession might 
be. 
This arrangement safeguarded the position and func¬ 
tion of the Minister as provided for in the constitution. 
He was virtually the boss of his ministry and was held ac¬ 
countable by the legislature for the work and shortcomings 
originating from same.-*- Policy decisions by Ministers, of 
course, were expected to be backed up with sound administra¬ 
tive and professional advice which, though individual Mini¬ 
sters were not necessarily bound to accept, had to be weighed 
and given consideration. On the other hand, integration set 
the professionals and the administrators at daggers drawn. 
Even though the Federal Government had adopted the principle 
whereby a highly experienced professional head of a large 
executive establishment was given a higher salary than the 
permanent secretary within the same ministry, professionals 
felt that ministries charged with technical matters should 
be headed by a technical or professional man. Complaints 
-*-See, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ni¬ 
geria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1963) , par. 91. 
^E. 0. Awa, Op. Cit., pp. 168-169. 
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were often aired by the professionals about the boss complex 
of administrative officers in their relationship with pro¬ 
fessional officers; of professional advice being subject to 
non-professional criticism by administrative officers; of 
management of professional work programs including postings 
and financial control being subject to directions from ad¬ 
ministrators; and, of promotion prospects, perquisites, status 
and prestige being far better in the administrative than in 
the professional services.3- These pathological tensions 
seem to have been laid to rest by the recommendations of 
the Public Service Review Commission, 1974, which introduced 
# o 
a unified grade structure and by the removal of the post 
of Permanent Secretary from the career structure thus end¬ 
ing its having to be regarded as part of the normal career 
expectation of a particular group of officials.3 
■^-Such complaints have been made before a Review Com¬ 
mission on the Public Service recently. See, Federal Re¬ 
public of Nigeria Public Service Review Commission. Main 
Report (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, September 
1974), par. 100. 
^Ibid., par. 102. 
3See, The Public Service of Nigeria: Government Views 
on the Report of the Public Service Review Panel (Lagos: Fed- 
eral Ministry of Information, September 1975), pars. 4(1) 
which sets grading for all Permanent Secretaries in the Fed¬ 
eral Civil Service at Grade Level 17 and 4(iv) which states 
that all officers in the Ministry within line management, 
irrespective of their discipline and background, should have 
equal opportunity of being considered for appointment when 
filling future vacancies in the grade of Permanent Secre¬ 
taries (chief executives). 
On the position of professionals, and others within 
line management, the Federal Government's white paper stated 
in paragraph 5 that "...in order to make the unified grade 
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On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent 
nation. The British control of the Civil Service had ended 
and Nigerians were assuming permanent control of the ma¬ 
chinery of government. Sad enough, it was not a new machinery 
of government but the colonial model. 
This chapter has investigated the historical roots 
of the present day Nigerian Federal Civil Service. It has 
reflected on some of the ills which attended the Colonial 
Civil Service. These weaknesses were inherited with the 
Civil Service at independence. They included the organiza¬ 
tional character of the Civil Service which was elitist as 
well as segregative, the structure of the Civil Service, and 
its operational and procedural norms. Transferred also to 
the independent Niaerian Civil Service were both the atti¬ 
tudes of the few Nigerians in the Colonial Civil Service 
and the public's attitude towards the Civil Service. In the 
next chapter we shall examine the role of the independent 
structure relevant to the needs of the country, profession¬ 
als and other officers (within line management who on merit 
should advance beyond the normal career expectation and are 
otherwise eligible for the post of chief executive but who 
for various reasons are not given that post) should be given 
the opportunity to earn as much as the chief executive. In 
the cases of specialists and others outside line management 
referred to in paragraph 4(iii) above, they should be able, 
on the basis of outstanding performance and merit, to earn 
salaries at levels up to or exceeding those of Permanent 
Secretaries as chief executives will continue to have over¬ 
all responsiblity for their Ministries." Finally, in para¬ 
graph 8, the Policy Paper states that for the Federal Civil 
Service, "...all posts of Heads of major Departments carry¬ 
ing former Salary Croups 3 and 4 should be effectively 
ranked in Crade Level 16." 
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Nigerian Federal Civil Service. Our discussions will show 
the effect of these inherited weaknesses on the function of 
the independent Civil Service. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE UNDER 
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REGIMES 
The period of transitional administration had given 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service the opportunity of trying 
out, under British tutelage, the roles Nigerians would ex¬ 
pect it to play in the government of an independent Nigeria. 
Following the attainment of self-rule, Nigerians became more 
conscious of their country's inadequacies which were the con¬ 
sequences of over half a century's administration for the 
maintenance of law and order instead of administration for 
development. It became clear that for Nigeria to play a 
significant role in both African and world affairs, she first 
would have to enhance her potentials through sustained eco¬ 
nomic, social and political development. Consequently, the 
government began to expand its activities by setting up new 
administrative cadres, providing some social services which 
the population identified with independence, and above all, 
embarking on far-reaching development schemes. 
This chapter looks at the contributions of the Niger¬ 
ian Federal Civil Service towards the task of development 
since the country achieved her independence in 1960. It 
examines the traditional role of the Federal Civil Service 
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in policy formulation and program implementation. The elit¬ 
ist image of the bureaucracy and the political culture of 
the Nigerian public are analyzed to show how they affect 
the role of the Civil Service. Finally, the country's 
Development Plans are discussed and their impact on the 
well-being of the common man are noted. 
The Nature of the Role of Administrative Bureaucracy— 
Theoretical Considerations 
Scholars who are interested in development administra¬ 
tion as well as in comparative administration have made sig¬ 
nificant contributions to our understanding of the nature 
of the role of administrative bureaucracies. So far, there 
is a general agreement among them that administrative bur¬ 
eaucracies in modern governments are the conduits through 
which the impact of the political executives' decisions get 
to the citizens. Almond and Powell state precisely that, 
when they speak of bureaucracies they are referring to the 
relatively elaborate organization through which rulers or 
rule makers seek to implement their decisions.^ The same 
opinion is held by Riggs when he notes that "under the con- 
y 
trol of this organization there is an administrative 
^Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative 
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1966), p. 145. 
^A political organization such as political party, 
parliament, public opinion, popular suffrage and interest 
group. It is established by a constitution and it lays down 
a set of goals and policies known as "laws and regulations." 
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apparatus or bureaucracy charged with the task of implement¬ 
ing the laws."l But by adding that, 
The bureaucracy is supposed to be politically "neu¬ 
tral": it does not participate in policy determina¬ 
tion, it has no specific interest of its own, it does 
not exercise any important power. It is, in other 
words, the obedient servant of the government, hence 
of the public whom the regime serves.2 
he throws in the politics-administration dichotomy of Max 
Weber whose bureaucratic role model was primarily concerned 
with "rule-application." Riggs, as well as subsequent writers, 
however, does admit that the Weberian ideal-typical models 
are only conceptual and analytical models. Since perfect 
bureaucratization is never fully realized, no empirical or¬ 
ganization corresponds exactly to his scientific construct. 
In his analysis of the nature of the role of bureaucracy, 
Riggs utilizes a structural-functional approach. To him 
a government bureau is a "structure" and a structure, he 
says, is "any pattern of behavior which has become a stand¬ 
ard feature of a social system."2 Thus, he maintains that 
bureaucracy as a structure consists of the many actions 
taken by officials as they relate to "the goals and work of 
the bureau." Besides the bureau also "includes the relevant 
actions of 'outsiders' with whom it interacts in the normal 
■*-Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: 
The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1964), p. 7. 
2Ibid. 
■^Ibid. , p. 20. 
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course of business, its clientele or 'audience.^ 
Classifying the nature of the functions performed by 
bureaus into two "hypothetical categories," Riggs states 
that, "whenever a structure performs a large number of func¬ 
tions we may say it is 'functionally diffuse'; when it per- 
forms a limited number it is 'functionally specific.'"^ 
Riggs is trying to develop a mid-way model for the 
analysis of administration in developing countries. He says 
the "diffuse" concept describes the administrative role in 
traditional societies while the "diffracted" model fits ad¬ 
ministration in industrialized societies. By introducing a 
"prismatic" model in his analysis, he finds a useful inter¬ 
mediary concept which for him describes befittingly the ad¬ 
ministrative roles in developing countries. In his earlier 
writing,^ he had argued to differentiate "traditional" and 
"industrial" administrative settings by using the terms 
"agraria" and "industria" respectively. This was another 
effort at constructing a structural-functional approach to 
the analysis of administrative systems. But all through his 
analysis he does not create the impression that he does not 
subscribe to the policy-administration dichotomy which was 
^Ibid. 
y 
Ibid., pp. 22-23. He narrows down the clumsy phrase 
"functionally diffuse" to "diffracted"; and "specific" to 
"fused" by using terminologies from physics. 
^See, Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," in William 
J. Siffin (ed.), Towards the Comparative Study of Public Ad- 
ministration (Bloomington, Inc.: Indiana University Press, 
1957), pp. 23-110. 
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a feature of the intellectual context of United States pub¬ 
lic administration in the 1950s when he and others first 
delved into the areas of comparative and development admin¬ 
istration . 
Herbert Simon questions some writers' failure to 
recognize the rule-making function in the theoretical con- 
isderations of the role of bureaucracies. He maintains that 
bureaucratic theory should be concerned with the process of 
decision making just as well as with the process of action. 
The process of decision making, while not terminating when 
the purpose of an organization has been determined, pervades 
the entire administrative organization equally as does the 
task of "doing." Indeed it is integrally tied up with the 
latter. Gabriel Almond's and G. Bingham Powell's conception 
of the role bureaucracies play is "multifunctional." But 
they are talking about the bureaucracies in the Western 
political systems. Besides stressing the point that the 
bureaucracies they are discussing have "near monopoly of a 
critical political function, that of rule application" or 
metaphorically put, the role of guarding the "output gate" 
of the political system,^ they concede the fact of bureau¬ 
cracies' importance in rule-making, rule adjudication, and 
the articulation and aggregation of interest.^ Interesting¬ 
ly, Ferrel Heady maintains a contrasting view with Almond 
^Op. Cit., pp. 157-158. 
2 
Ibid., p. 154. 
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and Powell. His bureaucracies in the Western political sys¬ 
tems are unifunctional. He notes that, 
The bureaucracies in developed countries resemble 
the diffracted model, with its more restricted func¬ 
tional activity for the bureaucracy, the bureaucra¬ 
cies in the developing countries are more likely 
to be multifunctional, participating actively in 
policy—or rule-making and even in interest arti¬ 
culation and aggregation. 
As a matter of fact, the nature of the role of admin¬ 
istrative bureaucracies in the emergent nations of Africa 
has become essentially multifunctional because of the demands 
of nation-building which fall almost entirely on these bur¬ 
eaucracies. The primary goals of these nations are economic, 
social, and political development. The nature of the job 
or actions needed to achieve these goals are by far differ¬ 
ent from those found in developed countries. Most of the 
things that the administrative bureaucracies or the civil 
service in emerging countries of Africa are required to do 
are those things which are taken care of by private entre¬ 
preneurs in advanced countries. 
A contemporary student of public administration and 
nation-building in Africa has observed that the excessive 
involvement of the bureaucracy in policy-making and therefore 
its functional significance in African government, is partly 
because of Ministers' lack of experience in matters of policy 
nature, and in some cases partly because of lack of knowledge, 
•^Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative 
Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 
p. 106. 
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education, and skills.-*- The Ministers depend on the expert 
advice of the bureaucracy while searching for ideas in the 
formulation of government policy. The marshalling of data 
necessary in the formulation of policy suggestions suitable 
for adoption by government, is a laborious process involving 
large numbers of highly trained and specialized people. The 
concentrations of sufficient manpower capable of prosecuting 
policy development work on a sustained basis in Africa can 
only be found in the Civil Services.^ 
Policy Formulation and Rule-Application in Nigeria's 
Development 
The Nigerian Federal Civil Service is presently an 
organization of some 114,000 employees.-^ Collectively, the 
Civil Service commands a pool of experience and know-how for 
helping to formulate and to implement the federal government 
policies. Structurally, the Civil Service is divided into 
Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Departments in order to be 
assigned responsibilities for specific activities or group 
of activities.^ The number of Ministries and Extra-Minister¬ 
ial Departments into which the Civil Service is organized at 
\l. Y. Katako, "Bureaucracy and Nation-Building in 
Africa," Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
July 1971, p. 411. 
^Ibid. 
-^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Public Service Review 
Commission's Main Report, September 1974, Op. Cit., p. 26. 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Civil Service Handbook 
(Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1972), p. 12. 
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any particular time depends on the decision of the government 
of the day and on the program which that government wishes 
to execute. During the civilian administration in Nigeria, 
1960-1966, there was a propensity towards proliferating 
Ministries not so much because of the types of program but 
in most cases to overcome political dilemmas as well as pro- 
vidincr jobs to the political faithfuls.-*- During the last 
five years of Gowon's administration there were eighteen 
• • • 9 Ministries^ in the Federal Civil Service. Presently there 
are twenty-four Ministries3 each responsible for a specific 
activity in the overall development program of the govern¬ 
ment. 
In spite of the division of responsibilities, each 
Ministry seeks the co-operation and support of other Minis¬ 
tries and Departments in carrying out some aspects of its 
duties. For example, a memorandum to the Council of Minis¬ 
ters or the Executive Council setting out the case for 
^For example, by January 1965 Sir Abubakar's govern¬ 
ment announced 14 Ministries. See, West Africa, January 27, 
1965, p. 223, "The Little Flection' (neither by-election nor 
general election) should take place within the next fort¬ 
night or so. After this Sir Abubakar will be in a position 
to form a substantive new government (the present one is 
really an anamolous continuation of the last government, due 
to exceptional circumstances). Since UPGA's acceptance of 
the election there are now great expectationsof office from 
both UPGA's ranks and NNA's Western wing, the NNDP. It will 
require all Sir Abubakar's considerable political ingenuity 
to satisfy these pressing claims." By April 1965 the number 
of Ministries was increased to 21. See, West Africa, April 
10, 1965, p. 395. 
^See, Nigeria Year Book (Apapa: Times Press Ltd., 
1975), pp. 251-253. 
3Paily Times, April 3, 1976, p. 11. 
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necessary funds for a health project has to be cleared first 
with the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. 
Personnel will be needed to manage the project. Therefore, 
the new posts which should be created have to be referred 
for approval to the Ministry of Establishments and Service 
Matters. A Capital Development Project which the Ministry 
of Health has to carry out has to be vetted by the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Development. Finally, when the project 
is approved by the Federal Government, the Public Service 
Commission appoints qualified officers for the new posts 
necessitated by a decision such as the building of more 
hospitals and new health centers.^ The coordination network 
is presented in Figure 3 below. 






Fig. 3. Typical coordination network between Ministries, the 
Public Service Commission, the Executive Council on a project 
decision. 
The role which is played by the Civil Service in the 
formulation and implementation of government policies is once 
^-Civil Service Handbook, Op. Cit. , p. 15. 
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more illustrated in the drawing up and execution of Nigeria's 
Development Plan. Nigeria has accepted the principle of 
planned economic development. The formulation and implemen¬ 
tation of comprehensive development plans have therefore be¬ 
come a significant feature of government activity in Nigeria. 
To a great extent, the burden of building up the mechanics 
of the Development Plan rests on the civil servants and 
mainly on the Administrative class. It is for this group, 
under the leadership of the Permanent Secretaries, to bring 
together the many and diverse views and array of data in¬ 
volved in matters requiring policy decisions, to advise on 
the appropriate decisions and subsequently to put them into 
effect. 
During the civilian administration, 1960-1966, there 
were two main organs responsible for economic planning in 
Nigeria. These were the National Economic Council and the 
Joint Planning Committee. The Council consisted of repre¬ 
sentatives of the Central (Federal) Council of Ministers as 
well as those of Regional Executive Councils and the Execu¬ 
tive Council of Southern Cameroons. The chairman was the 
Prime Minister.1 The Joint Planning Committee was the forum 
in which the Federal Civil Service played some leading policy 
formulation role. In it sat as members civil servants drawn 
from the Federal Ministries of Trade, Finance, Economic 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria. Second National Develop¬ 
ment Plan 1970-74 (Federal Government Printer, 1970), p. 7. 
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Planning, Agriculture, and Natural Resources. Regional 
representatives from identical ministries as well as offi¬ 
cials of the Central Rank were also members. 
The Committee's main functions were to: 
a) examine and report upon any matters remitted to 
it by the National Economic Council or by indiv¬ 
idual governments; 
b) advise the National Economic Council in particu¬ 
lar on 
( 1) preparing a statement of fundamental objec¬ 
tives for the guidance of the planning com¬ 
mittee of the several Governments in the 
formulation of their development plans for 
each succeeding period; 
(ii) examining the plans formulated by the gov¬ 
ernments and advising what modifications 
should be made to them in the light of 
fundamental objectives agreed for this pur¬ 
pose, in order that the plans together may 
form a coherent whole;1 and 
c) direct its secretariat in 
( i) the preparation of studies, reports and sur¬ 
veys ; 
(ii) the collation, co-ordination and dissemina¬ 
tion of information.^ 
While the basic technical work was tackled by various Minis¬ 
tries, the Federal Ministry of Economic Development acted as 
the Secretariat for both the National Economic Council and 
the Joint Planning Committee. It served also as the planning 
agency for the Federal Government. Its Economic Planning 
Unit was responsible for the technical aspects of policy 
■^The First National Development Plan was made up of 
five development plans prepared by each of the governments 
in the Federation (the three Regional governments, the South¬ 
ern Cameroons, and the Federal Territory of Lagos). These 
development plans had varying goals. Presently the plans 
are coordinated by the Federal Government under a common ob¬ 
jective. See page 65 of this chapter. 
^Ibid. 
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work, general economic planning and co-ordination of plans 
among the various economic planning and development agencies 
in Nigeria. 
Essential for the success of any economic development 
plan is the available quantity and quality of manpower in a 
country. Consequently, the National Manpower Board was es¬ 
tablished by the Nigerian Federal Government in 1962 with 
its Secretariat as part of the planning section of the Feder¬ 
al Ministry of Economic Development. Drawn to its membership 
were civil servants from Federal and Regional Ministries of 
Education, Labor, and Economic Planning besides representa¬ 
tives of the universities, the Employees' Association, and 
the trade unions. The Permanent Secretary for the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Development was the chairman of the 
Board. Among the functions of the Board were: 
the determination of the nation's manpower needs in 
all occupations and formulating, for the governments 
of the Federation, programs for manpower development 
through university expansion, training scholarships, 
fellowships, and other facilities.^ 
Another arm of the Civil Service whose role has been 
of great consequence in making of development policies by the 
Federal Government is the Federal Office of Statistics. It 
is the leading national agency for the collection and colla¬ 
tion of economic statistical data. However, the Federal 
Ministries of Education, Labor, and the Central Bank, besides 
-^Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 7. 
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the states' offices of statistics, also take part in collect¬ 
ing data. 
The advent of military administration in Nigeria and 
above all the needs for reconstruction and development plan¬ 
ning that was to take care of the post civil war period neces¬ 
sitated the setting up of a new planning machinery for the 
Second Development Plan, 1970-1974. Such a machinery was to 
recognize the concurrent powers of the states and the Federal 
Goverment in economic planning and development; the need for 
an agreed framework of national objectives and development 
priorities; the pre-eminent position of the Federal Govern¬ 
ment to lead and act as a co-ordinator in national develop¬ 
ment planning.^ 
To enforce these changes, the Supreme Military Council 
whose membership comprised the Military Governors of the then 
twelve states, some senior Military, Air Force, and Naval 
Officers with the Head of the Federal Military Government as 
the chairman, placed itself, from 1970-1975, as the highest 
planning authority in the country. This body from time to 
time set out broad guidelines of economic and social policy 
for the guidance of officials in the formulation and imple¬ 
mentation of development plans. 
Two other organs were set up and through them the 
Federal Civil Service contributed "necessary advice to the 
Federal Government on all aspects of planning." The first 
-*-Civil Service Handbook. Op. Cit. , p. 19. 
^Ibid. 
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body was the Joint Planning Board in which the Permanent 
Secretaries for the Federal Ministries of Economic Develop¬ 
ment and Reconstruction, Finance and the Chief Statistician 
were members among others. The second body was the Economic 
Advisory Committee composed of senior civil servants drawn 
from the Economic Ministries and representatives from the 
universities and the private sector.-*- 
The prominence of the Federal Civil Service in policy 
formulation as shown in its functions within the various 
development planning machineries stems from the leadership 
position in expertise and accumulated experience of most of 
the senior civil servants. It is true to say that the Civil 
Service has access to facts and data necessary for policy 
makina and can more readily assemble them for such uses 
than the Cabinet or Military Council can do. Apart from 
their role in policy formulation for development planning, 
the Permanent Secretaries, aided by the senior civil ser¬ 
vants in the Administrative class as well as top professional 
officers in the technical departments, have the duty of ini¬ 
tiating and submitting policy measures at an early stage for 
consideration by the political heads^ of their Ministries. 
This is because the Permanent Secretary as the chief 
1Ibid. 
^During the civilian rule, 1960-1966, the political 
heads of the Ministries were politicians and were called 
"ministers." Under the military rule the civilians and 
military personnel who are appointed to the policy leader * 
ship of the Ministries are styled, "Commissioners." 
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administrator is expected to give the direction in which he 
thinks the Ministry should move. 
In his analysis of the career executives in the United 
States Government, Earl Delong gives an insight to what is 
and what should be the role of those who are so called. He 
says that, 
In every federal department and agency, the senior 
bureaucratic positions have a unique and critical 
role—that of translations and brokerage between the 
political executive and the working level bureau¬ 
cracy. This role pervades the upper level of the 
bureaucracy: it is not limited to a few positions 
which have significant administrative characteristics 
as compared with a larger number which do not. The 
function is required of all persons in senior bur¬ 
eaucratic positions who have executive responsibil¬ 
ity over lower line organizations, who perform major 
staff services to senior bureaucratic or political 
executives or who direct the performance of major 
support activities. If this role is well performed, 
the organization works as an organization, however 
bad the top policy may be. If the role is ill- 
performed, the organization breaks down miserably, 
however good the top policy may be. Those holding 
such positions are intimately involved in the poli¬ 
tical executive's policy-making and equally in¬ 
volved in the subordinate organization's perfor¬ 
mance of the related programs. 
The senior bureaucrats' function in policy-making 
is to bring the knowledge and capabilities of the 
working level bureaucracy to the attention of the 
policy-maker, and to do so objectively.1 
These observations apply equally to the Nigerian Federal 
Civil Service. Nevertheless, the political heads of the 
Ministries may initiate policies but such efforts depend on 
a number of factors among which are the Minister's or 
^Earl H. DeLong, "Who Are the Career Executives?" 
Administrative Questions and Political Answers, ed. 
Claude E. Hawley and Ruth G. Weintraub (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand Co., Inc, 1966), p. 362. 
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Commissioners' academic and professional training, their 
knowledge of the matters under discussion or proposal, their 
role conception in the governmental structure and above all 
their individual personality.^ 
In the British system of government it is conventional 
for the civil servant to resign his appointment where he is 
strongly at odds with the policy which is being pursued and 
which, on moral grounds he feels obliged not to carry out. 
This convention is not so rigidly followed in Nigeria and 
there are not many occasions when such a convention is fol¬ 
lowed to the letter. The Nigerian system is flexible enough 
to allow appeals to higher authorities in the hierarchy. For 
example, a sharp disagreement between a political head of a 
Ministry and a Permanent Secretary of the Ministry over pol¬ 
icy issues need not end in the resignation of the Permanent 
Secretary who is free under the Nigerian system of govern¬ 
ment to refer the issues to the Cabinet Office for resolu¬ 
tion by the Head of Government.^ Nevertheless, a Permanent 
^-C. 0. Lawson, "The Role of Civil Servants in a Mili¬ 
tary Regime," Daily Times, Tuesday, December 11, 1973, p. 24. 
^Ibid. In a provocative analysis of this issue, 
Olatunji Oyinloye states that "the traditional channel of 
complaining to the head of the service has not been known 
to be effective." He suggests that "a civil servant who is 
confronted with a choice between his conviction and his duty 
to his country on the one hand and his loyalty to a political 
government bent on taking a purely political decision regard¬ 
less of public interest must have an alternative course of 
action. He should be free, in the last resort, to arouse 
public opposition to such a policy, if need be openly in 
the press or through an inspired leakage. Alternatively, a 
forum should be provided where in a workshop the politicians 
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Secretary is the leader of the civil servants in each Minis¬ 
try. He is intimately concerned with the whole policy of 
his Ministry as well as with the economy and efficiency of 
its organization. During the civilian regime he was deeply 
involved with the legislative business of the Ministry. He, 
aided by the civil servants in the Administrative class, gave 
briefings to the Minister on matters which had to be de¬ 
bated in the Legislature and helped in preparing bills and 
providing answers to questions which the Ministers had to 
answer in the Legislature. During the rule of the military 
the Legislature is suspended but the Permanent Secretary and 
his subordinates still play the same role, and are given 
more hearing and have enhanced status-^- with the military 
than was with the politicians in matters of government 
policies. 
Once a policy has been enunciated by the Cabinet or 
Federal Executive Council the rule-application function 
and the civil servants argue out in detail the issues in¬ 
volved." See, Mahmud Tukur, (ed.), Administrative and Poli¬ 
tical Development: Prospects for Nigeria (Zaria: Ahmadu 
Bello University, 1970), p. 150. 
Mr. Onyinloye was sometime Permanent Secretary, Mili¬ 
tary Governor's Office, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria. 
iRamesh K. Arora, taking his example from Pakistan, 
notes that a military dominated political system might even 
experience, though paradoxically, a phenomenal rise in power 
of its civilian bureaucracy. That this happens because of 
the military's dependence on the civilian bureaucracy for 
expert advice on administrative matters. See, Ramesh K. 
Arora, Comparative Public Administration (New Delhi: Asso¬ 
ciated Publishing House, 1972), p. 87. 
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devolves on the entire Civil Service. A policy provides 
mere guidelines as to the intent of the government in carry¬ 
ing out a specific program during a pre-determined period of 
development, as in the case of the National Development Plan. 
It may even be a policy on certain issues which may not be 
connected with the Development Plan as such, but with the 
exigencies of social, political, or economic life in the 
country. In the case of development of higher education in 
Nigeria, one of the policies of the Federal Government dur¬ 
ing the 1970-74 period was that of giving "financial assis¬ 
tance to students." The policy states, 
Federal and State Governments will continue the pro¬ 
motion and administration of schemes for financing 
of University students, involving the award of schol¬ 
arships, bursaries and loans to gualified and de¬ 
serving students. The objective of policy is to 
bring university education within reach of every 
qualified Nigerian, while providing incentives de¬ 
signed to facilitate the availability of nationals 
in the professions and skills which are vital to 
the social and economic development of the nation. 
On the economic front, the Federal Government laid 
down some general policy guidelines for the development of 
agriculture which is regarded as "the mainstay of the Niger¬ 
ian economy."2 A section of the policy stated that, 
^-Second National Development Plan 1970-74, Op. Cit. , 
p. 238. 
2Ibid., p. 103. The discovery and drilling of oil and 
the revenue obtained brought about the neglect of agriculture 
until in 1975 when the campaign on "Operation Feed the Nation" 
(OFN) was mounted to revive agricultural pursuits. This came 
in the wake of dwindling returns from the oil sale and the 
resulting fall in foreign exchange reserves. 
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under the active leadership and support of the Feder¬ 
al Government, the various State Governments will be 
guided during the plan period by the following objec¬ 
tives of agricultural policy: 
ensuring food supplies in adequate quantity and 
quality to keep pace with increased population and 
urbanization, having regards to changing tastes 
and need for fair and stable prices: 
creating rural employment opportunities to absorb 
more of the increasing labor force in the nation, 
and minimizing the tendency for inadequate and 
inefficient use of human resources in the rural 
areas generally.! 
Policies may be cruite good but the implementation of 
the programs they are meant to direct may render them inef¬ 
fective. For example, nepotism and corruption in the awards 
of scholarships may rob deserving candidates of opportunities 
of training in the fields in which they could be very useful 
to the country. In some cases those who get the scholar¬ 
ships fail to get the training the country needs due to some 
irregularities in monitoring their progress. Nevertheless, 
it is the Civil Service which looks into all the ramifica¬ 
tions of the government's development policies, works out all 
the details and makes suitable arrangements for their implemen¬ 
tation. If the help of other Ministries or Departments is 
needed for the execution of a policy decision, consultations 
and coordination have to be established between such arms of 
the Civil Service. If the execution calls for contracts to 
be awarded and large amounts are involved, the contract 
arrangements are referred to the Tenders Board. It is mostly 
in the execution of a policy that subordinate grades and 
!-Ibid., pp. 109-110. 
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divisions of Civil Service have their part to play. At the 
lower level, the level at which the public meets the civil 
servants over the counter, there is the tendency to "over¬ 
organize" (red tapeism). This stiffness and slowness "in 
turning of the official wheels," as Nicolson notes, 
is sometimes an encouragement to corruption and 
bribery and the unscrupulous use of influence to 
"oil the wheels" which otherwise turn so slowly 
..., this corruption leads to even stiffer and 
slower bureaucracy and more "lubrication."! 
This is one of the stigmas which have tarnished the image of 
the Federal Civil Service thus weakening the confidence of 
the Nigerian public in its capability as a machinery for 
the implementation of development policies. The bureaucracy's 
image is that of being insensitive to public needs as well 
as being corrupt.^ 
Development Policies, Programs and Plans—An Assessment 
Policies and programs of economic and social develop¬ 
ment in developing countries are worthless or ineffective 
unless they achieve the objectives they are set to accomplish. 
-^1. F. Nicolson, "Structure of Government at the Feder¬ 
al Level," The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Gov¬ 
ernment , ed"^ LT Franklin Blitz (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc. Publishers, 1965), p. 71. 
^See, Dr. J. A. Adegbite, "Corruption, How It All Be¬ 
gan," Daily Times, May 26, 1976, p. 7; also, Walter Schwarz, 
Nigeria (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 51. Where the 
author observes that the civil servants during the civilian 
rule were tainted by corruption, adding, "For it is often 
said in Nigeria that the politicians could not have got away 
with the plunder they did without expert departmental help. 
'Someone must have shown them how to do it.'" 
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Very often, blames for the failures of government develop¬ 
ment policies and programs are laid on the processes of im¬ 
plementation by the various output agencies and not on types 
of policies and programs they seek to implement. A close 
examination of some of these policies and programs will re¬ 
veal that they reflect to a great extent the value prefer¬ 
ences and desires of the policy makers and program formula- 
tors to the exclusion of the needs and aspirations of the 
masses. This pattern is noticeable in most of the former 
colonial states in Africa because the structures of deci¬ 
sion-making are more authoritarian and less participatory. 
This authoritarian posture derives from the traditional 
African pattern of rule, is reinforced by the legacy of 
authoritarian mode of colonial administration and in some 
independent African states is manifested in single-party 
rule tendencies. 
Approached from the perspective of elite theory,^ 
public policy and development programs in Nigeria can be 
regarded as reflecting the values and preferences of the 
governing and administrative elites. The latitude of free¬ 
dom which the political and bureaucratic elites have in 
^Elite theory postulates that it is the few who rule, 
that determine public policy, and not the ordinary people 
(the majority) who ought to determine public policy through 
their demands and action. That the policies so determined 
by the ruling elites are executed by public officials and 
agencies. See, Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The 
Irony of Democracy (Beltmont, California: Wadsworth, 1970), 
p. 6. 
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dominating policy making and development planning functions 
is traceable to Nigeria's prevalent political culture.1 
This work maintains that as long as the mass of the 
population in Nigeria is the object of development and the 
political and administrative activities which seek to bring 
it about, rather than initiators in this process, and, as 
long as their preferences and responses are only of much 
concern to the political and administrative elites without 
their participating in the dialogue of rulers and the ruled, 
so long will there be inequality in development in different 
parts of Nigeria, in standards of living among the people, 
and in the distribution of income among people and among 
regions. 
To test the validity of this assertion, three dis¬ 
cussions will be covered in this part of the chapter. First¬ 
ly, using Almond and Verba's classifications of types of 
political culture, the section will discuss the orientations 
of the Nigerian "masses," the common people, especially the 
rural folks whose well-being the Nigerian Government's 
development policies profess always to serve but rarely serve. 
Secondly, it will examine the outlooks and mental framework 
of Nigeria's Federal political as well as administrative 
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba define the term 
Political Culture as "political orientations—attitudes to¬ 
wards the political system and its various parts, and atti¬ 
tudes towards the role of self in the system." See, Almond 
and Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1965) , p. 12. 
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elites in order to show how their value preferences are con¬ 
sciously or unconsciously injected into the policies and 
development programs which they always maintain would ra¬ 
pidly "spread the benefits of economic development so that 
the average Nigerian would experience a marked improvement 
in his standard of living."-1- Finally, the section will look 
at some of the policies and development programs and comment 
on their success or failure. 
Almond and Verba have delineated three classes of 
citizen orientations in the political culture of some poli¬ 
tical systems. They refer to these as the parochial, the 
subject, and the participant political cultures. Such clas¬ 
sifications of cultures within political systems make it easy 
to identify the political objects to which individuals in a 
particular political culture are oriented, the attitudes de¬ 
veloped towards these objects and the roles the political 
objects perform—policy making or rule application.2 The 
parochial political culture portrays citizens who have little 
or no awareness of the national political process and have 
no perception of their own influence on or obligation to the 
political system. The parochials are rare in economically 
developed nations but remain a prevalent feature of tradition¬ 
al and transitional societies.^ in the subject political 
-^Third National Development Plan 197 5-8 0, Vol, I 
(Lagos: Ministry of Economic Development), p. 29. 
^Almond and Verba, Op. Cit., p. 15. 
-^Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Com¬ 
parative Politics, Systems, Process and Policy, Second Edi¬ 
tion (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 35. 
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culture, citizens perceive themselves as part of the national 
political system to the extent to which they see it as affect¬ 
ing their lives. However, these citizens have no desire of 
being active in influencing or shaping the policies or pro¬ 
grams which affect them.l The subject citizens generate 
only a passive relationship with the government and do not 
participate in the political system. Unlike the parochial 
or subject political culture, the participant political cul¬ 
ture consists of those citizens who have developed an aware¬ 
ness of the input process of the society and are eager to 
seize any opportunity to contribute to shaping or influenc¬ 
ing national policies.2 To the extent that every modern 
nation reflects the cultural "mix" of the parochial, the 
subject and the participant citizen, though in varying de¬ 
grees, the orientations of the Nigerian common citizens need 
to be examined to show specifically how they perceive the 
officials in government and whether they themselves feel 
they have any roles to play in influencing government poli¬ 
cies . 
The British colonial rule which lasted over sixty 
years in Nigeria had through its detached mode of operation 
misled some Nigerians, especially the rural masses, into 
thinking that participation in government processes was un¬ 




and the primary duties of the citizens were to pay taxes and 
to obey laws and orders of the colonial administrators. The 
pattern of participation of the Nigerian masses in the govern 
mental process of the time was that of symbolic involve¬ 
ment such as in the singing of the British national anthem, 
the march past and the saluting of the British flag during 
what used to be called "Empire Day." Government service was 
the "white man's job" and as pointed out in Chapter II, it 
was a rare privilege to work in a government office no matter 
how insignificant the post was and how marginal was the re¬ 
sponsibility attached to it. The few who were employed in 
the colonial government departments held their heads high 
and were highly regarded by the masses. Thus when the Niger¬ 
ian civil servants took over at Independence, the masses, 
especially the "rural majority"^ saw them as taking over the 
"white man's job" (olu onyibo, Ibo; Ise ijoba, Yoruba; Utom 
Mbakara, Efik). 
To a great extent the status and authority image with 
which the Nigerian masses associated the colonial administra¬ 
tors were transferred to the Nigerian successors and heir to 
the "specialized elites." Little wonder then why, for ex¬ 
ample, the rural Hausas associate and preface the office or 
^Part of the befitting title for a book Nigeria ' s 
Neglected Rural Majority, in which Dr. 'Dupe Olatunbosun dis¬ 
cusses Nigerian Government's neglect of its rural majority 
and advocates an integrated rural development within the con¬ 
text of a more balanced development of the economy as a whole 
See, Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority (Ibadan: Oxford Uni¬ 
versity Press, 1975). 
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post which an indigenous Nigerian officer holds in the gov¬ 
ernment with the local name for a European (Bature). An 
agricultural officer in the Civil Service is referred to as 
"Bature Ngona." This means literally that a Nigerian now 
holding a post which only a European (Bature) used to hold 
has taken the "status of a European" in the colonial con¬ 
text. That is why he is addressed literally as "The Euro¬ 
pean of Agriculture." For the Veterinary Officer in govern¬ 
ment employ, the name is "Bature Dabobi." The Police Officer 
is "Bature Dansanda" and the Army Officer is "Bature Soja." 
The generic name for the senior civil servants remains 
"Babban Bature." 
With this attitude which seems to invest the indigen¬ 
ous government and its functionaries with the image of im¬ 
perial authority, the Nigerian "rural majority" has devel¬ 
oped a subject mentality which creates for it a vision of 
the government officials as benevolent superiors. Benevolent, 
in the sense that whatever comes out of the government in 
the way of policies and development programs is accepted 
without question as favors; and superior, because of the 
image which the power and status of officials reflect. When¬ 
ever the construction of a project like a new road, a bridge 
or a bank is completed and is to be commissioned for use in 
a local area, pages of newspapers are often filled with con¬ 
gratulatory messages and profuse praises for the government 
by individuals, and by small and large private enterprises 
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existing in the locality. One wonders on reading these 
seemingly servile messages of gratitude, whether the "grate¬ 
ful" citizens and private businesses know that it is the 
government's duty to develop and provide basic amenities not 
only in the urban areas but also in the often neglected rural 
areas of the country. The disgust for this type of attitude 
looms when one considers the absence of good water supply, 
electricity, good roads and other basic features of devel¬ 
opment which could contribute to a better life in the rural 
areas of Nigeria. These kinds of considerations lead to 
questions about the necessity for the common people in Ni¬ 
geria, especially the rural folks, having "advocate planners"1 
to work among them in order to articulate their needs to the 
government. The government gets away with its neglect of 
the rural areas because a majority of Nigerians, and to some 
extent even some living in the urban areas, maintain a pas¬ 
sive relationship with the government and its administrative 
system. They do not bother to have any inputs in government 
policies and program planning. They remain "subjects" in 
the Nigerian political culture and accept with gratitude 
Ipaul Davidoff first developed the theoretical base 
for advocacy planning in an article captioned "Advocacy and 
Pluralism in Planning," Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, Vol. 31, 1965, p. 31. Advocacy planning can be a 
part of planning, for inputs from the neighborhood (in fact 
the public) are important to goal formulation and program 
development. The Advocate Planner may be an employee of the 
government doing the planning and programming and part of 
his job may be to help the neighborhood group articulate its 
interest to government. See, Donald C. Hagman, Urban Plan¬ 
ning and Land Development Control Law (St. Paul, Minnesota: 
West Publishing Co., 1971), p. 15. 
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whatever comes in the "downward flow" of the political and 
administrative system. The situation will change and active 
participation can be a principal feature of the Nigerian poli¬ 
tical and administrative culture only if there is greater 
realization on the part of the Nigerian public that the 
capability of the Nigerian political and administrative sys¬ 
tems depend to a great extent on the capacity of the public 
to use the systems effectively. If the modus operandi of 
the system continues to permit only those who share the 
values and norms inherent in its dynamic to participate in 
the benefits the system generates, then "there is little 
possibility for marginal client groups to link successfully 
with the system"^ of government and administrative service. 
Almond and Verba have suggested that there is a cer¬ 
tain amount of spill-over of political competence into ad¬ 
ministrative competence. They maintain that "the more 
politically competent a population is, the more inhibited 
is the bureaucracy in its ability to act arbitrarily and 
without consideration of the individual...."^ This politi¬ 
cal competence enforces bureaucracy's adherence to the rules 
of administrative procedure because it is armed with the 
threat of political reprisals like protest by citizens through 
political agencies. Moreover, the political competence of 
^Theodore R. Thomas and Derick W. Rrinkerhoff, Devolu¬ 
tionary Strategies for Development Administration (SICA Occa- 
sional Papers, Series 8, American Society for Public Adminis¬ 
tration, Washington, D. C., 1978), p. 7. 
^Almond and Verba, Op. Cit., p. 72. 
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the population, they add, would act directly to enforce in¬ 
dividual demands by compelling the bureaucrats to make a 
particular decision in favor of a particular individual or 
group.1 Thus it would be expected that the alertness, 
watchfulness, and active participation of the neglected Ni¬ 
gerian masses would increase the chances of their needs 
being provided for in the development programs. 
Citizen participation in the Nigerian Federal govern¬ 
ment administration is minimal and mostly ritualistic. Dur¬ 
ing the civilian rule, the most important areas of citizen 
involvement in government process were in the election of 
legislators and in organized demonstration of support or 
protest. A few of the legislators who were appointed Cabi¬ 
net Ministers had control over policy making. In general, 
the politicians had the obligations of attending to the needs 
of the constituencies from which they drew support in order 
to ensure continued success at the polls. Conscious of 
these obligations, the politicans often allowed political 
considerations to override some policy outcomes and develop¬ 
ment program implementations. However, once it is noted that, 
in Nigeria, unlike the situation in the United States of Am¬ 
erica, citizen groups and public interest organizations 
which help in stimulating widespread participation by citi¬ 
zens in political and administrative affairs are very weak, 
it is easy to understand why opportunities to enhance the 
■^Ibid. 
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responsiveness and legitimacy of political and administra¬ 
tive institutions to the whole country are forfeited. When 
local government was introduced in the early fifties, the 
rationale was that it would foster citizen participation in 
government affairs. But the "local elites" soon turned 
the local government councils into citadels of corruption 
and used the institution as a base for staging successful 
elections to the federal and regional legislatures.^ In 
fact the uneven development witnessed in Nigeria today can 
be traced in part to the elite-mass gap^ which very much 
contributes to a widespread sense of social deprivation and 
frustration among citizens resident in urban as well as 
rural areas of the country. 
The Political and Administrative Elites 
It is easy to discern points of heterogeneity as well 
as homogeneity among the political and administrative elites 
in the Nigerian federal government. Within the ranks of the 
elites, be it under the civilian or military rule, one finds 
people from different states and different tribes of Nigeria. 
This heterogeneity reflects itself in the variety of attitudes 
■'■Ronald Wraith, Local Administration in West Africa 
(New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972), p. 53. 
2Among authors who have postulated on the elite-mass 
gap phenomenon as a problem of political development in the 
new states, Edward Shils' contributions are significant. For 
example, see his "Political Development in the New States," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 11, No. 3, 
(April, 1960), pp. 265-92; No. 4 (July, 1960), p. 379. 
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held by elite individuals towards various problems and is¬ 
sues facing the nation in the range of tribal identification, 
in the variety of states and experiences.^- But the most 
striking point of similarity among the political and admin¬ 
istrative elites in Nigeria is that they suffer from am¬ 
bivalence. They detest some of the British colonial prac¬ 
tices but have partially absorbed the British class atti¬ 
tude which in itself has distinguished them from the general 
population thus alienating the common man from the govern¬ 
ment and its agents who are supposed to serve him. 
Most detracting from the cause of development in 
Nigeria is the image of the Federal Civil Service. The 
senior civil servants, especially those who are involved in 
policy making and development program planning, do not live 
among the general public. Instead, they find themselves 
comfortably settled in the very homes which were occupied by 
the colonial administrators. As was noted earlier, these 
homes exist in segregated low-density exclusive residential 
layouts far away from the rest of the city areas and espec¬ 
ially from the clustered hovels of Marako, Ajegunle, and 
Munshin. These homes have separate "boys' quarters" and are 
surrounded by large open areas in which the children of the 
successor elites play in comfort. Roads in these exclusive 
residential areas are well paved; drainage systems and other 
1-Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian 
Elite (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1960) , p. 93. 
84 
modem amenities are adequately supplied. The elite corps 
of the Civil Service as well as that of other public agencies 
have separate arrangements for the social services delivery. 
For example, in the case of the health services, this lot has 
separate arrangements for medical attention. As such, those 
of them who would have seen to it that conditions in the 
general hospitals, health centers, and maternities (where 
the general public go for medical services) are improved, 
hardly venture into these places. Only once in a blue moon 
when visiting dignitaries are conducted on white-washed tours 
do some of these elites have a glimpse of that with which 
less fortunate Nigerians have to put up. 
It is difficult to see how the elites who enjoy this 
preferential treatment can understand the needs of the vil¬ 
lagers who live in the slums situated in areas bereft of any 
modern-day conveniences. This is why Nigeria continues to 
suffer from lopsided development. The national development 
plans represent the elitist collection of programs on which 
the resources of the country are squandered. And, modern 
amenities provided for in these development programs are 
always concentrated in the urban areas of the country leaving 
the rural areas to decay. 
It is the contention of this work that if the elitist 
tendencies in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service could be 
eliminated in favor of egalitarianism, the planning and exe¬ 
cution of economic and social development would benefit all 
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sections of the country. A look at some policies and pro¬ 
grams will serve to illustrate the elitism that undermines 
the effectiveness of the role of the Civil Service in devel¬ 
opment . 
Some Policies and Programs 
1. Information. Before states were created in 1967, each 
of the three Regions had its own radio station and televi¬ 
sion station. There was also the Nigerian Broadcasting Cor¬ 
poration consisting of radio and television broadcasting 
stations owned by the Federal Government. The post 1967 
years witnessed the establishment of new radio and televi¬ 
sion stations in some of the new states. The Federal Gov¬ 
ernment soon realized that the states' radio and television 
were localized in terms of coverage and program content. 
There was also a limitation on co-operation between the na¬ 
tional service of the Nigerian Broadcasting Station and the 
states' radio stations. The result was that, except on im¬ 
portant occasions, there was no program link among the exist¬ 
ing radio stations.^ As an agent of national integration and 
unity, the radio and television broadcasting system was seen 
to be inadequate in its function. 
In the Third Plan, 1975-1980, the Federal Government 
policies and objectives are to improve the "communications' 
link between headquarters and state stations and to boost 
•^Third Plan, Vol. I, Op. Cit. , p. 274. 
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the internal and external services through the installation 
of more powerful transmitters."-'- Furthermore, the government 
plans to institute an audience research division in an effort 
to improve audience service, expand broadcasting personnel, 
extend television services to all parts of the country, and 
to introduce color transmission.2 A total of Nl76,038 mil¬ 
lion has been allocated for implementing the programs under 
these policy measures. Of interest is the fact that N122.15 
million is committed to the implementation of the Nigerian 
Broadcasting Corporation/Television (NBC/TV) Program. This, 
notwithstanding the amount set for radio and television as 
well as other areas of information by the then twelve states. 
Table 2 shows the Capital Budget by activity under Informa¬ 
tion Service for the whole country during the plan period. 
In July of 1975, Murtala Mohammed's government suc¬ 
ceeded Gowon's administration under which the Third Develop¬ 
ment Plan was launched. The new Federal Military Government 
instituted more radical policies regarding information ser¬ 
vices in the country. Among these were the taking over of 
the two most widely read newspapers as well as all radio and 
television stations in the country. The taking over of tele¬ 
vision stations was motivated by the desire to accomplish the 
following objectives, 
1. to assist in the general education; enlightenment 
and motivation of the nation, 
•'-Ibid. , p. 27 5 
2Ibid. 
TABLE 2 















Federal 22.251 4.900 15.800 14.372 176.083 0.920 234.341 
Benue-Plateau 0.175 1.640 0.500 4.000 • 2.500 0.600 9.415 
East Central 1.338 0.739 3.060 9.700 4.000 1.000 19.837 
Kano 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 6.500 
Kwara 1.350 0.400 3.850 2.500 7.800 15.900 
Lagos 1.000 0.500 0.100 3.700 5.300 
Mid Western 0.195 0.605 2.100 0.500 2.000 0.500 5.900 
North Eastom 1.270 0.727 3.640 5.100 5.400 16.137 
North Western 0.390 0.300 0.640 1.340 12.000 1.500 16.170 
Rivers 1.510 0.300 1.500 2.500 5.000 1.500 12.310 
South Eastern 1.720 0.790 1.300 4.000 6.500 0.800 15.110 
Western 2.649 0.350 0.596 3.200 9.117 3 .400 17.112 
North Central 0.993 0.400 1.050 2.250 1.500 6,193 
TOTAL 35.341 11.951 35.536 50.562 233.615 8.220 380.225 
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan 1975-80. Vol. 1. (Lagos: Ministry 
o( Economie Development 1975) p. "2517 
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2. to respond and to fulfill national needs rather 
than partisan or sectional interest, 
3. to reflect in its structures and activities the 
size and varieties of the Nigerian society as well 
as the unity of the nation, 
4. to exploit the rich cultural material available 
throughout the country and make its output mainly 
indigenous in character, and 
5. to aim at producing cultural and topical programs 
for export to other countries.^ 
Much as the above objectives seem laudable, especially 
as they aim at national integration, unity, and the mobiliza- 
of the population which is essential for economic development, 
the spending of almost N238.615 million for the setting up 
of color television transmission stations all over the coun¬ 
try, however, smacks of inexpediency. The Federal Government 
and proponents of color transmission have come out with 
plausible reasons for the policy. They warn that manufac¬ 
turers now center their efforts on color television equip¬ 
ment and, increasingly, parts and technological components 
for black and white television are either out of stock or 
no longer in the production line.^ In spite of this, but 
considering the hard economic realities of petro-millionaire 
Nigeria with a paltry per capita income of about N205, and 
with only a tiny fraction of the population presently being 
able to afford a black and white television set without tears, 
the question to be asked is how many will be able and willing 
to foot a color television bill? Besides, the government 
^Business Times, April 6, 1976, p. 5. 
^Reasons given by a Federal Government spokesman and 
quoted in Business Times. Ibid. 
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continues to slap higher custom duties^ on television sets 
making it a luxury for even an urban elite2 to afford. 
The switch from black and white to color television 
can also be viewed as one in the series of wrongly directed 
and wrongly ordered priorities in Nigeria's development pro¬ 
grams. Electricity is not available to all sections of 
Nigeria. So far its supply remains an urban phenomenon. It 
is only the very few in the rural areas who can afford gener¬ 
ators that enjoy this aspect of modernization. Within the 
last six years, the supply of electricity to towns and 
cities in Nigeria has been most erratic. There is no city 
in Nigeria that can boast of a continuous supply of elec¬ 
tricity within a twelve hour period. Complaints about out¬ 
ages and eratic supply of electricity surface daily in news¬ 
papers throughout the country. An official of the National 
Electric Power Authority (NEPA) is quoted to have said that 
the authority cannot do better given the resources, human 
and financial, at its disposal.-^ 
The above considerations support the views that the 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette (Extra¬ 
ordinary), Vol. 65, No. Ï6 (Lagos: The Federal Ministry of 
Information, Printing Division, April 1, 1978), p. 75. The 
rate of duty has been increased from 40 percent to 75 percent. 
^A Federal Commissioner is quoted to have said that 
"in his opinion, the urban elite should be able to afford the 
cost of a color television since after all it was not a 
'common man's' toy...." See, Business Times, Op. Cit. 
^Sunday Punch, April 4, 1976, p. 16. 
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Federal Government's decision to change to color transmission 
for the television network is a misplaced priority which is 
motivated by an elitist attitude. When the huge sum of 
money involved is weighed against the "cui bono" factor of 
the policy and program, it is obvious that the benefit of 
the measure accrues to the elites who are in the minority 
while the poor masses are left with greater disadvantage 
than when mostly black and white television sets were used. 
If the Federal Government truly wants the masses to benefit 
from the switch from black and white to color transmission, 
more positive steps have to be taken to help the common man 
to own and to use color television sets. The provision of 
adequate and stable electricity supply throughout the country 
should be a priority measure. This will ensure that anyone 
who can afford a color television set will have electrical 
power to operate it anywhere in Nigeria. Furthermore, the 
government should drastically reduce the soaring customs 
duty on color television or provide facilities for assembling 
the sets in the country. Other steps can be the subsidizing 
of color television prices or direct marketing of the sets 
in order to eliminate the middleman whose high profit margin 
has contributed to the prohibitive cost of color television 
sets. After ensuring the operating possibilities and the 
ability of the common man to buy a color television set, the 
government should increase the transmission time. Hitherto, 
the National Television Service has been transmitting its 
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programs only within a four hour period daily, 7 o'clock to 
11 o'clock in the evenings. Citizens should be able to view 
their television sets during day time. Such extension of 
transmission time will provide the Ministry of Information 
the incentive for developing more programs suitable for edu¬ 
cation, enlightenment, and mobilization of the population. 
2. Office Accommodation. The provision of good physical 
working conditions has always been a principle of good per¬ 
sonnel policy. Without adequate seating space, ventilation, 
lighting, tolerable sound level, and sanitary conditions in 
the office or place of work, public employees almost invar¬ 
iably lose out in the expenditure of energy for productive 
work. The growth of Nigeria's Federal Civil Service since 
independence has given rise to acute shortages of office 
accommodation and other facilities which can contribute to 
the service being an efficient administrative machinery. 
Until 1975, the only spacious office accommodation had been 
the twenty-five story Independence Building which housed 
only four Ministries while all other Federal Ministries were 
scattered in different locations in Lagos in some make-shift 
but now fast deteriorating buildings that were used by the 
colonial administration. 
Pursuant to the need to pool Federal Ministries to¬ 
gether in order to facilitate contact among them in the fed¬ 
eral capital of Lagos, the government decided in 1975 to erect 
a giant secretariat in Ikoji. The objective was that of 
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achieving efficiency and greater productivity through the 
provision of better working environment. This goal has not 
been realized because of the difficulties workers have in 
arriving at their offices in time and working in comfort. 
It has been pointed out already that Ikoji is a secluded 
area which was formerly occupied by colonial government 
elites and now, by indigenous Nigerian government and Civil 
Service officials. Locating the new office blocks in Ikoji 
shows a lack of concern for the underprivileged civil ser¬ 
vants and citizens who live far away. The bureaucratic 
elites who already have been assigned government chauffeur- 
driven cars can now walk into their offices while the poor 
man takes three or more hours to get to the same place of 
work. The city of Lagos presently is having one of the worst 
transportaion problems that is faced by capitals of African 
nations. As one observer put it, "there is no traffic prob¬ 
lem in Lagos but there is an urban crisis which has mani¬ 
fested itself in the traffic and housing sectors."3- It is 
ridiculous to expect the civil servants will improve in effi¬ 
ciency and productivity when they have to wake up at five in 
the morning, spend hours at the bus stops waiting for buses 
and finally get to their offices physically exhausted. 
This policy, like the decision to change to color tele¬ 
vision transmission, shows the unbending desire of the policy 
makers to maintain the status quo. Even though they desire 
^Daily Times, March 2, 1976, p. 7. 
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changes through the policies they make, such changes are not 
divorced of advantages to the already privileged. The result 
is that for almost two decades since independence the common 
man remains down-trodden. The gap between him and the advan¬ 
taged Nigerian continues to widen. There is widespread want 
in the midst of plenty and it does not appear that the task 
of economic and social development has yet begun. Are the 
advisors of the Federal Government to be blamed for any of 
the bad policies as General Gowon said?^- To a certain extent 
some of the policies^ of the Federal Government have been 
seen to favor those in the top echelons of the Civil Service. 
And, since these officials are those who help in the formula¬ 
tion of government policies there is no doubt that they some¬ 
times act to feather their nests. This raises questions on 
the integrity and impartiality of the Civil Service. Of 
course one cannot assume that officials will passively sub¬ 
mit to the "public" will, or that, given a chance, they will 
not assert the primacy of their own interest and thus convert 
(or subvert) the policy, shaping it to meet their own require¬ 
ment and instituting bureaucratic rule.^ Riggs suggests that 
-*-West Africa, April 14, 1975. 
^The change to color television transmission has been 
cited already. Another example was the decision to implement 
the salary awards recommended by the Public Service Review Com¬ 
mission in 1974. The Commission had recommended that salary in¬ 
creases should be staggered, sixty percent to be received in 
the first year and the rest after one year. But the government 
was advised to pay the award in one year with half of the back 
pay tax-free. This produced the worst inflationary spiral in 
the economy and brought the cost of living very high causing 
the common man to suffer more. 
3Fred W. Riggs, Op. Cit., p. 262. 
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to curb this manifestation of bureaucratic power, means must 
be devised to bring "bureaucrats to heel" and to impose "the 
collar of public responsibility upon official necks."1 
A decision to build the new secretariat on the main¬ 
land of Lagos would have mitigated the ordeal which some 
workers experience in going to work on Lagos Island. Such 
a policy decision would have generated other side benefits. 
For example, there would be two main directional traffic 
flows during the peak hours. While some workers living in 
Lagos Island, including the Ikoji elites, would be going to 
work on the mainland area, some mainland dwellers would at 
the same time be heading for their offices in Lagos Island. 
Other workers who live on the mainland would head towards 
the new secretariat on the mainland. This would help in 
easing the traffic congestion on Lagos roads. The same thing 
would apply after working hours during the journey home. Fol¬ 
lowing this it is hoped that the eight-hours-a-day for five 
days constant exposure of some of the Ikoji dwelling govern¬ 
ment elites to health menaces like open and stinking gutters, 
heaps of decaying and smelling trash on the road side, and 
flooding streets during rains will convince these government 
officials that it is time their policies and programs bene¬ 
fited the common man. The policy will bring about some de¬ 
centralization of Ministries and Departments in Lagos. To 
make this decentralization effective the government would 
1Ibid. 
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have to improve the telephone system in order to facilitate 
communication between the Ministries and Departments in the 
island and on the mainland of Lagos. 
Three Development Plans 
A development plan in Nigeria, embodies a capital 
budget of public investment projects, a budget of government 
expenditure which contributes to economic and social develop¬ 
ment, and a program of legislation and regulation. The 
legislations and regulations are intended to direct, guide, 
and encourage the activities of private individuals and in¬ 
stitutions so that they can contribute to the efforts towards 
economic and social development. The budget of government 
expenditures is examined here in an effort to show the 
achievements and short-comings of each plan. The First 
National Development Plan, 1962-68, for the economic devel¬ 
opment of Nigeria was an instrument jointly evolved and spon¬ 
sored by the Federal and Regional Governments of Nigeria. 
The objectives of this Plan were to accelerate the rate of 
economic growth, to raise the standard of living of the peo¬ 
ple, and to give the country an increasing measure of control 
of its economy.^ Hence, it was necessary to aim at surpas¬ 
sing the past growth rate of the economy of 3.9 percent2 per 
^National Development Plan 1962-68 (Lagos: The Federal 
Ministry of Economic Development, 1962), p. 3. 
2This was the achieved rate of growth of the economy 
between 1955-1960 when the Colonial Development Policy was 
geared towards the stabilization of the Regions in Nigeria. 
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year compound and to achieve a growth rate of 4 percent of 
the Gross Domestic Product by investing 15 percent of the 
Gross National Product yearly into the directly productive 
sectors of the economy. The highest priority in volume of 
resources was accorded agriculture, industry, and technical 
education. 
Overall, 70 percent of the total capital expenditure 
of N1353.6 million was to be devoted to sectors which contri 
bute directly to economic growth: primary production, trade 
and industry, electricity, the transport system, communica¬ 
tions, irrigation, and industrial water supply. It was a 
development oriented Plan. Table 3 shows the shift in the 
TABLE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL PROGRAMS AMONG MAJOR EXPENDITURE 
CATEGORIES (ALL GOVERNMENTS) 1955-61 AND 1962-68 
Type of Expenditure 1955-61 Plan* 1962-68 Plant 
Development 50.8% 71.4% 
Social Overhead 19.9% 20.8% 
Administration 29.3% 7.8% 
100.0% 100.0% 
♦Excludes Self-financing by Statutory Corporations 
+Includes Self-financing by Statutory Corporations 
SOURCE: National Development Plan 1962-68, p. 47. 
composition of capital expenditure from administration to de 
velopmental expenditure while Table 4 shows the major shifts 
to sectors accorded highest priority in the Plan. 
97 
TABLE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON AREAS OF MAJOR 
EMPHASIS (ALL GOVERNMENTS) 1955-61 AND 1962-68 
Sectors 1955- 61 Plan 1962- 68 Plan 
Expenditure 
(N Million) 








tion 17.7 3.7 183.6 13.6 
Trade 
and 
Industry 13.8 2.9 180.6 13.4 
Education 37.6 8.0 139.6 10.3 
SOURCE : National Development Plan 1962-68, p. 47. 
Judged by its elitist nature the achievement of the 
Plan in terms of benefits to the common man was not all that 
spectacular. Some of the goals of the Plan, the achievement 
of which could have benefited the common man, were the achieve¬ 
ment of a more equitable distribution of income both among 
people and among regions, and the creation of more jobs and 
opportunities in non-agricultural occupations. The fact that 
there was no effective command structure extending throughout 
the economy led to the subversion of the intent of the Plan 
by a handful of large private foreign companies which owned 
the capital. These firms did nothing to expand in order to 
provide job opportunities as well as help in training needed 
manpower. Participation of Nigerians in these foreign owned 
businesses was mere window-dressing. The few Nigerians who 
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were managers had nothing to do with the policy of the com¬ 
panies and so could not influence decisions or protect Ni¬ 
gerian interests.-*- Thus for a while agriculture which oc¬ 
cupied a dominant position in the economy helped in provid¬ 
ing jobs and income in the rural areas and accounted for the 
bulk of exports. These were reflected in the Gross Domestic 
Product of 65 percent in 1962-63 and 63 percent in 1966-67. 
With the faster growth of the non-agricultural sector 
of the economy, especially mining, the relative position of 
agriculture suffered a decline. Besides, since no signifi¬ 
cant attempt was made to plough back the resources derived 
from agriculture into the rural economy, the rural area re¬ 
mained neglected and undeveloped. The result was that the 
farm incomes were reducing while the urban wages were in¬ 
creasing. This induced young people who would have worked 
in the farms in the rural areas to drift to the urban cen¬ 
ters where there was already surplus labor. An adequate 
attention paid to the needs of small farmers in the rural 
areas (extension, training, credit, irrigation, storage, 
and marketing of food crops) could have increased rural in¬ 
comes thus stemming the migration tide. This was not done 
and, as would be expected, the goal of equitable spread of 
income among people and regions—a measure which could have 
benefited the poor—was not achieved. 
Table 5 shows the achievement of the Plan in terms of 
■^Dupe Olatunbosun, Op. Cit. , p. 64. 
TABLE S 
FEDERATION OF NIGERIA 
FIRST NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND IMPLEMENTATION, 1962-1968* 
FEDERAL NORTHERN PEG!ON* * EASTERN REGION*** wr.51 ! >(' ! ÎÏÏT.ION* *** TOTAL FOR FEDERATION 
SECTOR (N MILLION) (N MILLION) (N MILLION) (N Mill , i
1 N (N MILLION 
% \ \ % % 
Est Act Ach. Est. Act Ach. Est, Act. Ach. Est. Act. Ach Est. Act. Ach. 
Primary Production 40.9 21.9. 53.5 49.9 22.1 44.2 60.7 31.7 52.2 36.8 29.1 79.0 183.5 105.0 57.2 
Trade and Industry 88.0 24.8 28.1 19.7 21.9 111.1 25.8 20.5 79.4 46.8 27.7 59.1 180.5 95.0 52.6 
Electricity 196.2 149.0 75.9 3.0 1.2 0.7 58.3 3.0 11.5 383.3 203.4 161.3 79.3 
Transport 207.9 191.3 92.0 49.3 24.5 49.6 17.7 11.0 62.1 12.7 15.3 120.4 287.6 242.2 90.5 
Communications 60.0 22.0 36.0 60.0 22.0 36.6 
Water 3.7 1.3 35.1 14.8 15.6 105.4 10.2 10.0 98.0 1-9. ; 18.4 93.4 48.5 49.4 101.8 
Education 58.3 49.3 84.5 37.8 20.0 52.9 17.7 5.7 32.2 25.7 16.1 62.6 139.5 91.3 65.4 
Health 20.6 5.9 28.6 6.6 6.2 93.9 3.6 1.4 38.8 3.2 I .2 37.5 34.1 14.9 43.6 
Town and Country 
Planning 
46.3 29.8 64.3 12.0 0.6 5.0 6.6 3.4 51.5 18.5 5.3 28.5 83.4 39.2 47.0 
Co-Operative and 
Social Welfare 
5.3 t.l 20.7 4.8 4.1 B5.4 1.0 0,7 70.0 6.0 1 .4 23.3 17.3 7.4 42.7 
Information 4.7 4.4 93.6 0.1 1.2 1200.0 0.9 3.0 333.3 1.5 0.9 60.0 7.3 9.3 127.3 
Judicial 0.5 1.5 300.0 0.5 0.3 60.0 0.8 0.6 75.0 1.9 2.4 126.3 
Administration 87.8 181.0 206.1 1.9 8.0 421.0 4.1 5.2 126.8 2.2 12.6 572.7 98.1 207.0 211.0 




0.2 2.8 1400.0 3.2 12.0 375.0 7.8 25.7 329.4 
TOTAL B24.6 692.8 199.9 125.4 150.2 96.4 180.1 152.1 1352.9 1072.1 79.2 
Source: Federal Ministry OfEconomic Development, Second Nationol Development Plan 1970-74 (Lagos, Federal Government Printer, 1970) p. 13 
* The figures in this table have been couverte»! to N(Naira); B N 2, and have been let at first, decimal. This may account for slight 
differences from those contained in the Source. 
** The ’Actual" for 1967-68 refers only to the various Approved Estimates concerned 
*** Excludes 1967-68 figures for Actuals. The economy was disrupted by the Civil War. 
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the investments made in the priority sectors. The health 
sector from which the common man could have benefited had 
one of the lowest achievement percentages, 43.6 percent. 
There were generally short-falls in the actual sectoral 
spending. Of some concern to the government were the short¬ 
falls between actual and estimate in directly productive 
sectors like Primary Production (-57.2 percent) and Trade 
and Industry (-52.6 percent).^ However, the largest over¬ 
expenditure surfaced under Administration. This was a re¬ 
sult of the Defense requirement which increased enormously 
toward the end of the Plan period.^ Besides, it was partly 
caused by the Nigerianization exercise which induced the 
promotion of civil servants within pay scales, and the in¬ 
crease in pay scales following a general strike of 1964.3 
The Government of the Federation had expected to 
realize 50 percent of the funds needed for financing the 
Plan from foreign aid. This proved too costly an expecta¬ 
tion. As only 20 percent foreign financial aid was received, 
funds had to be shifted from stated priority sectors into 
some major projects like the Kainji Dam Project which had 
assumed additional cost in its implementation.4 The Plan 
^Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 (Lagos: 
Federal Ministry of Information, 197 0) , p~. 14. 
^ibid., p. 93. 
^Edwin Dean, Plan Implementation 1962-66 (Ibadan: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 57. 
^Ibid., p. 92. 
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had to its credit the completion of some major projects 
which included the Oil Refinery, the Security and Minting 
Plant, the Paper Mill, Sugar Mill, Niger Dam, Niger Bridge, 
some major roads, and ports extension. 
However, the Plan and its implementation had some 
problems and mistakes, some of which the Second National 
Development Plan 1970-74 attempted to correct. Some of 
these have been mentioned already. A few^ more are added 
here. Firstly, there was inadequate participation of the 
public in decision-making. The Plan relied to an extent on 
non-Nigerian planners and the Cabinet without tapping the 
opinion of the public. There was a serious lack of informa¬ 
tion which could be used in planning. The publication of 
Annual Reports by Government Departments and Statutory Cor¬ 
poration which yielded useful information for planning during 
the colonial days was ignored by the Civil Service. Statis¬ 
tical records ran years behind to be of use in any current 
planning. The Government has become increasingly reluctant 
to release information to researchers and has evolved a sys¬ 
tem of controlling individual research initiative by requiring 
1A number of sources have provided materials for this 
discussion on the inadequacy of the Plan. Prominent among 
these are, W. Arthur Lewis, Reflections on Nigeria's Economic 
Growth (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1967); Edwin Dean, 
Op. Cit.; and Sayre P. Schatz, "Nigeria's First National 
Development Plan (1962-68) An Appraisal," The Nigerian Jour- 
nal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 2, July 1963, pp. 
221-235. 
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that research touching on Government activities must have 
the stamp of Government approval.-1- This dearth of facts 
essential for planning seemed to have provided Wolfgang F. 
Stopler part of the title to his book. 
Secondly, there was no adequate machinery for imple¬ 
menting the public sector programs. The planning agency had 
no staff concerned exclusively with implementation such that 
projects could have been scheduled to meet time specified 
for each phase of implementation. Thirdly, there was in¬ 
adequate evaluation of how new policies were working out. 
Policies which were destined to result in negative outcomes 
were not early detected. And, fourthly there was excessive 
political intervention in economic decision-making. This 
resulted in displacement of priorities and in money being 
wasted on prestige projects which only benefited a few. 
Dr. A. D. Yahaya discusses fully the problems of hav¬ 
ing access to data from the Nigerian Government and asserts, 
"access to data particularly on government activities is an 
essential aspect of a democratic and participatory govern¬ 
ment." It is the monopoly of control of data which has in 
recent years catapulted the civil servants from "anonymous 
actors into a strong political force to be reckoned with in 
Nigeria." See, A. D. Yahaya, "Access to Data," Paper pre¬ 
sented at the National Conference on Research and Public 
Policy: Priorities and Strategies (Zaria: Institute of Ad¬ 
ministration, Ahmadu Bello University, 1976). Also see the 
illuminating discussion by Hans J. Morgenthau on the odds 
facing the political scientist in his search for truth, "The 
Purpose of Political Science," in A Design for Political 
Science: Scope, Objectives and Methods, Monograph No. 6, 
James C. Charlesworth (ed.) (Philadelphia : American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 1966). 
2Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Alloca¬ 
tion from Nigeria's Development (Cambridge: Harvard Univer¬ 
sity Press, 1966). Stopler headed the planning team for the 
National Development Plan. 
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Political intervention also led to corruption of all shades 
and forms. These and others will be fully discussed when 
examining the constraints on the role performance of the 
civil servants. 
The First National Development Plan, 1962-68, had to 
be extended to last for two more years because of the Niger¬ 
ian Civil War. In 1970 the Second National Development Plan, 
1970-74 (hereafter to be referred to as the Second Plan) was 
launched. The estimated cost was N3.192 billion distributed 
between the public and private sectors.^ The Second Plan 
contained not only the framework for the development of the 
economy but also the programs for reconstructing the ruins 
of the thirty months Civil War. 
The basic economic objective of this Plan was the 
achievement of a minimum average rate of growth of 6.6 per¬ 
cent per annum in the Gross Domestic Product. Mining and 
manufacturing were projected to be the fastest growing sec¬ 
tors in the Plan; and of this, petroleum accounted for 40 
percent. Agriculture was estimated to grow at an average rate 
of 2.4 percent annually during the Plan period while addi¬ 
tional employment of about three and a quarter million was 
to be generated. Unlike in the First National Development 
Plan, the Federal Government was to take a commanding posi¬ 
tion "in the quest for purposeful national development and 
^Third Development Plan 1975-80, Vol. 1 (Lagos: Feder¬ 
al Ministry of Economic Development, 1975), p. 11. 
104 
the provision of leadership and honest administration neces¬ 
sary for the attainment of a national sense of purpose. 
Thus in the Second Plan, five principal national objectives 
were set to establish Nigeria firmly as, "a united, strong, 
and self-reliant nation; a great and dynamic economy; a just 
and egalitarian society; a land of bright and full opportun¬ 
ities for all citizens; and a free and democratic society."2 
One may ask whether the Government lived up to the 
above objectives, especially as they affected the ordinary 
citizen. For, by accepting the notion of "a just and egali¬ 
tarian society full of opportunities for all citizens," the 
government was entering a caveat on the existing inequality 
of income distribution.3 This Plan period was the time when 
Nigeria experienced oil boom and obtained unprecedented 
revenue from it. The result was the Government's increased 
reliance on oil revenue with little attention paid to agri¬ 
culture which had been the life blood of the economy in the 
preceding years. No efforts were made at investing the oil 
wealth in developing the rural areas. Today the rural economy 
remains poor and still lacking in development of any sort. 
Even among workers resident in urban areas and working in 
the same establishment, salary differentials were still great. 
^Second Plan 1970-74, p. 32. 
^ibid. 
3By 1970 when the Second Plan was launched the computed 
annual per capita income was less than N62 which was the value 
in early 1960. 
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The attempt to narrow the difference with salary increases 
recommended by the Public Service Review Commission only 
helped to worsen the situation. The Government White Paper 
which accepted the new salary structure was seen as being 
manipulated by "a special interest group in the public ser¬ 
vice with intent to maintain its privileged position.The 
pay award which was implemented early in 1975 but made retro¬ 
spective to April 1974 brought with it increases of 3 to 40 
percent on prices of most essential goods and did not im¬ 
prove the lot of the workers. This position was reflected 
by the consumer index. In Lagos, for example, the consumer 
price index, based on the expenditure patterns of workers 
earning between N800 and Hi,600 per annum in 1960, went up 
from 186.1 percent in June 1973, to 226.3 percent in June 
1974. The index for the lower income group (clerks, artisans, 
and laborers) earning not more than N800 per annum in 1960 
went up from 191.3 percent in June 1973, to 223.3 percent in 
June 1974.2 Goods were in short supply and the prices of 
food, items soared because many hands were deserting the farms 
in search for the share of oil money in towns and cities. 
The Government measures to halt this trend met with colossal 
failures. 
Nevertheless, the Second Plan period had its achieve¬ 
ments and set-backs in the economic field. As a Plan embodying 
^West Africa, March 3, 1975, p. 249. 
2Ibid. 
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reconstruction programs, it successfully rehabilitated and 
brought back into operation some agricultural farms and 
plantations in the war-torn areas. The Marketing Board sys¬ 
tem was reformed making it possible for farmers to receive 
higher prices for their produce. Food production companies 
were established to produce more food items for the country. 
Two dams were also completed during the period. There were 
other achievements in the areas of transportation, education, 
information and social welfare, communications, and mining. 
The health sector got attention too but significantly in the 
teaching hospitals where the poor cannot afford the expenses 
for treatment. For the States as a whole, over three hundred 
health and maternity centers as well as dispensary units 
were established during the period. However, the impact of 
the achievement was limited to some extent by shortages of 
medical and para-medical manpower.^ 
Some criticisms of the Second Plan were made and it 
is useful to record here the pertinent ones. Like in the 
First National Development Plan, 1962-68, there was complete 
absence of consultation within the country. The private sec¬ 
tor which was to play a vital role in the development effort 
was not fully consulted. The local authority bodies as well 
as local communities were not associated with the Plan. The 
planners in assuming the role of philosopher kings had com¬ 
pletely ignored the fact that, 
•*~Third National Plan, Op. Cit. , p. 13. 
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Effective national development requires full mobili¬ 
zation of all units of national, regional, and local 
government. That, employees and their units of gov¬ 
ernment at all levels, must become committed to de¬ 
velopment action through education and involvement. 
That, the government has an important role in helping 
facilitate overall national participation.^ 
As a consequence of lack of input from the local authority 
bodies and local communities the Plan failed to provide for 
even development between the different parts of the country 
and the much needed social service.2 The failure of the 
Plan to have provided for the establishment of the iron and 
steel industry still left open the drainage of the country's 
foreign exchange through the importation of iron and steel. 
Besides, the income, employment, and other externalities 
which could have benefited,the economy and the ordinary man 
were forfeited in the absence of the industry. Of major 
concern was lack of infrastructure which could have kept up 
satisfactorily with the growth of industry and commerce. 
The destruction caused by the Civil War and the lop-sided 
concentration and promotion of particular industrial regions, 
especially around Lagos, have been responsible for this 
situation. The port facilities present recurring problems. 
The telephone and cable network are woefully inadequate and 
the frequent outages of electricity supply have caused the 
most enthusiastic investors some uneasiness in considering 
the expansion of their businesses. 
^Saul M. Katz, Guide to Modernizing Administration for 
National Development (Pittsburgh: Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs, 1965), p. 22. 
2Time Annual Review (Lagos: Magazine Division of the 
Daily Times of Nigeria, 1971), p. 5. 
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In 1975 the Federal Government launched another de¬ 
velopment plan, the third since independence. It is to cover 
the period 1975-80 and it aims at solving most of the econom¬ 
ic problems not treated by the two preceding development 
plans. While this Plan has accepted the five national ob¬ 
jectives identified in the Second Plan as still valid and 
applicable, specific short-term objectives aimed at facili¬ 
tating the ultimate realization of the five national objec¬ 
tives under the Third Plan have been enunciated. These are: 
increase in per capita income; more even distribution of 
income; reduction in the level of unemployment; increase in 
the supply of high level manpower; diversification of the 
economy; balanced development and indigenization of economic 
activity.1 The attainment of these goals, it is hoped will 
radically transform the national economy with a significant 
improvement in the standard of living of every citizen. 
The Plan started out with almost over-ambitious in¬ 
vestment allocations for different sectors of the economy 
(Table 6). Nigeria, between 1973 and 1975, was benefiting 
from the rise in the price of oil and was earning substantial 
revenue. The country could therefore afford such a large in¬ 
vestment expenditure. But twelve months after the Third Plan 
was launched, the government announced in the budget speech 
1976/77 that, "the development in the economy in the 1975/76 
fiscal year has not been encouraging. There are early warning 
•^Third Plan, Op. Cit. , p. 29. 
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TABLE 6 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM BY SECTORS: NIGERIA'S 
SECOND AND THIRD DEVELOPMENT PLANS COMPARED 
Sectors 
N Billion 
Third Plan Second Plan 
Transport 7.3 0.90 
Manufacturing 5. 3 0.19 
Regional Development 4.1 0.21 
Mining and Power 3.7 0.14 
Defense and Security 3.3 0.35 
Education 2. 5 0.40 
Agriculture 2.2 0.33 
Information and Communication 1.7 0.21 
Other Sectors 2.6 0.62 
Total 32.8* 3.35 
SOURCE: Third National Development Plan 1975-80, Vol. 1 
(Lagos: Ministry of Economic Development, 1975). 
*The Plan assumes this figure to be nominal capital 
program expenditure but considers the combined effective 
public capital program expenditure to be N20 billion. This 
is the level of investment by public agencies accepted as 
feasible, having regard to executive and absorptive con¬ 
straints such as manpower shortages and limited port facili¬ 
ties . 
signs of danger ahead if the economy were allowed to remain 
over heated. 
The causes of the poor performance of the economy in 
the 1975/76 year were attributed to decline in the output of 
crude oil. The country's balance of payment was in poor 
shape. The foreign exchange was used up and the accumulated 
^Budget Speech by the Head of State, His Excellency, 
Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, April 1976. (Tape Recorded). 
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reserve had to be drawn to meet standing commitments. These 
last two were caused by reckless imports of consumer goods 
and existing high rate of inflation in the country. As a 
consequence of these detracting factors in the economy, 
General Obasanjo warned that though there was no intention 
of rewriting the Third Plan, essential first aid measures 
were to be taken to keep the Plan alive. The priorities in 
the Plan were to be re-ordered "to reflect the realities and 
aspirations of the nation." It was seen fit to eliminate all 
prestige projects in the Third Plan and priority had to be 
shifted to that of providing housing, health care facilities 
as well as boosting the agricultural sector. 
It is yet too early to judge the performance of the 
Third Plan. One thing can be said and that is that with the 
discovery of oil in nearby Ghana and Ivory Coast besides the 
likely dependence of Britain on the oil lately found in the 
North Sea and the U.S. search for new sources of energy, 
Nigeria's future dependence on money from oil sales is bleak 
and General Gowon's assertions that, "revenue from oil forms 
•^-Under a caption "Money No Obstacle to Development— 
No Longer Valid," the Africa Confidential wrote, "Oil revenues 
are down, partly as a result of conservation policy; costs 
are rising; (inflation is running at some 30 percent, and 
cost of local food is a contributor); the 30,000 million naira 
development plan is being pruned not only of its extravagances 
but of some more necessary projects. By 1979 a civilian gov¬ 
ernment may find that recurrent costsarising from present 
capital development—universal primary education, water sup¬ 
plies, roads, public housing, and the rest—will be difficult 
to meet. See, Vol. 17, No. 18, September 10, 1976, p. 3. 
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and will, for a long time, form a very large proportion of 
Government revenue"-*- is no longer valid. This lack of fore¬ 
sight of the planners and estimators of Nigeria's economy 
only lends weight to the contention that most of the planning 
is carried out with inadequate facts and wrong information. 
Besides, the country's sudden "poverty" is partly attributed 
to its reckless spending especially on prestige projects 
which are very non-productive economically. A certain amount 
of vain pride is taken by the leaders in wasteful spending 
only to gain for Nigeria cheap adoration of being first to 
get this or first to get that in Africa. Why, with the bil¬ 
lions of dollars tied down, is an unproductive project like 
the ultra modern and, in fact, first-in-the-worId Arts 
Theatre Building, standing sometimes unused for a whole year 
at Igamu? Of what benefits to the economy, and more so to 
the better standard of living of the ordinary Nigerian, was 
the Second World Festival of Black and African Arts and Cul¬ 
ture (FESTAC) held in Lagos in January 1977? And, of what 
use was the Lagos Trade Fair in which Nigeria could only see 
an array of foreign products to import but could not show 
much of what it is able to export? But millions of niara 
went down the drain and some even passed into corrupt uses 
all in an effort to prepare for and have the two "prestigeous" 
•^Broadcast on the 1974-75 Budget Recurrent and Capital 
Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1974-75 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1974), p. XV. 
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events staged in Nigeria. 
This chapter has attempted to show the roles the Niger¬ 
ian Federal Civil Service plays in the framework of the Fed¬ 
eral Government. It has examined the Nigerian political 
culture and also the mental framework of the civil servants. 
It contends that the top civil servants and government offi¬ 
cials pursue elitist policies and development programs in 
spite of their avowed declaration to serve the interest of 
the ordinary man. But it sees this flagrant abuse of public 
trust as a consequence of the passivity of Nigerians towards 
government processes. The only time Nigeria will achieve 
even development, equality in income distribution, and a 
better standard of living for all is when Nigerians, all and 
sundry, care to participate and make concrete inputs into 
policies and development programs. The chapter finally 
examines some policy measures and the three Development Pro¬ 
grams to buttress the contention that lack of input from 
the mass of the population into the policy process and devel¬ 
opment programs has led to uneven development, differential 
incomes and standard of living between groups and regions in 
the country. The next chapter looks at some of the constraints 
and facilitators on the role of the Civil Service since na¬ 
tional independence in 1960. 
CHAPTER IV 
SOME ROLE CONSTRAINTS AND ROLE FACILITATORS 
An analysis of the role of an administrative bureau¬ 
cracy in Nigeria should include an examination of the en¬ 
vironment within which that bureaucracy exists. Such an 
exercise serves to underscore the factors which contribute 
to, as well as those which detract from, the capacity^ of 
the administrative machinery in meeting the demands of its 
constituency.^ The Nigerian Federal Civil Service, since 
independence, in 1960, has been a function of two distinct 
^Capacity (to carry out plans or to perform assigned 
roles) depends on a government's resources. Three kinds of 
resources are particularly important: the level of support 
for persons in authority, the institutions and procedures of 
government and the political community; the availability of 
funds and the freedom to allocate them according to the gov¬ 
ernment priorities; and the competence of a country's public 
institutions. See, David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma 
of Popular Education: An African Case (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1969), p. 213. 
^Administrative Constituency is defined as "any group, 
body, or interest to which the administrative politician looks 
for aid or guidance or which seeks to establish itself as so 
important (in his judgment) that he 'had better take account 
of its preference even if he finds himself adverse to those 
preferences....' The term although customarily applied to 
external groups which make claims upon the administration, 
is equally applicable to subordinates, employees and colleagues 
who constitute internal constituencies. To an extent, it sub¬ 
sumes the idea of environment." See, Matthew Holden, Jr., 
"Imperialism in Bureaucracy," American Political Science Re¬ 
view , Vol. 60, December 1966, p. 944. 
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types of governments—the independent parliamentary and the 
independent military. Under each rule, we can identify some 
governmental and non-governmental organizations which are 
related either as they affect the inputs, the administra¬ 
tive processes or the output of the Civil Service. These 
constitute the "task" environment, which is immediate and 
operational. There is also a more remote and general en¬ 
vironment which can be referred to as "contextual^ This 
is the social setting within which both the "task" environ¬ 
ment and the Civil Service exist. Relations between the 
Civil Service and its environment can be depicted as being 
ecological.2 This is because the environment sets constraints 
on behavior and also stipulates resources though it does not 
regulate individual choice of action. On the other hand, if 
the Civil Service perforins well in using the resources pro¬ 
vided, it can foster citizens' participation in making and 
implementing "collective decisions" that can contribute to 
significant changes in the environment. Using this setting, 
this section will probe the factors constraining and those 
facilitating the policy formulating and policy implementation 
•'•The author acknowledges debt in setting these two 
categories. The notion of two environments--"task" and "con¬ 
textual" is drawn from Irving Swerdlow, The Public Administra- 
tion of Economic Development (New York: Praegar Publishers, 
1975), p. 367. 
^The term "ecological" derives from Fred Riggs' analy¬ 
sis of interaction between an administrative organization and 
its setting—political, social,historical. See, Fred W. Riggs, 
The Ecology of Public Administration (New York: Asia Publish¬ 
ing House, 1961). 
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Fig. 4. Conceptualized diagramatic presentation of the 
Nigerian Federal Civil Service within "Task" and "Contextual" 
environments of two governments: the Civilian and the Mili¬ 
tary . 
roles of the Federal Civil Service towards national develop¬ 
ment. Some factors in the contextual environment of the 
Civil Service will be treated first. 
Executive Capacity 
Nigeria at the time of independence was made up of 
three semi-autonomous regions each dominated by single party 
rule. By July 1963, a fourth region was created out of 
Western Region. This new region was known as the Mid-west. 
Of the four existing regions, the Northern region formed the 
largest block in size and in population. Its preponderance 
over the other three regions put together contributed to the 
existence of an unusual type of federation which had in it 
"one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be 
116 
capable of vying in strength with many of them combined."3 
The effect of this anomally was most telling in the opera¬ 
tions of the Federal Government which was representative of 
the four regions. The 1958 Constitutional Conference had 
sanctioned the North's electoral advantage as it was then 
written into the Constitution that the Federal Parliament 
would be elected on the basis of the population figures. 
The measure guaranteed the North a "political veto"3 over 
the rest of the country. 
The population advantage of the Northern Region over 
that of the rest of the country put together has remained a 
thorny political issue and one cause of the major divide 
between North and South. The doubts of Southern Nigerians 
have been reinforced by the awareness that population con¬ 
centrations in the northern parts of the country are sparse 
and one sees more of savanah vegetation than people while 
travelling in the vast North. Moreover, there is the sus¬ 
picion that the British administrators, in their blind zest 
to "protect the North and use it as a ballast for conservat¬ 
ism"3 in Nigeria against the radical Southern political demo- 
gogues, who constituted "a small minority of educated and 
3J. S. Mill, Consideration on Representative Govern- 
ment, R. B. McCallum, (ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 
1946), p. 299. 
B. J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria 
(London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 270. 
3Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1970), p. 148. 
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Europeanized natives having nothing in common with the large 
native population,"-*- had inflated the 1921 and 1952 census 
figures in favor of the North. These two censuses are often 
regarded by Southerners as mere guesswork providing no base 
population."^ The 1962 and 1963 censuses which the Southern 
politicians thought would remedy the imbalance and which 
were conducted by Nigerians were fraught with irregularities 
and large scale inflation of figures even though civil ser¬ 
vants, the "elite corps" in the country controlled the oper¬ 
ations . 3 
Confident of the voting strength which ensured for 
them a cast-iron dominance of Nigerian political life but 
fearing that administrative power in the Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice would be monopolized by Southerners because of their 
long-standing educational lead, the Northern leaders started 
agitating for the use of a guota system in recruitment into 
the Federal Civil Service.4 The late Sardauna of Sokoto, 
^-Frederick Lugard, Report on the Amalgamation of South 
ern and Northern Nigeria, and Administration 1912-1919, Cmnd. 
4 68 , (London : H.M.S.0., 1920), Cited in Frederick A. Schwarz 
Nigeria, the Tribes, the Nation or the Race (Cambridge, Mass. 
The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 151. 
^West Africa, December 22, 1962, p. 1421. 
3Ibid. See also, Walter Schwarz, Op. Cit♦, p. 51. 
Final figures for the 1963 Census were: North, 29,758,875; 
East, 12,394,462; West, 10,265,846; Mid-west, 2,535,893; 
Lagos, 665,246, West Africa, September 5, 1964, p. 1007. 
40f recent the use of a guota system in the Federal 
Civil Service to ensure representation of different groups 
in Nigeria thereby gaining political stability in the country 
featured as a subject of discussion in a conference on the 
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Premier of Northern Region and leader of the Northern Peo¬ 
ple's Congress, testified to the existence of such fears in 
his justification of the policy of "Northernization" which 
his government adamantly pursued. He said, 
As things were at that time, if the gates to the de¬ 
partments were to be opened, the Southern Regions 
had a huge pool from which they could find suitable 
people, while we had hardly anyone. In the resulting 
scramble it would, we were convinced, be inevitable 
that the Southern applicants would get almost all 
the posts available. Once you get a Government post 
you are hard indeed to shift and providing there is 
no misconduct, the line of promotion to higher posts 
must, so far as possible, follow seniority. The 
answer was clearly that in these circumstances the 
Northerners' chance of getting anywhere in the Gov¬ 
ernment service would be exactly nil.. for we were not 
only educationally backward but we stood at the time 
far behind the others in material development. This 
was due largely to our great size and rather scattered 
population.... If the British administration had failed 
to give us the even development that we deserved and 
for which we craved so much, what had we to hope from 
an African administration....The answer to our minds 
was quite simple, just nothing, beyond a little win¬ 
dow dressing. •*- 
'Ladipo Adamolekun, discussing this agitation for an applica¬ 
tion of a political solution to an administrative problem, 
notes that from 1967 onwards the Nigerian House of Represen¬ 
tatives remained divided on what the term "Nigerianization" 
should mean. To some it meant that it was intended to be 
localization of personnel through a systematic replacement 
"Reform of the Nigerian Public Service" held at the Institute 
of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, October 
1971. See, Reform of the Nigerian Public Service by Mahmud 
Tukur (ed.) (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1971), pp. 1-39. 
^-Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni¬ 
versity Press, 1962), pp. 110-111. 
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of expatriate officers by any "qualified" Nigerians. To 
others who desired an ethnic equation in the Nigerianization 
process, it meant that the exercise should take the "principle 
of representativeness" into account.-*- Nevertheless until the 
end of 1959 the Federal Government's policy on Nigerianization 
had it that, 
Appointments and promotions to posts in the Federal 
Public Service are not based on tribal considerations. 
Any Nigerian, no matter his tribe, is eligible for 
appointment or promotion to any post for which his 
experience, seniority, academic attainment and merit 
qualify him.2 
Victor A. Olorunsola has said that although no written 
statement was made about recruiting the Civil Service on the 
basis of a quota system, actual practice suggests the exis¬ 
tence of an undeclared policy. He found out that the North¬ 
ern Premier's Office and the Federal Public Service Commission 
kept in constant touch about available Northerners for posts 
in the Federal Civil Service, and that attractive posts were 
earmarked for such officers. Besides, the most common way 
by which most Northerners were recruited into the Federal 
Civil Service was by secondment and promotion from the re¬ 
gional service.-* 
-*-'Ladipo Adamolekun, "Parliament and the Executive in 
Nigeria," in Ife Essays in Administration, Colin Baker and 
M. J. Balogun (eds.) (Ife: University of Ife Press, 1975), 
p. 74. For an opinion on Regional and Tribal discrimination 
in the Federal Civil Service, see, West Africa, January 18, 
1964, p. 73. 
^Prime Minister's reply to a member's question on main¬ 
taining "proper balance between the tribes in the Federal Pub¬ 
lic Service," November 20, 1958, cited in Adamolekun, Ibid. 
^Victor A. Olorunsola, "Patterns of Interaction Between 
Bureaucratic and Political Leaders: A Case Study," The Jour¬ 
nal of Developing Areas, Vol. 3, October 1968, p. 59. 
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Sir Abubakar, the Prime Minister, was soon to realize 
after independence that if experience, seniority, academic 
qualifications and merit were to be the only criteria for 
recruitment and promotion, his native North would finish 
last in the race for administrative and other positions in 
the Federal Civil Service. For, in spite of the Northern 
political control of many federal ministries, at the time 
of independence only one percent of numerical strength of 
the Federal Civil Service was held by citizens from the 
North, and of this most were in the lower grades of the 
Civil Service. By the end of 1961 it was two percent.^ A 
political solution seemed to have been the only way out of 
the dilemma.^ Sir Abubakar appointed in 1963 a fellow 
Northerner to be the Chairman of the Federal Public Service 
Commission, a post which the incumbent held until 1975. 
This appointment greatly eased the infusion of Northern 
candidates into the various grades of the Civil Service but 
^•Figures given by the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Establishment in answer to a Parliamentary ques¬ 
tion. Parliamentary Debates. House of Representatives, 
April 4, 1962, Cols. 815-816. Cited in Frederick A. 0. 
Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria, the Tribe, the Nation, or the Race 
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 115. 
2This notion of political solution was even listed in 
a letter published in West Africa January 18, 1964 in which 
the author stated, "It is true that there is regional and 
tribal discrimination in the Federal Civil Service, but all 
regional Governments are guilty of this sin. The NPC are 
only trying in their own way to balance the Western" and 
"Eastern domination of the Federal Civil Service.... The 
short-comings of the Federal Government originate from the 
very pattern of Nigerian politics." 
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with some unfavorable effects in the post independence per¬ 
iod. ^ Commenting on the effect of this deviation from the 
merit principle, Henry Bretton observes that, 
One element of deterioration of the public service 
must be traced to the Federal Government itself, in 
particular to the dominant Northern Region contin¬ 
gent in it. Insistence by Northerners that the ratio 
of approximately fifty-fifty be applied throughout 
the federal service with regard to north-south repre¬ 
sentation in all superscale posts brings to a vir¬ 
tual halt operations in certain departments where 
officers of seniority, but of Southern origin, are 
compelled to remain frozen in their posts while the 
country awaits the emergence of suitably trained 
Northern Hausa candidates. Many of the candidates 
advanced in the North are, in fact, semi-literate 
and extremely inexperienced.^ 
Table 7 shows the number of posts Nigerianized in the 
higher grades of Federal Civil Service between 1960-1963. 
This exercise resulted in a rather rapid turnover in the 
service and consequent dilution of experience. The effects 
were astounding in the contribution of the administrative 
bureaucracy towards the planning and execution of the First 
National Development Plan, 1962-1968. It has been indicated 
earlier that the two principal Ministries most concerned with 
planning under the Plan were Finance and Economic Development. 
These two, among many others, were during part or all of the 
^1. F. Nicolson says that the practice prevented "the 
effective realization of the ideal of a non-political civil 
service." See, "Machinery of the Governments in John P. Mac¬ 
kintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston: North¬ 
western University Press, 1966), pp. 197-198. 
^Henry L. Bretton, Power and Stability in Nigeria (New 
York: Frederick A. Praegar, Publisher, 1962), p. 150. See 
also, Abernethy, Op. Cit., Chapter II for politically de¬ 
stabilizing effect of this pattern of recruitment in the Civil 
Service. 
TABLE 7 
















b c d 
« 
Administration (i) 41 19 6 32 50 40 15 44 17 57 22 77 5 60 15 92 
(ii) 109 200 76 65 20 161 61 89 2 119 19 99 2 106 42 98 
Audit (i) 5 1 2 17 5 3 — 37 7 5 — 42 4 4 — 50 
(ii) 6 42 8 88 3 44 6 93 4 54 — 93 2 54 2 96 
Foreign Affairs (i) — 31 6 100 — 31 30 100 — 47 23 100 
(ii) 1 89 39 99 — 69 31 100 1 196 7.3 99 
Commerce- (i) 23 5 9 18 21 6 11 22 20 6 — 23 9 6 4 40 
Industry (ii) 39 173 69 82 28 186 74 87 22 147 — 86 6 96 51 94 
Economic (i) 21 — 9 0 19 3 10 14 18 1 7 5 11 7 10 39 
Development (ii) 75 112 63 60 52 145 87 75 50 144 62 74 30 208 61 87 
Education (i) 24 8 6 25 15 11 16 42 14 13 14 48 13 17 4 57 
(ii) 75 113 70 60 80 130 65 62 96 103 40 51 51 132 87 72 
Health (i) 20 24 27 41 11 31 9 74 17 24 23 58 10 32 60 76 
(ii) 46 238 40 84 31 303 34 91 36 354 4 91 20 386 5 95 
Justice (i) 5 8 — 62 5 10 8 66 5 12 4 70 5 16 5 76 
(ii) — 31 2 100 — 39 5 100 — 27 11 100 — 37 11 100 
Transport and (i) 21 5 6 19 13 5 13 28 19 3 6 14 14 6 10 30 
Aviation (ii) 75 94 42 56 77 83 77 52 49 85 113 63 32 76 174 70 
Works and (i) 58 9 11 13 43 14 19 24 47 13 3 22 26 17 13 40 
Surveys (ii) 356 223 161 39 222 288 130 56 221 275 217 58 165 421 122 72 
SOURCE: Compiled from Annual Reporta of the Federal Public Service Commission by A. H. M. Kirk- 
Green and presented in "the Higher Public Service" in L. Franklin Blitz, Op. Cit., p. 226. 
Key: (a) Postsheld by expatriate officers (c) Postsunfilled (i) Superscale posts 
(b) Postsheld by Nigerian officers (d) Percentage of postsheld by Niger- (ii) Other Senior posts 







Plan formulation headed by expatriate Permanent Secretaries. 
Table 7 shows no Nigerian holding the superscale post in the 
Ministry of Economic Development in 1960, but three in 1961, 
and one in 1962. These Nigerians who because of the pace of 
Nigerianization process were promoted to senior level posts 
were relatively young and inexperienced in the new responsi¬ 
bilities thrust on them by their new positions. The quan¬ 
tity and quality of civil servants of particular types were 
therefore inadequate for the demands of the Plan,-*- hence the 
heavy reliance on non-Nigerian planners. In fact it can be 
said that the infusion of less educated and inexperienced 
Nigerians in the higher ranks of Federal Civil Service in 
the immediate post independence period, on whatever grounds, 
did more harm than good to the already weak administrative 
machinery. Executive capacity problem stood out as the 
single most potent cause in the failure of the Federal Gov¬ 
ernment to achieve various targets of development earmarked 
in tfhePlan. It led to the failure of the government to at¬ 
tract the much needed foreign aid which was essential for the 
Edwin Dean, Plan Implementation in Nigeria (Ibadan: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 124. Dean analyzes in 
depth the implications of "lack of executive capacity" during 
the Plan period in Chapter 4 of his book. He maintains that 
"the same administrative inadequacies which, in 1961, had 
caused serious delays in negotiations on projects, continued 
to delay the receipt of foreign aid through 1966," p. 119. 
'These inadequacies in Nigerian executive capacity resulted 
partly from a relative lack of people with particular skills 
or the necessary experience. Lags in the preparation of 
projects for execution and aid negotiations resulted in part 
from too few engineers, architects, quantity surveyors, etc.; 
and the use of foreign planners was partly due to a lack of 
skilled Nigerians, as of 1960-62," pp. 123-124. 
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implementation of the Plan. It also forced Plan distortion 
in that there was abandonment of sectors where excessive 
strain on executive capacity was experienced for those re¬ 
quiring relatively little executive capacity. The problem 
affected the 1970-74 Development Plan which was the first 
Plan that was drawn up mainly by Nigerians. Nevertheless 
the difficulties it posed during that Plan period, besides 
those which are experienced in the 1975-80 Development Plan 
period, were not and are not as intractable as those witnessed 
during the 1962-68 period. Nigeria had since embarked on the 
production of high-level and intermediate-level manpower to 
satisfy the requirements of the public and private sectors. 
Whatever the position was in the immediate post inde¬ 
pendent years, the blame for not providing adequate executive 
capacity in the Civil Service cannot be put entirely on the 
Nigerian Government. The British Colonial Administration has 
to bear the blame for failure to have trained in quality and 
quantity enough Nigerians to man the Civil Service effec¬ 
tively after Nigeria had become independent. One of the 
policies-*- which was pursued by the colonial administrators 
in Nigeria and sanctioned by metropolitan headquarters in 
London was that of keeping to the barest minimum the number 
\some of the policies which were followed by the Brit¬ 
ish colonial administrators have brought, for all Nigeria, a 
train of disaster since independence. For a discussion of 
some of these policies, see, Isaac M. Okonjo, British Admin¬ 
istration in Nigeria 1900-1950: A Nigerian View (New York: 
NOK Publishers, 1974), chapter 9. 
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of trained Nigerians as well as those who could undergo 
apprenticeship in running the country's Civil Service. The 
strategy was part and parcel of the overall colonial policy 
in Africa. For, as Walter Rodney has noted, 
The main purpose of the colonial school system was 
to train Africans to help man the local administra¬ 
tion at the lowest ranks....In effect that meant 
selecting a few Africans to participate in the 
domination and exploitation of the continent as a 
whole....Colonial schooling was education for sub¬ 
ordination, exploitation, the creation of mental 
confusion, and the development of underdevelop¬ 
ment .1 
It can be argued that the problem of inadequate man¬ 
power in the Federal Civil Service was the British government's 
creation aimed at incapacitating the Nigerian Federal Civil 
Service as well as frustrating the Federal Government. There¬ 
fore to attribute the delays in the flow of foreign aid to 
lack of executive capacity is to shift blame besides attempt¬ 
ing to camouflage the intention under which developed nations 
give aid to developing nations. Edwin Dean would like his 
readers to believe the plausible notion that the imperialist 
countries were eager to "help" Nigeria to implement the de¬ 
velopment plan which the non-Nigerian planners had drawn up 
if the Federal Civil Service had had adequate executive capa¬ 
city. The truth is that the imperialist powers did not see 
any threats to their continued exploitation of Nigeria soon 
after independence, hence their reluctance in offering any 
^Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 
(Washington, D. C.: Howard University Press, 1974), pp. 240- 
241. 
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further concessions for the opportunities they had already 
got. 
"Aid," as observed by Teresa Hayter, has never been 
an unconditional transfer of financial resources. Usually 
the conditions attached to aid are clearly and directly in¬ 
tended to serve the interest of the donor government.^- 
President Kennedy, stating the policy of the United States 
in giving aid, maintained that 
Foreign aid is a method by which the United States 
maintains a position of influence and control around 
the world, and sustains a good many countries which 
would definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist 
bloc.2 
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that if the 
aid donating countries had seen any conditions in Nigeria 
which could have undermined their interest the "bribe" could 
have been used to sweeten the pill of exploitation. After 
all it is a well known fact that the Abubakar post independ¬ 
ence government, though proclaiming its being non-aligned, 
was solely pro-West in its stance. 
Corruption 
This is a socio-cultural factor which has stigmatized 
the image of the Federal Civil Service, weakened its credibil¬ 
ity and reduced its effectiveness as the main organ which 
■'"Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, Inc., 1974), p. 15. 
2Quoted in Ibid., p. 5. 
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gives effect to Government policies on development. Some 
authors have reflected on corruption as being endemic in all 
governments-*- while others maintain that because of conditions 
involved in under-development, behaviors which easily pass 
for corruption are more likely to be experienced in develop- 
. . o 
mg countries. Among conditions cited are disparity m the 
distribution of income and wealth; conflict of values; the 
weakness of social and governmental enforcement mechanisms; 
political office as the primary means of acquiring wealth and 
the absence of sense of loyalty to the nation.3 Corruption 
in Nigeria, since her attainment of independence, can be 
traced to one or more of the conditions afore-cited. To say 
that the population at large was (or has been) tolerant of 
corruption as is suggestive of Joseph Nye's statement4 is not 
correct in its entirety. The press, long regarded as the 
conscience of any nation, even with its restricted freedom 
-*-C. J. Friedrick, Man and His Government (New York, 
1963), p. 167; also, Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureau¬ 
cratic Corruption," Public Administration, Vol. 40, (Winter 
1962), p. 357. 
Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, Corruption in De¬ 
veloping Countries (London, 1963); Colin Leys, "What Is the 
Problem About Corruption?" Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol. 3, No. 2 (1965); 0. P. Divivedi, "Bureaucratic Corrup¬ 
tion in Developing Countries," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 4, 
April 1967. Ralph Braibanti also contributes to this idea. 
See, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," referred to 
earlier. 
^Colin Leys, Op. Cit., pp. 224-226. 
^Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 61, No. 2, June 1967, p. 423. 
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in Nigeria, has often come out strongly against the social 
evil. From time to time, public figures as well as private 
citizens have spoken against corruption in the society. But 
lack of morally balanced and selfless political leadership 
capable of forging a sound economic order out of Nigeria's 
wealth has created a situation in which most Nigerians strive 
to get what they want by methods fair or foul. The inordin¬ 
ate desire, capitalist mentality or consumerist orientation, 
to accumulate wealth and the wreckless inclination to adopt 
even the most despicable methods to achieve such an objective 
have surfaced in the findings of some commissions which have 
so far been set up to probe corrupt practices. 
In 1964, one of the political parties made a serious 
indictment on the state of the Nigerian nation. It observed 
that, 
There was "systematic frustration of the lofty aspir¬ 
ations of the masses....Money and material wealth has 
since become the supreme value in our society and the 
goal of all social action. This has given rise to cor¬ 
ruption, selfishness, malingering and a general lack of 
patriotism and social responsibility. The country 
abounds in...Ministers who do not scrupple to play 
false with the nation for personal gains.... 
But in the following year, press allegation of a minis 
terial misconduct in connection with a land transaction had 
demanded the removal from office of a Minister who was a 
pillar in the same party which characterized the situation 
in Nigeria as above. In the defense of the Minister, the 
^Statement by UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance) 
cited in West Africa, November 28, 1964, p. 1331. 
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governing council of the party had passed a unanimous vote 
of confidence on him. The national legal adviser of the 
party issued the following statement, 
To say that financial transactions in land and landed 
property by many leading citizens of Nigeria have not 
become a gainful pastime is to start deceiving our¬ 
selves. All top Nigerians, Ministers, parliamentar¬ 
ians to civil servants, journalists hold positions 
of trust in one form or the other. They all indulge 
in these transactions. When it suits our purpose we 
quote conventions surrounding the British parliamen¬ 
tary system. When it again suits our purpose, we 
close our eyes to certain practices, all in the 
Nigerian way of life. Our journalists must make 
up their minds which system they are going to up¬ 
hold in Nigeria. The British parliamentary conven¬ 
tions or the Nigerian way of life as it exists today, 
where everybody regards it fair to make money. ^ 
The two preceding statements by the same political party illus¬ 
trate the ambivalent attitudes of Nigeria's post independent 
political leadership towards corruption. Lack of a common 
standard of morality towards corruption in the Nigerian society 
in no small way rendered ineffective any action against this 
practice. The politicians who had almost the power of life 
and death demonstrated unbridled proclivities towards corrup¬ 
tion. Their corrupt activities were often scorned with tirades 
such as this, 
It is deplorable that people who have the opportunity 
to serve the nation in high capacities dhould use it 
to line their own pockets and indulge in ostentatious 
living. While we are crying for foreign capital, some, 
including ministers, invest their wealth overseas. Far 
^Statement by Chief Kolawole Balogun, National Legal 
Adviser of the NCNC, cited in West Africa, March 6, 1965, p. 
255. The NCNC (National Council of Nigerian Citizens) was 
an ally in the UPGA for the 1964 Parliamentary Elections. 
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from setting the much needed good example, some poli¬ 
ticians take the lead in activities that are not to 
the best interest of the nation.1 
"Making money" was not the only count in corruption 
indictment. Tribalism, nepotism, perfidy and bribery fea¬ 
tured prominently too. Of nepotism, West Africa clearly 
pointed out one bad effect on the nation by stating that, 
...the serious aspect of corruption is the nepotism 
that goes with it. While Nigerian's Federal and Re¬ 
gional Ministers are on top of their jobs, too many 
posts in the lower echelons are filled by men who got 
there and stay there by devious means. The foreign 
investor, attracted by well sounding and well planned 
projects, may find himself dealing with men who do 
not represent the best side of Nigeria.2 
As early as 1964 President Nnamdi Azikiwe in one of his 
"Broadcasts to the Nation" told Nigerians in the most tren¬ 
chant and uncompromising language that tribalism, nepotism, 
perfidy, bribery and corruption were the enemies of Nigeria. 
That with tribalism on the ascendance, "the personality of 
our nation becomes decomposed and stinks." With nepotism 
influencing the politicians' judgments "the will of the 
nation becomes stifled and immolated." With perfidy "as 
the vogue among some of our politicians, the morals of the 
nation vanish to zero as no faith can be placed on the words 
of a crooked, double-faced, double-tongued scourge of the 
human race." With bribery and corruption permeating their 
way of life, "the prestige of our nation dwindles to the 
^West Africa, January 27, 1962, p. 98. 
^West Africa, November 24, 1963, p. 1289. 
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vanishing point, defacing our national image and, bringing 
shame and contumely to those who wear the 1agbada' of Niger¬ 
ian citizenship. 
These sombre statements paint accurately the corrupt 
environment in which the post independence Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice operated and do not justify the tolerant attitude which 
has been attributed to the society at large. It is worth 
noting that during the period of parliamentary rule in Nigeria 
the politicians seemed to have borne the whole blame for 
corruption. Some corrupt activities by civil servants were 
eclipsed by those of the politicians who were their bosses 
and who were held accountable for whatever performances 
showed up in different Ministries of the Civil Service. The 
only strong indictment preferred against the Civil Service 
at that time was that it was an accomplice in the crime of 
p 
corruption perpetuated by the politicans. 
The Civil Service was not accused of corruption when 
Iparts of President Nnamdi Azikiwe's Fourth Independ¬ 
ence Anniversary Address to the Nation, reported in West Afri¬ 
ca , October 10, 1964, p. 1146. 
p £For example, Alhaji Maitama Sule, former Minister of 
Mines and Power in Balewa's Government, contributing to a dis¬ 
cussion on the "Role of the Public Service in a Plural Society" 
snapped at the Civil Service during Nigeria's Parliamentary 
experiment saying, "while agreeing that the political class 
did contribute to that situation (chaos and disorder in the 
country), I must say at the same time that if the Civil Ser¬ 
vice had stood firmly and were united in resisting attempts 
of the political class to mismanage the society I think we 
would not have landed ourselves in the mess we are in today. 
To a very large extent then the blame should go to both 
groups." Mahmud Tukur (ed.) Op. Cit., p. 22. See also, 
Walter Schwarz's comment referred to on page 67, chapter 3. 
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the Military seized power on January 15, 1966. The speech 
of one of the leaders of the military coup d'etat reflected 
that, 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swind¬ 
lers, the men in the high and low places that seek 
bribes and demand ten per cent; those that seek to 
keep the country divided permanently so that they can 
remain in office as Ministers and VIPs of waste; the 
tribalists, the nepotists; those that make the country 
look big for nothing before the international circles, 
those that have corrupted our society and put the 
Nigerian political calendar back by their words and 
deeds... . l 
However, during the military interregnum the situation 
has changed for the worse in the Civil Service. The military 
which when taking over the government had promised to rid the 
nation of corruption became a bed-fellow of the very social 
evil. The Civil Service which during civilian administration 
was never in the lime-light as far as corruption was concerned 
became engulfed in the miasma of corruption. Some reasons 
can be adduced for the now alarming rate of corruption which 
is evidenced in the Nigerian society and in the Civil Ser¬ 
vice. Firstly, Nigeria now gets large revenue from oil and 
has embarked on a greater scale of economic and social devel¬ 
opment than was the case during the period of parliamentary 
experiment. It now seems that the greater the efforts ex¬ 
pended in enhancing development in Nigeria the greater the 
rate of corruption. Nigeria, therefore, typifies the para¬ 
dox of the developing society. Explaining this paradox, 
-'-Text of broadcast taken from a tape of the speech by 
Major Chukuma Nzeogwu over Radio Kaduna on January 15, 1966, 
cited in Ruth First, Power in Africa, Op. Cit., p. 285. 
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Professor Smith notes that while Nigeria wants development 
in industry, agriculture, communications, etc., 
we devise large scale complicated plans for achiev¬ 
ing this. But when we get down to putting these plans 
into operation, we find that the implementation of the 
great development programs rapidly creates facilities 
not so much for the development intended but for social 
corruption of all sorts. 
Secondly, the multifunctional nature of the role of 
the Federal Civil Service subjects the organization to cor¬ 
rupt influences from the Nigerian society. This role dimen¬ 
sion has even been stretched too far because of the military's 
greater reliance on the Civil Service by having it to perform 
most of the functions which used to be attended to by poli¬ 
ticians. Nigerian Federal Civil Servants carry out certain 
functions which in the developed societies are performed by 
entrepreneurs. They conduct feasibility studies, for example, 
for the Iron and Steel Industry to be set up by the govern¬ 
ment, they run Marketing Boards, Supplies Cooperatives, and 
other bodies connected with development. Some Permanent 
Secretaries serve as chairmen of Government Corporations, 
posts which used to be filled by politicians or political 
appointees and which since independence have been known to 
be prone to corrupt pressures and influences. For instance, 
in 1976 the Nigerian National Oil Corporation had the Federal 
Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
■'■Professor Abdullahi Smith, "Development of Corruption" 
(First Ali Akilu Memorial Lecture), New Nigerian, January 26, 
1976, p. 5. 
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as its Chairman and Director of the Board of Management while 
the Permanent Secretaries for the Ministries of Finance, 
Economic Development, and Industries were also members of 
the Board. In assessing the additional responsibilities 
which the Federal Civil Service has taken on, those of a 
service or welfare character especially, one needs to ask 
whether or not the burdens imposed on it may be too great for 
it to carry and whether they contribute to the evils of 
bureau-pathology. If so, then one possible way to enhance 
the capacity of the Federal Civil Service to carry out the 
essential responsibilities that it alone is qualified to 
perform would be to reduce its burdens by transferring some 
of them to extra-bureaucratic organizations that can share 
the responsibility. 
Government corporations unlike the Civil Service exist 
to provide services as well as to make profit. In other 
words, they have to be managed like business concerns. It 
is therefore absurd for the Nigerian Federal Government and 
the public to expect civil servants who are so involved in 
entrepreneural concerns to acquire the skills of entrepre¬ 
neurs but not to imbibe the type of morality and ethics pre¬ 
valent among entrepreneurs in the society. Commenting on the 
double standard which is applied to public officials as con¬ 
trasted with men in private life, 0. Glenn Stahl maintains 
that, 
...there is still a failure on the part of the gen¬ 
eral public to appreciate that a public service can 
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hardly be expected to rise much above the level of 
its enviornment, that it derives most of its tempta¬ 
tions for wrongdoing from that environment. 
Having been given a free hand and being so much relied 
upon by the military for advice and for the implementation 
of various projects in the development process than was the 
case during Nigeria's parliamentary experience, the Nigerian 
Federal Civil Service becomes a powerful force in the country. 
It is said that "power corrupts; absolute power corrupts 
absolutely." The Civil Service though playing the leader¬ 
ship role in baking the national cake has been seen to join 
in the scramble for a share when the cake is only partially 
baked.^ The proclivity towards corruption is not limited 
to officials holding positions of public trust. Many other 
Nigerians regard it as having their share of the national 
cake. A Nigerian lawyer even referred to the "social cancer" 
as "democratic corruption"—a means whereby the wealth of 
Nigeria is redistributed.3 Officials in the Federal Civil 
Service are also accused of nepotism. Durina the civilian 
rule, a man who became the Minister of Works had the road to 
his village quickly tarred.^ Even now, in the military regime, 
^O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 7th 
edition (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976), p. 279. 
^Mahud Tukur, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
^Africa Confidential, Vol. 15, No. 20, October 4, 1974, 
p. 6. 
4 
A typical case of political communalism was the siting 
of national secondary schools aimed at fostering political in¬ 
tegration. The three ministers who decided on the locations 
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it is not unheard of that officials in the Ministry of Educa¬ 
tion must make sure that contracts for the supply of desks, 
tables, and blackboards are given to people from their vil¬ 
lages, tribes or clans while more capable artisans are denied 
these contracts. The government's efforts towards training 
suitable manpower necessary for economic and social develop¬ 
ment have sometimes been stymied by the awards of scholarship 
to undeserving candidates or candidates who pursue courses 
of study not in the government's priority lists. These are 
brought about by the action of the nepotists in the Civil 
Service and the ripple effect is that of reducing public 
trust in the integrity at all organizational levels and caus¬ 
ing deep resentment among those who lack "long legs," the 
West African term for influence or "pull."l 
Today, under the military administration it can be 
said that the Federal Civil Service does not adhere strictly 
to the principles of operational accountability as was the 
case during the civilian administration. The ministers who 
were politicians were accountable to the public through the 
parliament. To help them do this, the civil servants over 
whose ministries the ministers presided in the performance 
of their duties, had to comply with the instructions laid 
of these schools hailed from Sokoto, Warri and Afikpo: the 
schools were sited in Sokoto, Warri and Afikpo. See, James 
O'Connell, "The Political Class and Economic Growth," Niger¬ 
ian Journal of Economic and Social Sciences, 8 (March 1966), 
p. 137. 
^David Abernethy, Op. Cit. , p. 276. 
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down in the "Civil Service Rules and Regulations" and, the 
"Financial Instructions." The Military is not elected to 
office and so is not accountable in the same way as were the 
civilian politicians. The Nigerian Federal Civil Service 
serving the Federal Military Administration enjoys laxity 
in its operations. The worst instance of this laxity which 
provided a loophole for corruption was demonstrated in the 
cement racket occasioned by the "ordering in early 1975 of 
the amazing quantity of 20 million tons of cement for use 
by Nigeria's public sector. Sixteen million tons were or¬ 
dered by the Ministry of Defense alone.Because of the 
large amount involved the matter ought to have been referred 
to the Tenders Board which could have awarded the contract 
as laid down in the "Financial Instructions." This was not 
done. Besides, there was no specific head in the Defense 
Estimates for the cost of the cement. The cement racket 
cost the government at least one billion dollars, the cost 
of decongesting the ports, of economic dislocation, and 
other expenses excluded. Summing up the report on the cement 
scandal a writer noted that the whole loss incurred by the 
government was "a price for corruption and inefficiency which 
those who were guilty are unlikely to pay."2 Nevertheless, 
the Government took firm action against public servants whose 
■'■"Nigeria: The Cement Scandal." See, Africa Confi¬ 
dential , Vol. 17, No. 12, June 11, 1976, pp. 6-7. 
2Ibid., p. 7. 
138 
conduct in the cement scandal was not in keeping with the 
high standards of morality expected of their office. Some 
were compulsorily retired from office while others were dis¬ 
missed . 
On October 1, 1970 General Gowon, the then Head of 
Government, in a nine-point program aimed at being achieved 
before handing over power to a civilian administration in 
1976, promised the "eradication of corruption in national 
life."-*- This was a promise which the General could not carry 
out because for one, corruption was widespread in the pub¬ 
lic service, private sector, and in the society at large. 
And, for the other, it was generally alleged that some of 
the military Governors who were members of the Supreme Mili¬ 
tary Council, as well as some Federal Commissioners who were 
members of the Federal Executive Council were corrupt. Briga¬ 
dier (now Major-General) Abisoye, commenting on the acguisi- 
tive instinct that was plaguing Nigeria during General 
Gowon's administration, said, "the present (Nigerian) socie¬ 
ty encourages the belief that each man is entitled to ac¬ 
quire as much as he can through whatever means.Nigerians 
expected General Gowon to start his corruption eradication 
process by reassigning the state military Governors to strict¬ 
ly military duties and thereby appointing another set.3 Gowon 
-*-See, West Africa, October 10, 197, p. 1205. 
^The New York Times, March 6, 1975, P.E. 15. 
3The Supreme Military Council comprising the Military 
Governors of the then 12 states, with General Gowon as the 
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vacillated on this point till he was removed from office. 
The "Purge" in the Public Service 
On July 29, 1975 through a bloodless army coup, the 
third military administration in Nigeria came to power under 
Brigadier Murtala Muhammed. There was a clean sweep of 
thousands of employees of all categories in the public ser¬ 
vice.-*- To many, the purge was unavoidable considering the 
degree of lethargy the country's public service had got into 
under Gowon's administration. But necessary as it might 
have been, the manner in which the purge was effected and 
the unwholesome effect of the purge on the public service 
as a whole left much to be desired. The reason for the purge, 
according to the Federal Government was "to improve effi¬ 
ciency and rescue the public service from possible collapse."2 
The irony of it all is that the purge in the public ser¬ 
vices turned out to be counter-productive. Some effects of 
the measure on the Nigerian Federal Civil Service are here 
examined. 
Chairman, was the highest governing authority in the country. 
Cowon unfortunately became a prisoner of this body. Some of 
the states' military governors who had become a doubly privi¬ 
leged class were known to have resented any suggestion of re¬ 
assignment saying if they had to go everyone including Gowon 
himself had to be removed. General Muhammed's administration 
avoided this difficulty by making state military Governors 
members of the Council of States and subject to reassignment 
and disciplinary action by the Supreme Military Council. 
-*-All in all, at least a total of 10,000 workers of all 




In spite of the instability which characterized the 
Nigerian political scene beginning with the Action Group 
crisis of 1962, perhaps the only break which has saved the 
federation from total collapse has been the Federal Civil 
Service. It was the senior federal civil servants who pre¬ 
vented national disintegration in the closing months of 
1966. Partly, no doubt, because they had vested interest in 
unity. Most of them managed to remain Nigerians long after 
almost everyone else had descended into tribalism. 
In the purge, most of the senior and experienced 
Federal Civil Servants were victims of circumstances. The 
authorities had refused to specify in each case why an offi¬ 
cer was being removed. Blanket accusations or reasons were 
given to those affected. 
Generally, the procedures for dismissal and termina¬ 
tion of appointment as laid down in "Federal Public Service 
of Nigeria, Notes for Guidance, No. 2," 1972 and in Chapter 
Four of "Federal Republic of Nigeria, Civil Service Rules," 
1974, were ignored. This gave room for foul play, injustices, 
and victimization. It is common knowledge that some honest, 
hardworking, and efficient civil servants were removed from 
service on account of the prejudices of the heads of their 
departments who submitted their names. The whole exercise 
had the perfume of discipline but the odor of foul play. 
Indiscriminate high handedness was not entirely absent. A 
^"Walter Schwarz, Op. Cit. , p. 51. 
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Nigerian clearly pointed out that the "Celebrated Purge" was 
ill-conceived and it was executed with unpardonable malice, 
apparent vindictiveness, glaring unfairness, and indefensible 
discrimination.1 He noted further that the whole exercise 
was punctuated with naked acts of partiality and injustice 
that stink to the high heavens and concludes by saying that 
the effect of this will continue to haunt this potentially 
great country (Nigeria) for many decades.2 
By nullifying the security of tenure which attracted 
people to join the Civil Service in the past, the purge de¬ 
stabilized the Civil Service. Commenting on the wanton 
removal of officials from office, an article in Africa Con¬ 
fidential noted that, 
...dozens of experienced and able officials have 
been retired or otherwise obliged to leave the gov¬ 
ernment service because of alleged incompetence, 
idleness, corruption, nepotism—or even because 
they had concealed their true age....Their succes¬ 
sors may be more suitable, and more honest, but 
perhaps less inclined to accept responsibility 
because of the apparent ease with which officials 
can now be removed.3 
This observation is true and was corroborated by the 
-*-M. I. Owoeye, "The Purge and the Public Service," 
Nigerian Tribune, June 28, 1977, p. 3. 
2Ibid. 
3Africa Confidential, Vol. 17, No. 18, September 10, 
1976, pp. 2-3. See also, West Africa, December 1, 1975, p. 
1462, where Brigadier Obasanjo is quoted to have said that 
"one other undesirable effect of the purge is that people 
are applying excessive caution in their work to the point 
of paralysis of the public service." 
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views of one of the officials who preferred to remain anony¬ 
mous.^ General Muhammed had argued that if any attempt had 
to be made at all to correct the mistakes of the past, it 
"must start with the leadership of the institutions that 
were responsible" and that there was no alternative but to 
apply "firm and, in some cases, drastic measures in order 
to set the stage for healthier and more efficient services."2 
His successor in office, Lt. General Obasanjo, was guick 
to realize that "the purge in the public service has not 
revitalized the service as envisaged.And, a columnist 
in one of the dailies noted that the millions of naira spent 
in implementing Udoji/Williams4 has not brought in any 
^The official stated that on many occasions the Su¬ 
preme Military Council would ask an official to produce, for 
its decision making, within a couple of hours, information 
or data which in the normal Civil Service procedure would 
necessitate committee meetings of two or three days to come 
up with. That in order to meet the urgent demand of the 
Military Council, the official short-circuits the process 
and stands the risk of dismissal or early retirement by 
a succeeding military regime, in case of a coup d'etat. He 
added that as soon as he reaches the voluntary retirement 
age of 45 years he will leave the service as the future of 
every civil servant was becoming uncertain. 
^West Africa, October 6, 1975, p. 1167. 
^Extract of a broadcast by the Head of State, Lt. Gen¬ 
eral Olusegun Obasanjo, reported in Nigerian Chronicle, May 
17, 1976, p. 16. 
4Udoji/Williams refers to the recommendations of Sep¬ 
tember 1974 Public Service Review Commission whose Chairman 
was Chief J. 0. Udoji and the recommendations of the June 1975 
Public Service Review Panel headed by Akintola Williams. The 
first dealt extensively with ways in which productivity could 
be improved in the public services and recommended gradings 
and salary scales. The second reviewed the complaints and 
petitions made by the public against Udoji's gradings and 
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improvement to the public services. That "workers still go 
to work late; many are not found where they should be found. 
In spite of a wave of retirements and dismissals, our ser¬ 
vice still lacks the tone of urgency."1 
The reported increase in low morale, lack of interest, 
lack of enthusiasm and dedication which characterizes the 
Federal Civil Service at present is the direct result of the 
mismanaged purge of 1975 and the shabby treatment meted out 
to many public servants in the country. Most of those af¬ 
fected had distinguished themselves in various fields by 
serving Nigeria loyally, faithfully, and with devotion to 
duty. Unfortunately they were removed from service in a 
most disgraceful manner. Merkl must be correct when he 
says that, 
In a career Civil Service where the individual ad¬ 
ministrator expects to spend a life-time at his career, 
the rewards and punishments can be quite subtle with¬ 
out losing their effectiveness. In fact, drastic 
measures or a constant threat of dismissal would be 
more likely to create a poor working climate and 
feelings of job insecurity that can be just as in¬ 
jurious to productivity in the public service as 
they are in industry. It is far wiser to engage a 
person's pride and ambition in his optimal perfor¬ 
mance than to worry about how to deter him from 
wrongdoing.2 
An organization in which feelings of insecurity prevail risks 
salary scales and made suitable recommendations to the Federal 
Military Government. 
^Sunday Chronicle, March 21, 1976, p. 5. 
2Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change, (Re¬ 
vised Edition) (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1972), 
p. 293. 
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the absence or weakening of administrative conditions of devel¬ 
opment administration. These conditions as postulated by- 
Victor Thompson-*- include an innovative atmosphere, operational 
and shared planning goals, combination of planning and action, 
cosmopolitan atmosphere, the diffusion of influence, and tol¬ 
eration of interdependence. Elsewhere,2 Thompson discusses 
the bureaupathic behavior incidental to feelings of personal 
insecurity. 
Such behavior manifests in tendencies towards over¬ 
organization—close supervision; failure to delegate; emphasis 
on regulations, precedents and the accumulation of paper to 
prove compliance; cold aloofness; insistence on office pro¬ 
tocol; fear of innovation; or restriction of communication. 
The net effect of all these is a distrust of subordinates, 
their unwillingness to take responsibility and their propensity 
to wait and be told what to do. These can be damaging to the 
effectiveness of a development administrative machinery. 
Just as the Civil War (1967-1970) had disrupted the 
manpower which was needed for the successful implementation 
of part of the First National Development Plan, 1962-1968, 
the purge in the Civil Service in 1975 plays a role undermin¬ 
ing the successful implementation of the 1975-1978 Development 
Plan. With the ten thousand public servants dismissed or 
^''Administrative Objectives for Development Adminis¬ 
tration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 9, June 1964, 
pp. 94-99. 
^See, Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1961). 
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compulsorily retired, Nigeria has lost able and experienced 
personnel who would have helped the Civil Service in its role 
in the economic and social development of the country. 
As a follow up of the stringent measures adopted to 
infuse discipline and commitment into the public service, the 
Federal Military Government set up in 1975 a Public Complaints 
Commission and empowered it to investigate complaints by mem¬ 
bers of the public against public officers and federal and 
state government institutions and agencies. The principal 
objective of the Public Complaints Commission "is to ensure 
that no person in a position of trust, in both public and 
private sectors, abuses his position to the detriment of any 
person resident in Nigeria."1 But in 1976, Decree No. 11, 
known as the "Public Officers Protection from False Accusation 
Decree" was promulgated. It imposed stiff penalties of heavy 
fines or imprisonment on anyone who makes accusations of im¬ 
propriety of official conduct on any public servant but fails 
to prove same. The Federal Director of Public Prosecutions 
said the Decree was "designed to silence those who without 
any control whatsoever open their mouths to make reckless 
statements and tell unfounded stories that have no iota of 
truth to the detriment of the innocent ones."2 
The Decree No. 11 stimulated protest from different 
^Nigeria. A publication by the Information Division 
of the Embassy of Nigeria, Washington, D. C., October 1975, 
p. 24 . 
2Paily Times, April 9, 1976, p. 19. 
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sections of the Nigerian community. Much as one would sympa¬ 
thize with the government in checking the brashness of accusa¬ 
tions towards public officials, the Decree certainly restrains 
the public from serving as watch dogs on the conduct of offi¬ 
cials. An official who is corrupt or who abuses his public 
trust can still slip out of the noose of the accusations 
which are made against him. His accuser not being in a posi¬ 
tion to get the details either in the form of documents or 
cogent facts may fail to prove the case against him. The law 
in this situation will punish the accuser and set free the 
public officer who may actually be corrupt. 
The Federal Cabinet 
In setting out the two categories of "task" and "con¬ 
textual" environments earlier in this chapter, it was speci¬ 
fied that within the environment in which the Federal Civil 
Service exists there are some governmental as well as non¬ 
governmental organizations, bodies or groups which are re¬ 
lated either as they affect the inputs, the administrative 
processes, or the output of the Civil Service. These were 
seen as constituting the "task" environment, which is immediate 
and operational to the Civil Service. This section will deal 
with one body whose relationship with the Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice has affected the latter's input as well as output in 
the development process. This is the Cabinet or Federal Exe¬ 
cutive Council (during the military administration). 
The government which ruled Nigeria during the first 
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five years of independence was an offshoot of a complex and 
strife-ridden political system. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, by 1959 the three main political parties were region¬ 
ally and tribally based drawing most of their strength and 
support from the major, articulate ethnic groups in each of 
the regions. However, each tried to make inroads into the 
power center of the others only with very modest successes. 
The control of the center became the obsession of each of the 
major parties, the Northern People Congress (NPC), the National 
Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG). 
It was clear by the results of the Federal election of 1959 
that none of the major parties alone could hold power at the 
center without bringing chaos to Nigeria. Table 8 shows the 
Federal Election Results. In 1959, the NPC could not form the 
Federal Government alone because the election results did not 
secure it a two-thirds majority of seats in the House. And, 
if the two major Southern parties had tried to join to form 
a coalition government the Northern region would have felt 
threatened. "An Action Group-NCNC alliance would have led to 
the unhappy situation of confronting South and North as Govern¬ 
ment and Opposition."^ It happened that both the NPC and the 
NCNC, despite their ideological differences, entered into a 
coalition to form the government at the federal level while 
the AG became the official opposition party. The NPC remained 
^-Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1966), p. 298. 
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TABLE 8 
NIGERIAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS 1959 AND 1964 
1959 Elections 1964 Elections 
Regions Parties 1959 Seats Electoral 1964 Seats 
Coalitions 
Northern NPC 135 
Allies of UPC 8 
G 2 5 
Independence 
and Other 6* 
NNA 163 
UPGA 4 
Eastern NCNC/NEPU 58 
AG 14 
NPC and Allies 1+ 
Independence 
UPFA 87 
Western AG 33 
NCNC 21 
Independence 1 
NPC and Allies 7++ 
UPGA 6 
NNA 3 6 
Other 1 
Lagos NCNC/NEPU 2 
NPC and Allies 
Action Groups 1 
Independence 
Mid-West UPGA 13 
SOURCES: Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 298; John M. Ostheimer, Nigerian 
Politics (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), pp. 130- 
TJT.  
* Declared subsequently for NPC 
+ Niqer Delta Congress 
++ Mobolaje Grand Alliance 
NOTES : 
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the senior partner in the coalition while the NCNC was the 
junior partner. The Federal Cabinet consisted of members 
from the parties in the coalition and, in the Cabinet system 
of government, the Cabinet constitutes the seat of political 
power as the parties were caught in the continuous struggle 
for regional advantage. Besides, since the parties in the 
coalition government had divergent programs and ideologies 
it was difficult for the government to develop a coherent 
national ideology on which national as well as foreign policy 
could be based. In the words of Chief Obafemi Awolowo the 
government at the Federal level was an "enforced association 
of incompatibles."^ 
Regional rivalry and animosity were brought to the 
Federal Government while the embers of disunity were con¬ 
stantly fanned into small flames by the intemperate utter¬ 
ances of party leaders. This accentuated the distrust be¬ 
tween members of the coalition government. On May 15, 1960, 
for instance, the Chairman of the NCNC Eastern Working Com¬ 
mittee, Dr. G. C. Mbanugo, told the conference of the Eastern 
Branch of the Zikist National Vanguard that most of them in 
the NCNC were "not happy with the set up of the NCNC-NPC Fed¬ 
eral Coalition Government." He appealed to the Vanguard to 
^Chief Obafemi Awolowo, "A Philosophy for an Inde¬ 
pendent Nigeria," a lecture delivered by Chief Awolowo to 
the Nigerian students in London on September 3, 1961, and 
published by the Information Division of the Office of the 
Agent-General for Western Nigeria in the U.K. Cited in 
Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Pol¬ 
icy 1960-1966 (Ibadan University Press, 197 3) , p"! 39. 
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be prepared to face "any eventuality that crops up after 
October 1"(Nigeria's date for independence).1 The statement 
from the National Organizing Secretary of the NPC was in no 
regard modest in content as to strengthen the Coalition. 
He, Mallam Yusufu Dantsofo, said that although the NPC and 
the NCNC were running the Federal Government, "the NPC (sen¬ 
ior partner in the coalition) does not regard the NCNC as a 
reliable partner." He advised his party supporters of the 
need to be on the alert "for any eventuality as the NCNC 
could break away from the Coalition any time—because Zik 
was not made the Prime Minister of the Federation.2 The 
change of party alignments before the 1964 federal election 
(see Table 8 for results) clearly demonstrated the instabil¬ 
ity of the system. While the NCNC leaders were bitter about 
the results of the 1963/1964 census which turned out low 
population figures for the Eastern Region, the NPC, on the 
other hand, viewed their "partner's" behavior during the 
1964 general strike as double-faced. The Coalition had agreed 
on a government bargaining package only to have the NCNC 
speak out against the government's offer in the East. In 
July 1964, the president of the NPC, Sir Ahmadu Bello declared, 
"the Ibos have never been true friends of the North and never 
1Daily Service, May 16, 1960. Cited in Gordon J. 
Idang, "The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratifi¬ 
cation and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agree¬ 
ment," African Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, September 1970, 
p. 241. 
^Daily Service, June 20, 1960. Cited in Idang, Ibid. 
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will be." Such feelings of distrust undermined the Coalition 
and induced the NPC to seek alliance with Akintola's faction 
which the NPC had helped to put in power in Western Nigeria.^ 
One would wonder whether the distrustful political 
relationship existing at the seat of federal political power 
extended to the Federal Civil Service during the civilian 
administration. An investigation on the "Patterns of Inter¬ 
action Between Bureaucratic and Political Leaders" by Victor 
Olorunsola^ has advanced our understanding of how the rela¬ 
tionship which existed within the Cabinet affected the role 
of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. The study was based 
on two sets of hypotheses, the "communications hypothesis" 
and the "bureaucratic attainment or frustration hypothesis." 
Out of the five hypotheses tested in the first set these two 
were strongly borne out: 
1. Communication tends to be more informal when 
the higher civil servant and his respective 
minister have cultural characteristics in com¬ 
mon; and more formal when the two do not share 
common cultural characteristics. 
2. Communication tends to be more informal when 
the higher civil servant and his respective 
minister have the same political identification, 
and more formal when the two have differing 
political affiliations. 
Olorunsola found that no Eastern Minister or Ibo 
Minister belonged to the elite corps of the federal Ministers 
^■John M. Ostheimer, Op. Cit. , p. 135. 
2 
Olorunsola, Op. Cit., pp. 51-66. This study had 
the Nigerian Civilian Federal Government as its empirical 
focus. 
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(which invariably consisted of ministers of Northern origin 
and of the NPC). The few Ibo ministers who were close to 
the real political elite corps were those whose activities 
were not of nuisance value to the NPC though they were re¬ 
garded as traitors and untrustworthy by the Ibos and the 
Ibo higher civil servants. 
Of the five hypotheses tested in the second set, the 
following were borne out: 
1. There is a greater manifestation of bureaucratic 
attainment when the higher civil servant and his 
respective minister communicate informally; but 
bureaucratic frustration is manifest when the 
two confine their communication largely to for¬ 
mal channels. 
2. There is a greater manifestation of bureaucratic 
attainment when the higher civil servant and his 
respective minister share the same political pre¬ 
disposition or affiliation; but frustration when 
their political affiliations are incompatible. 
3. Bureaucratic attainment is high when the higher 
civil servant and his respective minister come 
from the same region; but frustration when the 
two come from different regions. 
4. Bureaucratic attainment is high when the higher 
civil servant and his respective minister come 
from the same ethnic group; but frustration when 
the ethnic groups are different. 
From these, the study concluded that identical poli¬ 
tical affiliation, cultural affinity, ethnic compatibility 
were crucial in fostering informal communication between the 
Cabinet ministers and the top civil servants. That if it is 
established that informal communication is important for high 
bureaucratic attainment, then the denial or lack of these 
access points would be injurious. The study found informal 
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communication patterns among the Ibo higher civil servants 
and the Northern political bosses as well as frustration 
among Ibo top civil servants even when they were serving 
under the Eastern ministers. 
What the study failed to test was the communication 
patterns and achievement or frustration levels existing be¬ 
tween the few non-Ibo and non-Nor them top civil servants, 
especially the Yorubas whose regional party, the Action Group, 
was represented at the federal level as an opposition party. 
As for the Ibo top civil servants, there were strong reasons 
which could have induced strong bitterness against the North¬ 
ern political elites. Some of these reasons have been dis¬ 
cussed earlier in passing. 
Besides the conclusion of this study, one can glean 
from the reflections of people who had associated with the 
Federal Government of Nigeria during the five years after 
independence what type of relationship existed between the 
Civil Service and the Cabinet and how that relationship af¬ 
fected the role of the civil servant. A. A. Ayida states 
that the new political masters viewed the disciplined top 
civil servants as major obstacles to their exercise of abso¬ 
lute power.1 This, he points out, was the result of the 
Cabinet being over-pampered by the departing expatriate senior 
^A. A. Ayida, "The Contribution of Politicians and 
Administrators to Nigeria's National Economic Planning," 
Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.) Nigerian Administration and Its Poli¬ 
tical Setting (London: Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1968), 
p. 63. 
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civil servants who had no stake in the development of Niger¬ 
ia. He concedes that some of the senior federal civil ser¬ 
vants had no experience in their new role of advising the 
Cabinet on the running of a government whose major thrust 
was economic development. That they were more interested 
in routine administration for which they had been schooled 
under the colonial administration. The politicians, anxious 
to maximize their political and personal gains from their 
positions of power and influence, sometimes embarked on 
reckless actions which undermined the First National Devel¬ 
opment Plan. The political leaders repeatedly made policy 
decisions without the advice of the higher civil servants 
and often interfered in the detailed implementation of govern¬ 
ment programs. Edwin Dean notes that "the imperatives of 
the political situation and the interest of the politicians, 
as they themselves understood them led to the distortion of 
the Plan."l Though "the ability of some of the ministries 
to discharge their functions was somewhat strained by the 
fact that the ministerial structure was unstable,"2 the many 
points of conflict between the political system and effective 
plan implementation, and the many lapses from financial dis¬ 
cipline on the part of politicians, must have dampened the 
enthusiasm of those civil servants who were committed to ef¬ 
fective planning and thereby undermined the basis of cooperation 
^Edwin Dean, Op. Cit. , p. 50. 
n 
^Ibid., p. 46. 
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between them and the politicians.^ 
In some cases the top civil servants were politically 
victimized. A permanent secretary is appointed, and can only 
be removed by the Head of State on the advice of the Prime 
Minister. But before tendering his advice, the Prime Minis¬ 
ter has to consult the Public Service Commission of the Fed¬ 
eration.2 This was the case during the civilian administra¬ 
tion. Under the military rule, the Head of State consults 
with the Public Service Commission, the Secretary to the 
Federal Military Government who is the head of the Civil 
Service before making the appointment. What was bad during 
the civilian regime was that the appointment and removal re¬ 
quired some political inputs. Dr. Saburi Biobaku, recalling 
the situation during the latter days of the Nigerian First 
Republic, states that in a political situation where the 
doctrine of "who is not with us is against us," was the order 
of the day, political partisanship was not limited to members 
of political parties. The situation was so bad that, 
civil servants who dared to express or worse still, 
who were adjudged to be likely to express contrary 
opinions to those of the ruling parties, by reason 
of their tribal or place of origin were held suspect 
and indeed victimized at the first opportunity.3 
^Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information Printing Division, 
1963), p. 68, Section 149 (i) and (ii). 
^Dr. Saburi Biobaku, "The Role of the Civil Service," 
The Bureaucrat (Midwestern Nigeria Civil Service Journal), 
No. 1, January-March, 1973, p. 14. 
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In spite of this, the civil servants remained dedicated and 
its nonpolitical nature has been its source of strength in 
times of crisis. 
Under the military regime there has been a new pattern 
of relationship between the military rulers and the Civil 
Service. In the three administrations headed by General 
Gowon, Mohammed and Obasanjo respectively, two bodies have 
been set up at the cabinet level. These are the Supreme 
Military Council and the Federal Executive Council. The 
Supreme Military Council has the authority over the country 
and makes policy on various issues affecting the country. 
The chairman is the Head of State. Under General Gowon it 
comprised the State Military Governors and Heads of Services 
of the Armed Forces and the Police. Under Generals Mohammed 
and Obasanjo, it is made up of selected members of the Armed 
Forces but the composition of the Federal Executive Council 
under each of the three regimes has not changed. The mem¬ 
bers are known as Federal Commissioners and they occupy the 
positions which were filled by Ministers during the civilian 
administration. The Head of government presides over the 
Federal Executive Council. 
The role of the Civil Service under the military rule 
has been enhanced by several factors.^ And, to a great extent 
■'■This section on role facilitators draws heavily on 
an address captioned "The Role of Civil Servants in a Mili¬ 
tary Regime," by Mr. C. 0. Lawson, Secretary to the Nigerian 
Federal Military Government, to the Lagos Chamber of Commerce 
and putlished by Daily Times, December 11, 12, and 13, 1973. 
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the Civil Service has shared power with the military ruling 
elites in governing the country. The innovation of allowing 
permanent secretaries and other senior officials in the Civil 
Service to sit on the Military Executive Council and to con¬ 
tribute to Cabinet deliberations1 enables that forum to be 
better informed and ensures that bald political considerations 
do not always override relevant professional and technical 
advice. 
Secondly, there is a simplified legislative process 
under the military regime. Under the civilian administration 
the parliament was the law-making body. The legislative 
process was rather hazardous and time consuming in that it 
could take up to one or two years before the policy advised 
on by a ministry was passed into law by the parliament. Sub¬ 
sequently, before the Civil Service could carry out the rule- 
application function a lot of time was wasted. Since the 
legislative function under the military rule falls to the 
Federal Executive Council or the Supreme Military Council, 
both the policy formulation and rule application roles of the 
Civil Service have been accelerated. 
Thirdly, the homogeneity of the goals of the military 
regime and that of the Civil Service has been an important 
1Richard L. Harris notes that this innovation is satis¬ 
fying for the senior bureaucrats since they are recognized 
in this arrangement as invaluable sources of advice and as¬ 
sistance. Besides, they have more responsibilities delegated 
to them. See, "The Effect of Political Change on the Role 
Set of the Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria," Adminis¬ 
trative Science Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, December 1968, 
p. 398. 
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facilitator in the role of the Federal Civil Service. The 
military leadership is pre-occupied with economic and social 
development just as the elite corps in the Civil Service. 
In this situation, the civil servant finds unprecedented 
opportunity for creative activity more than in a political 
atmosphere where the civil servant tried to avoid being 
dragged into political squabbles. 
Besides, the similarity of the backgrounds of the 
military officers and those of the top civil servants has 
created a greater rapport among the two groups. Both are 
the elite corps of the respective professions, British- 
trained, especially in the formal educational systems, and 
influenced by the British traditions of service. Both de¬ 
test the politicians who, out of avarice and proclivity 
towards elite enrichment, plunged the country into chaos.1 
The military personnel and the civil servants have a high 
stake in the government because their careers are involved. 
The Ministers in the civilian regime derived their incentives 
from their political career whose continuity they had to en¬ 
sure as it could be ended once the government of which they 
were members fell out of favor with the electorates and was 
voted out of power. The absence of generational conflict 
between the two groups as opposed to that which existed be¬ 
tween the politicians, who were much older but new in their 
roles, and the civil servants, who were younger but some of 
-'-Ibid. , p. 398 . 
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whom had served in the Colonial Civil Service, has made it 
easy for the senior civil servants to support the military 
leaders and for the military elite to rely extensively on 
them. 
So far, this thesis has examined the evolution of the 
Nigerian Federal Civil Service from a colonial instrument 
for the maintenance of law and order toward an integrated 
indigenous machinery for economic and social development. 
The last two chapters have taken a close look at the roles 
and performances of the indigenous Federal Civil Service. 
Some policies which the civil servants have helped to formu¬ 
late as well as the programs of development which they have 
executed have been evaluated in terms of the contributions 
to the welfare of the Nigerian society. Some role constraints 
have been identified and some factors have been seen as 
facilitators to role performance. But we need to have the 
opinions of the civil servants. They have to tell us their 
role conception. They have to say what we do not know about 
the performance of their organization, the strength of their 
commitment to the Civil Service, and how they see their or¬ 
ganization now under the military rule compared with their 
organization under the civilian rule. They have to tell us 
all these and other facts through the analysis of the data 
generated from the survey conducted on the Nigerian Federal 
Civil Service. The analysis will also serve to confirm or 
reject some of the hypotheses and propositions set forth in 
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the thesis. These then are to be the concerns of the next 
two chapters of this work to which we now turn. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CIVIL SERVICE SURVEY—SETTING, SAMPLE 
AND CIVIL SERVANTS' PROFILE DATA 
The Setting 
The data which are presented in this and the next 
chapter were obtained from a survey that was conducted on 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service during Spring and early 
Summer of 1976. Often, the decision to use a particular 
method for generating survey data is influenced by resource 
or situational factors like inadequate funds or political 
atmosphere. Whatever it is, a researcher who is bent on 
getting the data for his work must decide on the method 
which will be of optimal value considering the factors which 
may adversely affect his research. 
Two situational factors which influenced the method 
used in this survey deserve mention. On July 29, 1975, the 
third military administration came into being in Nigeria and 
within a few months dismissed and retired thousands of public 
servants throughout the country.-1- Feelings of uncertainty 
and of job insecurity swept through the public services 
-*-This situation has been discussed under "The 'Purge' 
in the Civil Service" in Chapter IV. 
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and public servants became over-cautious in the discharge 
of their duties. In the Federal Civil Service the effect was 
tremendous because the Supreme Military Council which trig¬ 
gered the wave of dismissals and retirements was there at 
the federal headquarters. Initial contacts with some senior 
and middle level civil servants on my intention to conduct 
a survey among the shocked and even frightened civil ser¬ 
vants revealed that a survey based on a sample drawn from 
the entire Civil Service population had no chance of secur¬ 
ing the participation of a large enough group of respondents. 
In order to participate in the survey, some civil servants 
required a written statement, urging their participation, 
by the head of the Civil Service. Such written statement 
could not be obtained because of the political situation in 
the country. 
On February 13, 1976, General Murtala Mohammed was 
assassinated in an attempted military coup. It was an open 
secret that his administration, because of the support given 
to liberation movements in Africa and the new image it was 
building in international affairs,was fast stepping on the 
toes of those who preferred the status quo. This notwith¬ 
standing, the events which transpired immediately after the 
assassination made Nigerians suspect external involvement in 
an attempt to cause unrest in the country.-1- In this political 
-*-West Africa was quick to point out that Brigadier 
Murtala Mohammed's praises of General Gowon's great services 
to Nigeria, and, General Gowon's dignified and wise accept¬ 
ance of the changes were benefiting answers to the "ignorant 
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setting a Civil Service survey designed to obtain data for 
a dissertation which was to be written for a foreign insti¬ 
tution was from all indications not warmly welcomed by the 
authorities. And, even though a letter from the Civil Ser¬ 
vice Administration Division of the Cabinet office to the 
author stated in part "...if you call here at any time, you 
will be given any assistance within our reach," it was real¬ 
ized that if the promised "assistance" was to be depended on, 
the survey would never be conducted. There were some restric¬ 
tions and regulations on the release of information. By 
discussing the purpose and merit of my work with a number 
of officials in the senior and middle level positions in 
the ministries, some of the help and co-operation which the 
survey needed was forthcoming. 
The Sample 
Several studies^ have been done on civil services of 
a number of countries. Some of these focused attention on 
commentators abroad who talked, and wrote dangerous nonsense 
about counter-coups." See, issue of August 4, 1974, p. 886. 
^These include H. E. Dale, The Higher Civil Service 
of Great Britain (London: Oxford University Press, 1941); 
R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955); Reinhard Bendix, Higher 
Civil Servants in America (Boulder, Colorado: University of 
Colorado Press, 1949); Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society 
in Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); 
Henry F. Goodman, The Civil Service in Pakistan (Dacca: 
National Institute of Public Administration, Ï963); and 
Robert M. Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Ghana (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975). 
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the "higher civil servants." Among these are the works of 
H. E. Dale, R. K. Kelsall, Richard Bendix, and Morroe Berger. 
Dale's work was mainly a descriptive essay in which 
no survey data were used. The focus was on a group of British 
higher civil servants drawn mainly from the administrative 
class which numbered 1430 during the early months of 1939. 
This class of civil servants was distinguished from the rest 
by the fact that to it was assigned "duties concerned with 
the formation of policy, the co-ordination and improvement 
of government machinery, and with the general administration 
and control of the Department of Public Services."1 From 
this group Dale excluded the lowest ranks in the administra¬ 
tive class but included the executives of public corporations 
and the top professional officers whose positions were egui- 
valent in rank to those he selected from the purely adminis¬ 
trative class. 
Similarly, R. K. Kelsall, in a more recent study of 
the higher civil servants in Britain, confined his inquiry 
to "those permanent civil servants whose functions were ad- 
ministrative. The professionals, "who were required to 
possess specialized knowledge or experience in other fields 
as a condition of holding their employmentwere excluded 
from the concerns of the study. Unlike Dale, Kelsall's 
^H. E. Dale, Op. Cit. , p. 3. 
^Kelsall, Op. Cit., p. 13. 
-^Ibid. 
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administrative class included even officials in the lowest 
rank of that class. These were mainly Assistant Secretaries 
who, though performing administrative duties, still had many 
years of service to offer before getting into the policy¬ 
making group of civil servants. When Kelsall conducted his 
study in 1950, his focus was on the 1045 men and women who 
fell under his own definition of administrative class. 
In 1940 Richard Bendix conducted a study to show the 
social origins, careers, and power-positions of America's 
Federal higher administrators. At that time, the Federal 
employees (exclusive of those serving in the national defense) 
numbered 836,492. From this population he drew a sample of 
428 higher civil servants "who were in positions high enough 
to affect policy formulation"^ but not classed as political 
appointees. All lower Federal personnel, as well as those 
higher ranking officials whose duties were mainly technical 
in character, were excluded from the sample. Bendix was 
careful to represent all the government departments and 
agencies in his sample. But, as he noted, the representative¬ 
ness was "diminished by accidents of mailing and by possible 
bias of the respondents."2 
A landmark study of bureaucracy in the developing areas 
has been that of Morroe Berger's Bureaucracy and Society in 
Egypt. Berger's sample of the civil servants consisted of 
■^Bendix, Op. Cit. , p. 14. 
2lbid., p. 17. 
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the senior bureaucrats in only four central government minis¬ 
tries. Using a detailed questionnaire which was framed in 
Arabic, Berger obtained from the survey some data which re¬ 
flected the orientations of higher civil servants on several 
critical variables affecting official behavior. Assuming 
that the degree to which developing societies can achieve 
their goals is in good part a function of their ability to 
adopt the Western bureaucratic model, he constructed certain 
professionalism indices and bureaucratic scales to test the 
validity of his tenets. The findings of this study have re¬ 
mained important contributions to the understanding of 
bureaucracy in developing countries. 
In spite of the usefulness of Berger's study, his 
survey has been criticized for containing "serious technical 
weaknesses." Principal among these are the arguments that 
the sample used was not representative of the population of 
his study, "the higher civil service," and, that no random 
sample was taken of the officials in the ministries surveyed.1 
In the present survey, conducted on the Nigerian Fed¬ 
eral Civil Service, 300 civil servants were in the sample. 
These were drawn from six executive ministries. However, 
because of the problems which confronted the survey, it was 
felt that the use of a sample method which was capable of 
eliciting responses from all levels in the Civil Service 
^-Robert V. Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in 
Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, Winter 
1959, p. 31. 
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was most advisable. Accordingly, a stratified random sample 
was decided on. The Civil Service Staff List and lists con¬ 
taining the names of employees in the executive grades as well 
as those in the lower levels in each of the six ministries 
were used. The list from each ministry was broken into 
separate lists containing the various grades in the Civil 
Service. From each list, respondents were randomly drawn 
until the number of civil servants which constituted the 
sample was obtained. To facilitate the analysis of the re¬ 
sponses obtained from the survey, the different ranks repre¬ 
sented in the sample are grouped as follows under Senior 
Management, Middle Management, Supervisory, and Junior em¬ 
ployees . 
A questionnaire containing some thirty-three questions 
was the main survey instrument used in obtaining the civil 
servants' views on different aspects of the Civil Service. 
For each ministry I had two civil servants to help me in 
the distribution and collection of the questionnaires. Only 
160 of the 300 questionnaires given out to the civil servants 
in the sample were returned. Not surprisingly, very poor 
returns were obtained from the supervisory and junior per¬ 
sonnel categories. This is understandable. The "casualties" 
of the 1975 "purge" in the Civil Service seemed to have taken 
the heaviest toll from these two ranks. Hence the apathetic 
attitude reflected by the civil servants in the two groups. 
Nevertheless, given the effect of the purge and of the 
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NOTE: The table above gives only a few posts under each 
level. There are several others, which through the coding 
process used in sorting out the responses, had been identi¬ 
fied with the corresponding class in the Civil Service. 
political atmosphere bourgeoning then in Nigeria, the total 
response was fair. 
In spite of this, the weaknesses of the survey research 
method have to be acknowledged. The ideal method could have 
been to take a simple random probability sample of the whole 
Civil Service. This would have provided a large enough 
sample adeguately representative of the entire population 
but as pointed out earlier, the method would have risked the 
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failure of the entire exercise. Howbeit, the inclusion of 
civil servants from all strata of the bureaucracy in the 
sample used did preclude the survey from obtaining, through 
the responses, a partial view of the Civil Service. I am 
convinced that if this survey were to be conducted now in 
Nigeria, the research environment would provide less con¬ 
straints and therefore would make for the use of a more 
ideal survey method. But in the given situation the method 
used in generating the data, though not entirely satisfactory, 
served a useful purpose. 
The Civil Servants' Profile Data 
This section sets out the profile data of the civil 
servants whose responses to questions on the bureaucracy are 
analyzed in the next chapter. The first section of the 
questionnaire was designed to give data on the ages, state 
of origin, ethnic origin, sex, education, job position, and 
work experience of the respondents. These particulars, while 
telling the reader who the Federal Civil Servants are, serve 
as useful parameters for the analysis of their attitudes. 
The first question on the survey instrument was ori¬ 
ginally framed to let each respondent give his or her speci¬ 
fic date of birth. During preliminary discussions with some 
civil servants on the thrust of the survey it was learned 
that not many respondents would be freely disposed towards 
170 
stating their birth date.^ That attitude on questions which 
individuals regard as soliciting "very personal" data such 
as exact age could induce refusals by some unduly sensitive 
would-be respondents to complete and return the questionnaires 
With this information in mind, the question on age was re¬ 
phrased to provide age ranges which guaranteed a certain 
degree of vagueness regarding ages. Table 10 presents the 
age spread of respondents. 
Forty-two and one-half percent of the respondents' 
ages fall within the range of 21 and 30 years. Of this, 
30.6 percent held middle management positions while 8.8 per¬ 
cent were in the senior management cadre. Most civil servants 
join the Civil Service when they are over twenty years old. 
However, for appointements in the administrative class can¬ 
didates are required to "have attained the age of 22 years 
but should not normally be over 40"^ at the time of entry 
into the Federal Civil Service. 
State of Origin. The stratified sample which was 
used in this survey made possible the identification of the 
civil servants by both state and ethnic origins. Table 11 
depicts the state of origin of respondents. Nigeria being 
a plural society has suffered immensely from state and ethnic 
■^This problem has already been referred to in a quote 
from Africa Confidential, Vol. 17, No. 18, September 10, 1976. 
See Chapter IV, page 141 of this work. 
^Guide to Careers in the Federal Public Service of Ni¬ 
geria , NOT I (Lagos : Federal Government Printers, 1961), p. 1 
TABLE 10 
DISTRIBUTION OF AGES OF RESPONDENTS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE SURVEY 
Age 
Senior Level Middle Level 
Supervisory 
Level Junior Level Totals 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
21 - 30 14 8.8 49 30.6 1 0.6 4 2.5 68 42.5 
31 - 40 30 8.8 33 20.6 3 1.8 0 0.0 66 41.2 
41 - 55 13 8.1 10 6.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 23 14.4 
No Opinion 1 0.6 2 1.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 1.9 







DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY RANK ACCORDING TO 
STATE OF ORIGIN 
N = 160 = 100% 
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cleavages. The creation of more states in the country in 
1967 and in 1976 was seen as both political and administra¬ 
tive action that would give all Nigerians some feelings of 
belonging to one country and therefore the acceptance of any 
public servant as one who represents the interest of all. 
These ideals have not been realized as evidenced by the clamor 
for the institution of a guota system in the Federal Civil 
Service appointments and promotions exercises. The sugges¬ 
tions stem from the fact that some states and ethnic groups 
are seen to be better represented in the Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice than others. And, in some cases, the various positions 
occupied by these representatives are positions of influence 
in the Service as well as in the government of the Federation 
of Nigeria. 
There are presently nineteen states in the Federation 
of Nigeria. In 1967 six states were created out of the for¬ 
mer Northern Region and three out of the former Eastern Region. 
The federal territory of Lagos became the state of Lagos while 
both the Western and Mid-Western Regions remained intact. 
The entire exercise left Nigeria then with twelve states-- 
six in the north and six in the southern part of the country. 
In 1976 the Murtala Mohammed administration created seven new 
states. Out of these, four more were created in the northern 
part of the country, two in the West and one in the East. 
Meanwhile the states created out of the former Western 
Region in 1976 and the Lagos state maintain their common bond. 
They are all Yoruba states, and very homogeneous in composition. 
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Before 1966, the struggle for jobs in the Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice had been between the Northern, Western, and the Eastern 
Regions. The Northern Region was in a weak position in the 
contest. For one, it had generally less well educated can¬ 
didates to field for the Federal Civil Service jobs and for 
the other reason, the few educated ones preferred working for 
the Northern Regional Government which gave to them better 
job positions, status, and privileges than those offered 
by any government in the Southern part of the country. Be¬ 
sides the short-sighted policy of keeping northern Nigerians 
from the South which was instituted by Frederick Lugard and 
selfishly perpetuated by his colonial successors had even 
long after Nigeria's independence continued to make most of 
the northern Nigerian citizens strangers in the southern parts 
of the country. Most educated Northerners could not compro¬ 
mise with the fast life in Lagos. It is a well known fact 
in Nigeria that in order to get some candidates from the 
Northern Region to agree to work in the Federal Civil Service, 
in Lagos, the Premier of the Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the 
Sardauna of Sokoto, had to bring pressure to bear and had to 
use his influence to secure for those candidates who ac¬ 
cepted to work in Lagos fairly high positions, rapid promo¬ 
tions, good housing and other benefits. The contest for job 
positions in the Federal Civil Service and the fact that the 
Northern Region was to remain at a disadvantage for many years 
strongly led to the Northern Region's agitation for a quota 
system whereby she could fill the position allocated to her 
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at her own pace regardless of the number of years it was to 
take in doing so. 
The Eastern and Western Regions therefore emerged as 
the two main principals in the contest for positions in the 
Federal Civil Service. The Mid-Western Region, formerly a 
part of the Western Region, was not badly off. Its people 
were fairly represented in the Federal Civil Service while 
it was still a part of the Western Region. The senior and 
middle level positions in the Federal Civil Service were 
dominated by officials from the Eastern Region (mainly Ibos 
in ethnic origin). Though citizens from the Western Region 
and the Federal territory of Lagos usually sought and held 
some high positions in the Federal Civil Service most of 
them took to the professions, mainly law and medicine. 
At the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, 
most of the federal civil servants from the Eastern Region 
fled their jobs and withdrew to their region. The war lasted 
for thirty months during which time citizens of the former 
Western Region and the Mid-Western Region filled the vacan¬ 
cies which were created by the exodus of the Easterners. 
Moreover, the creation of states caused many to leave the 
Federal Civil Service to take up appointments in their states 
of origin.^ Presently Nigerians who graduate from Nigerian 
-'-The former chairman of the Federal Public Service Com¬ 
mission is said to have warned some states against the deser¬ 
tion of positions held by the states' officials in the Federal 
Civil Service for appointments in the states. His contention 
is reported to have been that once states lose their represen¬ 
tation in the Federal Civil Service and such positions are 
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universities and from universities abroad prefer taking up 
employment in their home states' civil services to working 
in the Federal Civil Service. 
In the Nigerian political system to which particular¬ 
ism is fundamental, members of a tribe tend to enjoy better 
treatment and get more employment opportunities once fellow 
tribesmen are in control of departments or institutions.^ 
Table 11 shows that 36.9 percent of the civil servants 
in the survey sample came from the former Western Nigeria 
(Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo states) and Lagos which in reality is 
a part of Western Nigeria. Eighteen percent came from some 
states which were created out of the former Northern Nigeria 
filled with candidates from other states it will be difficult 
for the losing states to regain their places in the Federal 
Civil Service for a long time. 
-^This view was made known to the author when he asked 
one of the officials about the numerical strength of the mid¬ 
dle and senior level officials from his home state in the 
Federal Civil Service. The high cost of living, difficulties 
in finding accommodation, congestion and transportation prob¬ 
lems in Lagos seem to be factors which discourage many from 
working in Lagos. 
See, an article captioned "Nigeria: Yoruba Radical¬ 
ism and Oil," Africa Confidential, February 20, 1976. During 
the civilian rule the Ibos were targets of attack in many 
Nigerian newspapers because of their numerical strength in 
and occupation of key positions in the Federal Civil Service, 
the Foreign Service, and the Federal Corporations. Under the 
military administration the publication of articles that can 
engender tribal animosity have been proscribed. The Yorubas, 
from the states created out of the former Western Nigeria and 
from Lagos presently, in numerical strength, dominate and con¬ 
trol key positions in the Federal Civil Service, Foreign Ser¬ 
vice, and Federal Corporations. Of course, vacancies have 
to be filled and when candidates from other states do not 
show up candidates from states in the former Western Region 
and Lagos have the right to be considered for such positions. 
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(Benue, Kwara, Sokoto, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, and Borno). The 
former Mid-Western Region (nov; Bendel) had 15.7 percent while 
the former Eastern Region had 28.8 percent representation in 
the sample. In terms of key positions the former regions 
line up as follows in our sample. The Western Region and 
Lagos had 10.0 percent representation at the senior level and 
26.3 percent at the middle management level; the former 
Northern Region had 10.5 percent of the senior management 
officials and 7.5 percent of the middle management officials. 
For the former Mid-Western Region, the position was 6.3 per¬ 
cent for senior management level and 9.4 percent for middle 
level management. The former Eastern region had 9.3 percent 
senior officials and 15.1 percent middle management officials. 
Our grouping of states is mainly to show their former loca¬ 
tions vis à vis the old regional boundaries. The states in 
Nigeria prefer maintaining their individual identity to 
being referred to as belonging to former regions which had 
been abolished. However, Table 11 shows precisely how each 
state was represented in our sample. 
Ethnic Origin. In Table 12 the ethnic origins of the 
respondents are shown. When these figures are matched with 
those in Table 11 discrepancies are obvious. This is because 
in Nigeria, ethnic groups cut across state boundaries though 
maintaining greater homogeneity and identification with each 
other. There are over four hundred tribes in Nigeria and 
some states are multi-tribal in composition. Yoruba, Hausa, 
178 
TABLE 12 

































Yoruba 18 11. 2 44 27.5 1 ' 0.6 0 0. 0 63 39.4 
Bini 6 3.8 7 4.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 13 8.1 
Urhobo 1 0.6 3 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 2.5 
I bo 9 5. 6 17 10.6 2 1.3 3 1.9 31 19.4 
I jaw 3 1.9 5 3.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 8 5.0 
Ibibio 5 3.1 4 2. 5 1 0.6 1 0.6 11 6.8 
Efik 
» 
0. 0 3 1.9 0 0. 0 0 0.0 3 1.9 
Igbirra 3 1.9 0 0.0 0 0. 0 0 0.0 3 1.9 
Tiv 4 2.5 1 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 3.1 
Hausa 6 3.8 1 0.6 0 0. 0 0 0.0 7 4.4 
Fulani 1 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.6 
Kanuri 1 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.6 
Nupe 0 0, 0 3 1. 9 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 1.9 
Others 0 0.0 1.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.3 
No Answer 1 0.6 4 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 3.1 
58 36.2 94 58.8 4 2. 5 4 2.5 160 100.0 
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Fulani, and Ibo are tribes which are found in more than one 
state in Nigeria. Once an issue which has ethnic overtones 
crops up, even in the Federal Civil Service, it is always 
sure to arouse great sentiments and sometimes misplaced 
tribal loyalties. 
In Nigeria, people are more often identified with 
their ethnic groups than with their states. It is conven¬ 
tional to say that the Yorubas, the Ibos, the Hausas or the 
Ijaws are dominating the Federal Civil Service or Federal 
Corporations. To use states in classifying civil servants 
would create problems because while a group of civil servants 
may be in the minority when states are considered they may 
actually be in the majority group when ethnic origin is used 
as classification criterion. 
Sex. Though the legal language calls for egual oppor¬ 
tunity in most appointments for both men and women in the 
Nigerian Federal Republic Service, not many Nigerian women 
hold senior management positions in the Service. A number 
of non-legal factors have impeded female advancement in the 
Civil Service. Two related factors need to be mentioned here. 
They are education and sex. 
Until recently attitudes towards education of girls 
in various rural communities in Nigeria varied from apathetic 
to retrograde. In terms of economic investment some families 
regarded education of girls as losses because the girls for 
whom so much money was spent on their education usually ended 
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up marrying outside persons to whom they transferred their 
entire loyalties. For this reason, some families' attitudes 
toward female education were negative and the majority of 
girls in such communities grew up as illiterates. The female 
literacy rate in such areas remained slow to the extent that 
some state governments had to accord preferential treatment 
in the award of scholarships in an attempt to enable girls 
to be educated so as to be able to catch up in the employment 
market. Table 13 shows the enrollment of boys and girls in 
secondary schools by class and division in one of the states 
in Nigeria, in 1970. At the Lower VI and Upper VI classes 
the enrollments of girls in nearly all schools in the divisions 
were low. Until two years ago admissions to Nigerian Univer¬ 
sities were based on a candidate's successful completion of 
education in the Upper VI class with passes in at least two 
subjects at Advanced Level or possession of Advanced Level 
General Certificate of Education (GCE) in two or more sub¬ 
jects. If only half of the total eighteen female students 
who were in the Upper VI classes in all the secondary schools 
throughout the state could successfully complete their educa¬ 
tion at the Upper VI classes it meant that barring any other 
setbacks nine of them could get into the universities in 
1971. Their being employed in the Civil Service in the mid¬ 
dle management position as Assistant Secretaries depended on 
their acquiring a first or second class honor degree from the 
universities. 
TABLE 13 
ENROLLMENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS BY CLASS AND DIVISION, 1970 
Class Class Class Class Class Lower Upper 
I II III IV V VI VII Total 
No. f M le 
Division Schools M n r M F M F M F M F M F M F M F Female 
Abak 4 266 95 207 66 223 73 216 55 192 35 40 - 13 - 1157 324 1481 
Calabar 6 506 328 372 314 306 272 276 177 246 124 90 26 88 15 1184 1256 3140 
Eket 5 346 157 314 113 306 140 203 92 208 71 57 7 45 3 1149 583 2062 
Enyong 4 162 179 95 120 63 118 75 67 51 39 - - - - 446 523 969 
Ikom 2 60 65 52 34 27 - 24 23 24 - - - - - 187 122 309 
Ikot Ekpene 2 69 25 52 21 48 14 28 10 19 4 - - - - 216 74 290 
Obubra 2 137 33 116 12 79 14 58 20 48 9 - - - - 438 88 526 
Obudu 1 61 - 32 - 28 - 26 - 21 - - - - - 168 - 168 
Ogoja 3 134 76 104 40 70 40 56 53 58 42 26 1 25 2 473 254 727 
Opobo 2 139 28 109 14 93 19 90 10 80 4 - - - - 511 75 586 
Uyo 9 546 366 377 317 379 286 296 224 234 171 12 2 11 1 1855 1367 3222 
Total 40 






There is no discrimination because of sex in employ¬ 
ment in the middle management level, supervisory level, and 
the junior level where women hold mainly clerical positions. 
However, advancement for women through the middle management 
ranks could be slow because of bias toward sex. Unfortunate¬ 
ly, men are in many cases promoted to higher positions, the 
responsibilities of which are sometimes demanding. Most of 
the female respondents in the survey were in the middle man¬ 
agement grades and held Senior Assistant and Assistant Secre¬ 
tary posts. Only one female respondent held a senior manage¬ 
ment position (see Table 14); 7.5 percent occupied middle 
TABLE 14 





























Male 57 35.6 82 51.3 4 2.5 1 0.6 144 90.0 
Female 1 
. 
0.6 12 7.5 0 0.0 3 1.9 16 10.0 
58 36.2 94 58.8 4 2.5 4 2.5 160 100.0 
level management positions while 1.9 percent were junior 
civil servants. In all, 10 percent of the respondents were 
female while 90 percent were male. However, the female popu¬ 
lation in Nigeria is 27.5 million which is 49.4 percent of 
the entire population. Data on the population of women in 
183 
the Federal Civil Service are not available; otherwise it 
would be interesting to see what percentage of the Federal 
Civil Service is female. 
Level of Educational Attainments. For every post in 
the Federal Civil Service a particular educational qualifica¬ 
tion is desirable. A candidate for, or serving officer in, 
the administrative class is normally expected to have a 
University Honors Degree^ or a higher degree than the Bache¬ 
lor of Arts or Science. But in a few cases, candidates or 
serving officers with lower qualifications and who possess 
sound experience, breadth of outlook, vision, initiative and 
high intellectual capacity are acceptable as worthy of pro¬ 
motion to the administrative class. The qualification re¬ 
quirement is in keeping with the demands of the task per¬ 
formed by the administrative class. It is here that much of 
the organization, management, and control of the complicated 
administrative machinery of government is executed. 
Other professional or technical areas of the Federal 
Civil Service call for specific qualifications. An auditor 
in the Federal Civil Service is required to be an associate 
member of one of the following; 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (England and Wales, 
Scotland or Ireland), 
Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants 
-^Federation of Nigeria: Guide to Careers in the Federal 
Public Service of Nigeria, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
184 
Institute of Cost and Works Accountants 
Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, 
or should hold an Honors Degree (not necessarily in mathema¬ 
tics) from a recognized university.^ It is the view of this 
author that mere possession of an Honors Degree in a disci¬ 
pline other than mathematics is not an appropriate qualifica¬ 
tion for a good auditor. Since auditing of government ac¬ 
counts involves dealing with figures, a degree holder who is 
a candidate for the post of an auditor but who has no pro¬ 
fessional accounting qualifications should at least have 
passed the General Certificate of Education at Advanced 
Level, or the Higher School Certificate Examination in mathe¬ 
matics. Quite often poor performance on a job can be traced 
to lack of adequate training in a discipline relating to the 
job. No useful purpose is served by employing Honors gradu¬ 
ates in history, Latin, or any modern language as auditors. 
Doing this is tantamount to placing square pegs in round 
holes. The Civil Service, the nature of the work of which 
consists of routine performance, has this flaw of improper 
utilization of manpower. 
To ascertain the highest level of educational achieve¬ 
ments of the respondents, the question put to them specified 
three types of educational training. Very few respondents 
mentioned educational achievements which could not be con¬ 
fined to any of the three categories. Therefore, "others" 
-*-Ibid . , p. 10. 
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is used in the Table to categorize such answers. 
Table 15 indicates the number and percentage of re¬ 
spondents who reached the level of each type of educational 
TABLE 15 













































tion 4 2.5 12 7.5 1 0.6 0 0.0 17 10.6 
Others 2 1.2 11 6.9 2 1.3 1 0.6 16 10.0 
No 
Response 0 0.0 1 0.6 0 0*0 0 0.0 1 0.6 
58 36.2 94 58.8 4 2.5 4 2.5 160 100.0 
training. In Nigeria, when discussing higher education, the 
implied reference is primarily to university education lead¬ 
ing to the award of academic degrees. For the purpose of this 
work, some professional qualifications, like in accounting and 
architecture which are obtained through rigorous studies after 
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secondary school career and the duration for which compares 
with that for university education, are classified as higher 
education. 
Survey for this study provides evidence of the ac¬ 
tual educational qualifications of respondents. Table 15 
presents the data. Of the fifty-eight senior management 
officials in the sample 32.5 percent held academic degrees 
(Bachelor, Master, Doctorate), 2.5 percent were profession¬ 
als highly qualified in disciplines like accountancy, archi¬ 
tecture, etc., while 1.2 percent said that they held quali¬ 
fications like diploma in education and in public administra¬ 
tion. These later groups had, by dint of hard work, obtained 
promotions into the senior management grade. 
The bulk of the middle level management officials 
are those who had earned their academic degrees (Bachelors 
and Masters) and hold the Assistant and Senior Assistant Sec¬ 
retary positions. Most of them are graduates in liberal arts, 
economics, public administration and the social sciences. 
They formed 40.0 percent of our respondents. About 4 percent 
of this class of civil servants had only secondary school 
background with experience in areas like accounting. These 
are the type of civil servants who after years of hard work 
can rise through promotion to Higher Executive Office, Senior 
Executive Officer, and Principal Executive Officer positions. 
Seven and five-tenths percent of the middle level management 
officials were those who had technical training and were 
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qualified as draftmen, survey technicians, principal statis¬ 
tician, etc. 
Only one supervisory personnel in our sample had a 
secondary school background, two held junior professional 
qualifications in secretaryship while another had a technical 
qualification. In the Junior grade, the three who possessed 
secondary school qualifications were female clerks while the 
one male had completed elementary education and after some 
years of work as messenger-typist was promoted to the posi¬ 
tion of a clerk. 
Recruitment Pattern and Work Experience. In the 
study of organization it has been found that the recruitment 
pattern and also the background experience with which indi¬ 
viduals come to formal organization have much to do with con¬ 
flicts which often exist in organizations. This is more so 
because the complex cultures in which formal organization 
exists and from which it recruits has a wide variety of dis¬ 
tinctions between categories of persons. The social, cultural, 
political and even religious distinctions, though irrelevant 
to the official roles and operations of the organization, 
sometimes become active in organizational contexts as latent 
roles.^ Some occupational qualifications are associated with 
^•James D. Thompson's article, "Organizational Manage¬ 
ment of Conflict," clearly discusses the causes of conflict in 
formal organization and their resolution and I am indebted to 
the ideas expressed therein. See, Administrative Service Quar¬ 
terly, Vol. 4, March 1960, pp. 389-409. 
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the latent roles. And, since the organization needs those 
qualifications, it often accepts them with some built-in 
latent roles. However, careful recruitment procedures and 
selection process can act as palliatives to the latent roles 
syndrome. 
How Nigerian Federal Civil Servants come to the organ¬ 
ization, their work experience and background may have a 
causal relationship with their attitudes towards the Federal 
Civil Service—their role, the performance of the organiza¬ 
tion as a machinery for economic and social development of 
the country, besides the type of changes desired by the civil 
servants themselves. The responses to the two questions on 
recruitment pattern and work experience can be useful in the 
analysis of these attitudes. Tables 16 and 17 show these 
responses. 
Individuals come to work in an organization through 
different motivations. Sometimes friends or relations recom¬ 
mend a particular organization because either they happen to 
work there or know much about the organization. Some job 
seekers learn of employment vacancies in organizations through 
advertisements. Others act independently of any agents. 
They observe the organization, become interested in what it 
does, and decide to seek employment with it. The Table which 
follows shows that a high percentage (19.4) of the respondents 
in the senior management decided to work in the Federal Civil 
Service because of motivations other than relations, friends, 
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TABLE 16 






























tives 2 1.2 7 4.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 5.6 
Friend 17 10.6 34 21.3 1 1.3 4 2.5 57 35.6 
Advert. 5 3.1 19 11.9 1 0.6 0 0.0 25 15.6 
Others 31 19.4 31 19.4 1 0.6 0 0.0 63 39.4 
No 
Answer 3 1.9 3 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 3.8 
58 36.2 94 58.9 4 2.5 4 2.5 160 100.0 
or advertisements. On the other hand, friends were instru¬ 
mental in the decisions of the majority in the middle level 
group (21.3 percent), and junior level (2.5 percent). 
Of the civil servants who responded to the question¬ 
naire survey, nearly 84.0 percent indicated they had some 
work experience (see Table 17). While a majority gained 
their experience through working in various positions in the 
Civil Service, 20.0 percent of the respondents had worked in 
other organizations before coming to the Civil Service. 
The profile data presented in this chapter enable us 
to know more about the Federal Civil Servants in our sample. 
Looking at the data we can say that the average respondent 
was between 21 and 40 years of age, that he or she possessed 
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TABLE 17 































Yes 57 35.6 74 46.3 3 1.9 0 0.0 134 83.8 
No 1 0.6 20 12.5 1 0.6 4 2.5 26 16.2 
58 36.2 96 58.8 4 2.5 4 2.5 160 100.0 
as a base educational qualification a high school diploma or 
an equivalent, that the other qualifications—degrees, diplo¬ 
mas, professional and technical—were built on the high school 
background. The data also reveal that the bulk of our re¬ 
spondents, besides holding Bachelor or higher degrees, do 
have some years of experience working in the Federal Civil 
Service or in other employments before joining the Civil Ser¬ 
vice. This knowledge of their backgrounds gives us the con¬ 
fidence that whatever opinions they give about the Civil Ser¬ 
vice are based on sound understanding of the system in which 
they work and that the positions which most of them occupy 
permit them to have clear perspectives of the organization. 
Though the variables which we are to deal with in the 
next chapter do not permit the use of correlation in our 
analysis, because they cannot be assigned numerical values, 
we shall present the opinions of our respondents within the 
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parameters of their profile data and comment on what impli¬ 
cations these views or attitudes have for the Civil Service. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SURVEY: 
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS 
For analytical purposes the views of the survey re¬ 
spondents are presented in this chapter under five sub¬ 
headings. These are: (a) efficiency of the Civil Service; 
(b) identification with the Civil Service; (c) comparative 
performance of the Civil Service during the Civilian and 
Military rules; (d) obstacles undermining efficiency and 
goal attainment; and finally, (e) changes suggested by 
civil servants. 
The Efficiency Problem 
Very often the concepts of efficiency and effective¬ 
ness have been used to portray how well or how bad an organ¬ 
ization's performance is. "Efficiency" relates a program's 
products to the costs incurred in an effort to maximize the 
value of product per unit cost or to reduce the cost per unit 
of product. On the other hand, organizational effectiveness 
which subsumes the whole idea of efficiency reflects 
the extent to which an organization as a social 
system, given certain resources and means fulfills 
its objectives without incapacitating its means 
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and resources and without placing undue strain on 
its members.1 
The problem with the use of efficiency in the evalua¬ 
tion of administrative performance lies in the fact that its 
application to human outputs and inputs presents the diffi¬ 
culties of measurement and quantification.2 The concept is 
most useful in its application to mechanical operations be¬ 
cause the inputs and outputs are identifiable and measurable. 
These differences in usage notwithstanding, efficiency as 
a concept has been used to portray a quality in administra¬ 
tive machinery which is crucial to successful management 
and execution of programs of development. It is in the light 
of this awareness that the governments of some of the new 
states have embarked on measures designed to boost the ad¬ 
ministrative efficiency of their bureaucracies. These mea¬ 
sures include training programs for different categories of 
civil servants, as well as the introduction and use of new 
administrative techniques such as, Organization and Methods 
(O&M), Program and Performance Budgeting (PPB), Project Man¬ 
agement and Management by Objectives (MBO). 
It has been argued that the concept of efficiency 
when applied to human inputs should include considerations 
1-Basil S. Georgopolous and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "A 
Study of Organizational Effectiveness," American Sociologi¬ 
cal Review, Vol. 22, No. 5, October 1957, pp. 534-540. 
2Irving Swerdlow, The Public Administration of Eco- 
nomic Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 
p. 351. 
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of the well-being of man as the major purpose of the pro¬ 
duction process.1 Consonant with this opinion, governments 
have tried to improve the conditions of service, work en¬ 
vironment and social amenities,among other things, in order 
to motivate the civil servants to maintain high levels of 
administrative efficiency. But in spite of the concerted 
effort, the public still finds no cause to be satisfied with 
the standard of performance of the administrative bureau¬ 
cracies. In Nigeria public dissatisfaction with the perfor¬ 
mances of the Civil Service is evident in complaints such 
as these. 
Service to the public (does not seem to be) a main 
objective of large numbers of employees at the junior, 
middle and in some cases senior levels. Output per 
man hour is very low and sometimes significantly 
lower than it should be.2 
and 
the idea that it (employment in the Civil Service) 
is government work is so pronounced that but for 
services rendered by the private sector, the Niger¬ 
ian society would one day have grinded to a com¬ 
plete halt; thanks to the poor working attitude of 
civil servants ! 3 
Efficiency of the Civil Service thus becomes an issue between 
what the public expects and how much it realizes from the 
services performed by the administrative bureaucracy. 
■'•Ibid. , p. 3 51. 
2 
Mahmud Tukur, ed., Reform of the Nigerian Public Ser- 
vice (Zaria: Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello Univer- 
sity, 1971), pp. 172-173. 
3Paily Times, March 29, 1976, p. 16 
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Since efficiency is primarily a criterion of the in¬ 
ternal life of an organization and touches the economic and 
technical aspects of an organization, it was assumed that 
the civil servants as members of the organization could give 
their evaluation of efficiency in the Federal Civil Service. 
Two questions in our survey instrument aimed at finding out 
the civil servants' opinions on the efficiency of the Feder¬ 
al Civil Service. 
We first asked the civil servants in our sample to 
evaluate the Federal Civil Service in terms of its promoting 
and emphasizing efficiency and economy in operations since 
the achievement of Nigerian independence. While the over¬ 
all opinion was that the administrative bureaucracy was seen 
to be promoting the two related values, the margin of dif¬ 
ference (7.6 percent) between the total "yes" responses 
(36.9 percent) and the total "no" responses (29.3 percent) 
was however significant (see Table 18). 
An analysis of the opinions given by respondents who 
held senior and middle management level positions in the Fed¬ 
eral Civil Service reveals some interesting difference of 
opinions. One finds that there is a wide difference of opin¬ 
ion between the total "yes" and the total "no" answers (6.9 
percent) given by senior management officials, but a (-0.7 
percent) difference in the two opinions expressed by the 
middle management personnel. Judged from the percent of 
"yes" answers one would think that while the senior officials 
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feel that progress has been made in achieving these values 
the middle management officials see differently. In their 
views, efficiency and economy have neither been emphasized 
nor practiced. The senior officials are by their positions 
and status distant from most of the middle management offi¬ 
cials and even farther removed from the supervisory and jun¬ 
ior civil servants. As such they do not know much about 
the day to day operations down the hierarchy. To a great 
extent they depend on the upward communication to know what 
goes on. And, in many cases they are not presented with 
reports which reflect the situations the middle management 
staff feel they can handle. 
Statement: Since independence the Federal Civil Service has 
emphasized and practiced efficiency and economy. 
Yes No No opinion  
TABLE 18 
PERCENT RESPONSES ON EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY 


















Yes 15.0 19.3 1.3 1.3 36.9 
No 8.1 20.0 0.6 0.6 29.3 
No opinion 11.9 17.5 0.6 0.6 30.6 
No answer 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 3.2 
NOTE: The "No opinion" responses were clearly indicated 
by respondents. But the "No answer" shows the percentage of 
respondents to our questionnaire who left the question unan¬ 
swered one way or the other. 
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When the "No opinion" responses from the civil ser¬ 
vants in each of the two levels of management are considered, 
it can be argued that those respondents in the middle manage¬ 
ment positions entertain greater doubts regarding the accom¬ 
plishments of the organization in promoting efficiency and 
economy than respondents of the senior management grade. 
Further, if the "No opinion" answers are taken as represent¬ 
ing negative answers which respondents were not willing to 
state as such, and, should be considered with the actual 
"no" responses which indicate the non-achievement of these 
values, it would be clear that the total negative responses 
percentage-wise overwhelm the total "yes" responses. How¬ 
ever, the responses of the middle management personnel are 
significant because their positions permit them to observe 
closely the performances of both the senior and junior civil 
servants. They are of the view that both values have not 
been maintained at a high level since the country's attain¬ 
ment of national independence. 
Both the supervisory and junior civil servants recorded 
positive responses to the question. But because of the poor 
returns from the two groups their responses as shown in the 
table do not provide enough analyzable information. 
A second method used in obtaining the civil servants' 
evaluation of the efficiency of the Federal Civil Service was 
through the use of social reference group performance criter¬ 
ion. By this method, the relative performance of the focal 
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bureaucracy (the Federal Civil Service) was compared to per¬ 
formances in other organizations which were conceived as 
reference organizations for organization assessment. Three 
types of organizations, namely, Expatriate Controlled Firms, 
Private Indigenous Business, and Public Corporations, were 
used as reference organization. The respondents were asked 
to compare, in terms of relative efficiency, the Federal 
Civil Service with each of the organizations. The evalua¬ 
tion scale used was "more efficient than," "as efficient as," 
and "less efficient than."l Since "efficiency" is a relative 
term it was believed that the respondents' knowledge of per¬ 
formances in the three reference organizations would help 
them arrive at a fair assessment of the performances in 
their own organization regardless of their responses to the 
first question. Table 19 shows the summary of respondents' 
opinions on the relative efficiency of the Federal Civil 
Service. 
The data indicate that the Civil Service was seen to 
be less efficient than expatriate controlled firms (81.9 per¬ 
cent opinion), more efficient than private indigenous busi¬ 
ness (63.7 percent opinion), but as efficient as any of the 
government owned public corporations (48.1 percent opinion). 
In the comparison, it is worth noting that the expatriate 
1This question is an adaptation from a questionnaire 
item used by M. J. Balogun in measuring the efficiency of the 
Civil Service of the former Western State of Nigeria. See, 
his "Management Improvement in a Period of Transition," Ife 
Essays in Administration, Colin Baker and M. J. Balogun (eds.) 
(University of Ife Press, 1975), p. 42. 
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Question: In terms of relative efficiency, please compare 
the Federal Civil Service with the following: 
Expatriate controlled firms 
Private indigenous business 
Publie corporations 
TABLE 19 
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ON THE RELATIVE 
EFFICIENCIES OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE, EX¬ 
PATRIATE CONTROLLED FIRMS, PRIVATE INDIGENOUS 
BUSINESS AND PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. N 160=100% 
Expatriate Indigenous Public 
Evaluation Scale Firms Business Corporations 
Federal Civil 
Service 
More efficient than 2.5 63.7 18.7 
Federal Civil 
Service 
As efficient as 5.0 4.4 48.1 
Federal Civil 
Service 
Less efficient than 81.9 14.9 15.6 
No opinion 10.6 17.0 17.6 
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 
firms are controlled and managed by expatriates, while private 
indigenous business and government owned public corporations 
are managed and dominated by Nigerian personnel. 
The question which quickly comes to one's mind is why 
expatriate managed firms in Nigeria are more efficient than 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. While it is not our aim 
to probe the reasons in detail it is important to note that 
the differences in goals may account for the methods by which 
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goal attainments are pursued. Profit maximization is the 
compelling force which renders a clear and immediate cri¬ 
terion for effectiveness and is a viable motivational force 
in expatriate-managed firms. The argument that firms, be¬ 
sides profit making, do have social responsibilities-1- does 
not, however, diminish the exploitative tendencies of the 
foreign owned and controlled firms in Nigeria. It is the 
profit or exploitative orientations of these firms that in¬ 
duce their use of methods and procedures which ensure their 
operational efficiency and effectiveness. They employ and 
retain only those workers who are not only qualified but who 
demonstrate acceptable competence in discharging assigned 
duties. This is because, unlike the Civil Service, since 
their administration is not politicized they can conven¬ 
iently rely on achievement instead of ascriptive criteria in 
appointments and on universalistic instead of particularistic 
criteria in working relationships. One other possible cause 
of greater efficiency in expatriate controlled firms is the 
continuous search and adoption of new methods, procedures, 
and organizational structures in the process of managing 
the business. 
The Federal Civil Service is a service institution 
whose financial resources are guaranteed from tax-payers' 
money through an annual budget that is voted by the 
^See, for example, Keith Davis, "Understanding the 
Social Responsibility Puzzle," Business Horizons, Winter 
1967, pp. 45-50. 
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legislature. Though its failure to allocate its organiza¬ 
tional resources-*- in such a way that approaches optimum dis¬ 
tribution may incapacitate its efforts towards the achieve¬ 
ment of its goals, its existence is never affected. The 
typical responses of service institutions to failure of an 
activity or program is the doubling of its budget and staff.2 
One frequent complaint which is made against govern¬ 
ment institutions is that their operations are tardy be¬ 
cause of rigid adherence to rules and regulations. Max 
Weber5 had pointed to the extensive use of rules as one of 
the traits intrinsic to bureaucracy. Some large organizations, 
especially service institutions, have increasingly found them¬ 
selves in a straitjacket of rules hardly conducive to flex¬ 
ible behavior. Anthony Downs attributes this ossification 
syndrome to methods which officials devise to effect control 
of the organization—the increasing specialization in the 
organization and the escalation of operating authority.4 
A satire5 written by an observer of the Nigerian 
^"Resources" is used here in a wider sense to include 
time, manpower as well as ordinary resources like money. 
2Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), p. 227. 
5Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 196-244. 
4Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 158-159. 
5Peter Enahoro, How to Be a Nigerian (Ibadan: The 
Caxton Press West Africa Limited, 1966), p. 47. 
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bureaucratie scene has described the administrative machin¬ 
ery as one of the few institutions "left behind by the Brit¬ 
ish which have survived independence." It derides the bur¬ 
eaucracy's continued use of rules and regulations which were 
formulated by the colonial government saying: 
Moslems have their Koran; Christians have their Bible; 
the Nigerian public servant has his General Orders.... 
The "G.O." as it is formerly called, is the last 
authority on bureaucracy.1 
Within the uninformed public the impression which seems to 
develop is that for one to be a good Federal civil servant 
one has to know and obey the rules and regulations contained 
in the massive book of rules known as the General Orders. Un¬ 
fortunately, civil servants devote immense efforts to minute 
details, carry out operationally superfluous procedures and 
prepare elaborate justifications for past or potential ac¬ 
tions. Any novel procedure becomes extremely difficult to 
be adopted because it does not conform with what the rules 
and regulations stipulate. Peter F. Drucker pointedly ac¬ 
knowledges this flaw when noting that 
all service institutions are threatened by tendencies 
to cling to yesterday rather than to slough it off, 
and put their best and ablest people on defending 
what no longer makes sense or serves a purpose. Gov¬ 
ernment is particularly prone to this disease.^ 
llbid., p. 51. For another satirical attack on the 
rigid observance of rules and regulations in the Nigerian 
bureaucracy, see a poem captioned "The Bureaucrats' Creed," 
The Bureaucrat: Midwestern Nigeria Civil Service Journal, 
No. 1 (January/March, 1973), p. 16. 
9 
*-Peter F. Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilit¬ 
ies, Practices (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), 
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The opinions of the civil servants in the survey shed 
some light on how much stock the Civil Service places on 
rules and regulations. Some descriptions of the Civil Ser¬ 
vice were presented to the respondents. They were asked to 
indicate which description fits the civil servant who would 
either be promoted quickly or commended for excellent per¬ 
formance on his job. The answers given (see Table 20) show 
clearly that the Civil Service emphasizes strict application 
of its rules and regulations leaving not much room for in¬ 
dividuals' personal judgments as to the appropriateness of 
the rules to varying circumstances. 
Table 20 shows a trend of diminishing emphasis in 
opinions of the respondents on the different promotion cri¬ 
teria. Taking the answers given by the civil servants in 
p. 146. Other studies which support this view besides stating 
that there is less opportunity for advancement and real suc¬ 
cess achievement in public service include those of Morris 
Janowitz, et al., Public Administration and the Public (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Institute of Pub¬ 
lic Administration, 1958); Franklin Kilpatrick, et al., The 
Image of the Federal Service (Washington, D. C.: The Brook¬ 
ings Institute, 1964); H. George Frederickson, "Understanding 
Attitudes Toward Public Employment," Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 27, December 1967, pp. 411-420; Frank K. Gibson 
and George A. James, "Student Attitudes Toward Government 
Employees and Employment," Public Administration Review, 
Vol. 27, December 1967, pp. 429-435; James S. Bowman and 
David L. Norman, Jr., "Attitudes Towards the Public Service: 
A Survey of University Students," Public Personnel Management: 
Journal of the International Personnel Management Association, 
(March/April 1975), pp. 113-121; and Harold M. Banger, "Images 
of Bureaucracy: A Tri-Ethnic Gonsideration," Public Adminis¬ 
tration Review, Vol. 3 (May/June 1976), pp. 287-296. 
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TABLE 20 
RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ON CIVIL SERVANTS' COMMITMENT 
TO APPLICATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS AS BASIS 
FOR GAINING PROMOTION OR COMMENDATION 























rigidly 17.5 32.5 1.9 0.6 52.5 
One who in¬ 
terprets the 
rules and uses 
his initiative 
to apply the 
rules and reg¬ 
ulations where 
appropriate 16.8 21.9 0.6 1.9 41.3 
One who ig¬ 
nores the 
rules and 
uses only his 
judgment 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 
No answer 1.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 
the senior management group, there is a (0.7) percent differ¬ 
ence of opinion between the choice of the first and second 
descriptions of the civil servants. No member of this man¬ 
agement group felt that the Civil Service would commend or 
promote its employee on the basis of his using only personal 
judgment in the conduct of his work. The middle management 
group presents a stronger divergence of opinion on the three 
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descriptions of the civil servant. On the first criterion 
the total opinion score from this class of respondents re¬ 
gisters 32.5 percent. The percentage difference between the 
choice of the first and second criteria is 10.6 percent while 
the percentage difference of choice between the second and 
third criteria is even greater, 19.4 percent. The responses 
of the civil servants in both the supervisory and junior 
levels, also show some variances. However, it is interest¬ 
ing to note that seventy-five percent of respondents in the 
junior class felt that promotion or commendation would be 
given to a civil servant whose operational conduct meets the 
second criterion. 
The position of the middle management class in the 
civil service may partly account for the divergence of opin¬ 
ion noticed in the responses from this group. Orders or in¬ 
structions coming from the senior management class go through 
the middle management group down to the supervisory and jun¬ 
ior levels. When the orders are carried out, they are re¬ 
ported to the top management through the middle management 
group. Thus civil servants in this class are in a position 
which permits them to observe first hand how members of their 
class and those below them apply the rules and regulations 
in the conduct of their work. 
Another dimension to the problem which also undermines 
the role effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal Civil 
Service is the use of unnecessarily cumbersome operational 
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procedures. Often, matters of urgent concern are bogged 
down in laborious, minuting processes which start from one 
official at the base of the hierarchy to the most senior offi¬ 
cial at the top. In this process, each official adds his 
thoughts to the idea under consideration. Before the final 
decision is taken on the matter, the various recommendations 
and objections have to be taken into account. This attitude 
of procedural rigidity, "plus the delays involved in obtain¬ 
ing official rulings for unusual situations create the condi¬ 
tions that have become stereotyped as the 'bureaucratic men¬ 
tality' and 'red tape.'"-'- These are some of the images 
which the Civil Service conjure in the mind of the public. 
Our respondents were asked to comment on these images. We 
noted a split of opinions on the image of a civil servant as 
expert in creating red tape. The responses show that 23.8 
percent of the senior management officials felt that the 
statement was unjustified while an equal percentage of the 
middle management officials support the charge as reflecting 
the true situation. Though the supervisors and junior civil 
servants who reacted to the statement felt that civil ser¬ 
vants are not to blame for creating procedural delays, both 
groups scored equally in the percentage opinion which con¬ 
firmed the statement, 0.6 percent. Overall the data on this 
question provide evidence of strong rejection by respondents 
of the reality of the image of the civil servants that exists 
1Anthony Downs, Op. Cit., p. 100. 
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Statement: When I think of a Civil Servant, I think of one 
who is an expert in creating red tape. 
Yes No No opinion  
TABLE 21 
PERCENT RESPONSES ON CIVIL SERVANTS' IMAGE 
AS EXPERTS IN CREATING RED TAPE 
Respondents Yes No 
No 
opinion Totals 
Senior Management 5.6 23.8 6.9 36.3 
Middle Level 
Management 23.8 21.8 13.1 58.7 
Supervisory Level 0.6 1.3 0.6 2.5 
Junior Level 0.6 1.3 0.6 2.5 
TOTALS 30.6 48.2 21.2 100.0 
in the public's mind. 
Anthony Downs, in his typology of officials in a 
bureau, has identified "the conservers" as predominantly 
dominating the middle level positions over the lowest or 
highest levels. According to him these middle level position 
officials often apply rigidly the rules of procedure promul¬ 
gated by higher authorities. By so acting they protect them¬ 
selves "from being blamed for mistakes by their superiors 
and even from having to obey any orders that conflict with 
'the book.'"-*- This type of administrative behavior while 
1Ibid. 
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being rational for conservers as it helps them to avoid the 
risk of decision-making, constitutes a displacement of goals 
because it undermines the efficient performance of the or¬ 
ganization's functions. 
In the Federal Civil Service the rigid rule-following 
behavior and the use of delay causing operational methods are 
not confined to the middle level officials. They are features 
of the entire organizational life and are the consequences 
of continued use of the inherited colonial bureaucratic 
structure. A civil service which plays a crucial role in 
development policy formulations and implmentation should 
develop a thrust for a more adaptive, less structured, but 
flexible organization with positions and roles which accom¬ 
modate dynamic and equal interplay among functional parts and 
organization members. It is in this type of bureaucracy that 
the rules and regulations can be made flexible and operating 
procedures more expeditious. 
Civil Servants' Identification with the Civil Service 
Earlier in assessing the development policies, programs, 
and plans which the Nigerian Federal Civil Service helps to 
formulate, it was pointed out that the lack of input from the 
Nigerian public was partially responsible for the elitist 
quality of some of the policies, programs, and plans which 
the Federal Civil Service helps to formulate and to imple¬ 
ment. The apathy on the part of the Nigerian citizens had 
been traced to the days of British rule. The British colonial 
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administrators' unwillingness to employ and to give qualified 
Nigerians responsibilities in the Colonial Civil Service had 
made many Nigerians view the administrative bureaucracy as 
a symbol of foreign domination. Employment in it was branded 
"white man's job." With the Civil Service now completely 
manned by Nigerians it was necessary for the survey to find 
out how its members view the organization—the attitude 
which they develop towards the Civil Service. This section 
will analyze the level of identification of the civil ser¬ 
vants towards the Federal Civil Service using the data pro¬ 
vided by our Civil Service Survey. 
Though little study has been done to show how indi¬ 
vidual's involvement in a system leads him to regard the 
goals of that system as his personal objective, literature 
testifies to the fact that members' participation in organi¬ 
zation's decisions and their sharing in its rewards enhance 
their identification with the organization. Herbert A. Simon 
noting that "the values and objectives that guide individual 
decisions in organization are largely the organizational 
objectives"-*- submits that, 
The decision which is made in terms of organizational 
values is, to that extent impersonal; but the attach¬ 
ment to the organization derives from personal motives. 
The individual is willing to make impersonal organization 
al decisions because a variety of factors, or incentives, 
tie him to the organization—his salary, prestige, friend 
ship and many others.^ 
^-Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: 
The Free Press, 1976), p. 198. 
^Ibid., p. 209. 
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When organizations' goals and individual needs and values 
are congruent the individual's identification with the organ¬ 
ization promotes behaviors such as low absenteeism and turn¬ 
over, high productivity and maximal spontaneity and inno¬ 
vativeness in the service of the organizational goals. 
By specifying the character of members' identification 
with an organization it is easy to understand the contents of 
such organizational commitment. When individuals identify 
with an organization because they accept its objectives as 
worthwhile and their role performance which contributes to 
goal achievement as satisfying to their needs and values, 
their rewards are intrinsic and their identification pattern 
is said to be expressive. Conversely, if individuals' iden¬ 
tification with an organization is predicated on the fact 
that their role performances bring them some monetary re¬ 
wards, promotion or other extraneous considerations, the 
nature of their commitment is said to be instrumental.^ 
The expressive type of organizational identification is 
loaded with high motivation and it is the one which contributes 
to high levels of performance besides generating other behav¬ 
iors beneficial to an organization. Therefore, when consider¬ 
ing administrative capability as one of the areas to be im¬ 
proved in the inherited Civil Service in Nigeria, it is im¬ 
portant to take into account not only the quantitative aspects 
Isee, Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psy- 
chology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 
1966), pp. 117-119. 
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but the qualitative nature of the capability of those in¬ 
volved in planning and implementing of programs of economic 
and social development. The Nigerian Federal Civil Service 
has men and women who are qualified in many fields. What the 
Civil Service needs are devoted men and women who are ex¬ 
pressively committed to it and not those whose commitment 
is mainly of an instrumental nature. 
Identification with the Civil Service. Some questions 
in the survey instrument were designed to elicit from the 
subjects in our sample indications of their identification 
with the organization of which they are members. Respondents 
were asked whether they would leave their present jobs for 
positions in a large established firm under the following 
conditions: (a) lower salary, (b) same salary, (c) higher 
salary. The figures in Table 22 indicate the responses of 
the civil servants in our sample. Almost 49.0 percent in¬ 
dicated through their responses that they would leave the 
Civil Service for the firm on an inducement of a higher salary, 
while 48.1 percent of our respondents said that they would 
not leave the organization on any account. But a grand total 
of possible defectors which is eighty-three (51.9 percent) 
is still more than the number of those who are committed to 
stay in the Civil Service regardless of the degree of any 
outside inducement. By using some indices as shown in Table 
23, it is possible to indicate the level or strength of 
identification which the responses in Table 22 characterize. 
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TABLE 22 
RESPONSES INDICATING CONDITIONS FOR POSSIBLE 




Will leave for lower salary 0.6 1 
Will leave for same salary 2.5 4 
Will leave for higher salary 48.8 78 
Will not leave for any 
level of salary 48.1 77 
No response — — 
100.0 160 
TABLE 23 
DEGREE OF IDENTIFICATION AS REFLECTED 






Will not leave for any 
level of salary Very strong 48.1 
Will leave for higher 
salary Weak 48.8 
Will leave for same 
salary Weaker 2.5 
Will leave for lower 
salary Weakest 0.6 
NOTE: Chi Square for Table significant at .001 level. 
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It may be said that those civil servants who perfer to stay 
in the organization in spite of the worth and strength of 
inducements from a competing outside organization exhibit 
very strong identification. Those who would leave because 
of offers of higher, same, and lower salary show weak, 
weaker, and weakest identification respectively, to the 
Civil Service. 
When the responses of civil servants in each of the 
four groups are carefully studied, it is easy to discern 
the strength and type of identification which are manifested 
by each group. Besides, reasons which might account for the 
character of identification exhibited by each group of civil 
servants can be advanced. Based on the information pre¬ 
sented in Table 24, it can be said that the senior manage¬ 
ment officials exhibit a strong identification with the 
TABLE 24 
PERCENT RESPONSES ON INDUCEMENT TO LEAVE THE CIVIL 

















Lower salary 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Same salary 1.3 1.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 
Higher 




factors 27.5 20.6 0.0 0.0 48.1 
36.3 58.7 2.5 2.5 100.0 
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Civil Service while civil servants in the other three levels 
have weak ties with the organization. The majority of opin¬ 
ions from the senior officials reflect the respondents' will¬ 
ingness to stay in the organization in the face of competing 
outside inducement. But we are not yet in a position to 
specify the content of the senior officials' identification 
with the Federal Civil Service. We can do so after looking 
at the responses to another item in our questionnaire. Re¬ 
spondents were asked what in particular they liked about the 
Federal Civil Service. A mixed bag of values and benefits 
were suggested and the respondents were asked to rank their 
choices in order of preferences. Table 25 summarizes the 
results. The first two reasons—adequate benefits and up¬ 
ward mobility—are instrumental. Job satisfaction, oppor¬ 
tunity for developing Nigeria and provision of services to 
the public are reasons which portray expressive kinds of 
identification. Judged from the ranked preferences we can 
say that some civil servants in our sample have instrumental 
identification with the Federal Civil Service. The senior 
management officials whose percent responses reflected their 
desire to remain in their positions with the Civil Service 
in spite of any level of salary inducements to be offered 
by firms, feel that the Civil Service offers them adequate 
benefits and provides opportunity for upward mobility per¬ 
haps more than what they would get as employees in most 
firms. This attitude testifies to the favorable conditions 
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TABLE 25 
RESPONDENTS' REASONS FOR LIKING THE FEDERAL CIVIL 



















ity 7.1 10.9 0.4 0.5 18.9 
Provides job 




Nigeria 6.9 10.0 0.4 0.5 17.8 
Provides ser¬ 
vices for the 
public 6.9 9.9 0.4 0.5 17.7 
Any other 
reason 1.3 6.1 0.4 0.0 7.8 
36.2 58.8 2.5 2.5 100.0 
of employment which the senior management staff are presently 
enjoying since the Federal Government's acceptance and imple¬ 
mentation of the Public Service Review Commission's Report 
of 1974. The Commission's philosophy underlying a senior 
management plan for the public service stated 
...the definition of the job to be done by senior 
managers must be backed up by a series of inter- 
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related personnel systems which are designed to 
motivate these individuals to perform their func¬ 
tions with energy, intelligence and honesty. 
Among these systems are position ranking, salary 
scales, fringe benefits or other perquisites and 
retirement programs. Together, they comprise 
the reward system, which is one of the central 
incentive instruments for senior managers. Re¬ 
gardless of the qualifications of senior managers, 
in the absence of such motivation programs the 
achievement of organization objectives may well 
be impeded or totally frustrated.^ 
After the Public Service Review Panel, 1975, had re¬ 
solved the inconsistencies in the Public Service Review Com¬ 
mission's Report on the grade level for the Senior Management 
Group, the Federal Government approved "the Grade Level for 
all Senior Management positions in the Federal and States 
Civil Services to be Grade Level 13-17."2 These grade levels 
carry salary scales ranging from N7,764 to N13,968. Given 
the elite status which the senior officials hold in the 
society, the trappings attached to their official positions, 
their enhanced position in the military administration, there 
are reasons to believe that most senior management officials 
feel better off in their present jobs than they would be if 
they were working for private firms. They, in fact, accept 
the attractive qualities of the Civil Service in their career 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Public Service Review 
Commission: Report on Grading and Pay, Vol. 2, 1972-1974 
(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, September, 1974), 
p. 6. 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Government Views on the 
Report of the Public Service Review Panel (Lagos: Federal 
Ministry of Information, September 1975), p. 5. 
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in spite of the unattractive functional images the organiza¬ 
tion has had for other Nigerians. 
The middle level management officials, the super¬ 
visory personnel, and the junior civil servants rank "adequate 
benefits" and "upward mobility" as their first and second 
reasons for liking the Civil Service. These reasons again 
emphasize the instrumental nature of their identification 
with the Civil Service. As shown earlier in our analysis, 
since these grades of civil servants are "bound in by extrin¬ 
sic reward" they have a propensity to defect from the Civil 
Service. 
Expected Treatment from Civil Servants. Almond and 
Verba maintain that "the feelings that people have towards 
governmental authorities may be inferred from their expecta¬ 
tions of how they will be treated."1 These expectations are 
referred to as "output affect." In considering the civil 
servant's attitude towards the Civil Service two possible 
effects of whatever treatment they receive from officials 
and colleagues are possible. We assume that a fair and con¬ 
siderate treatment would evoke a favorably disposed attitude 
or feeling towards the colleagues who constitute "the Civil 
Service." The other extreme represents the opposite. In¬ 
considerate treatment would produce an unfavorable disposition 
towards the colleagues who form the organization. These 
^Cabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 68. 
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dispositions do affect the role performance of civil ser¬ 
vants. We asked the civil servants in our survey this ques¬ 
tion , 
What treatment would you expect from Civil Servants? 
(a) Polite and interested 
(b) Polite but uninterested 
(c) No interest 
(d) Rude and hostile 
(e) Sympathetic if given or promised favors 
(f) Others 
The responses to the questions are summarized in Table 26. 
TABLE 26 













Polite and Inter¬ 
ested 87.5 3. S 1.2 7.5 
Polite but Unin¬ 
terested 13.1 50.6 3.2 33.1 
No Interest 2.5 61.9 1.2 34.4 
Rude and Hostile 0.6 63.2 0.6 35.6 
Sympathetic if 
Given or Promised 
Favors 8.1 50.6 9.4 31.9 
Others 1.9 0.6 — 97.5 
*Multiple choices allowed. 
They provide an interesting pattern. The largest percent 
"yes" response came from those who thought they would get a 
polite and interested treatment from their colleagues. Other 
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suggested treatments drew favorable responses too. A 13.1 
percent was recorded by those who would feel comfortable 
with a polite, but uninterested attitude. A respondent stated 
that the manifestations of such attitudes were satisfactory 
provided civil servants do their jobs. On the attitude of 
being "sympathetic if given or promised favors," 8.1 percent 
response saw it as being reasonable. Nevertheless, it can 
be argued that the attitude underlying the treatment which 
civil servants give to their organizational colleagues may 
be the attitude they exhibit in the performance of their 
duties. There is no doubt that some civil servants are 
polite and do show interest in dealing with people as well 
as in doing their duties. The fact remains that the public, 
which is the client, is not satisfied with the conduct of 
the civil servants. The general impression which the 
public has come to develop about the attitudes of civil 
servants is therefore at variance with the impression which 
is reflected by the responses shown in Table 26. There is 
no doubt that if the question on expected treatment from 
civil servants were put to the public, none of the suggested 
treatments would have scored a favorable response as pre¬ 
sented in Table 26. An interesting comment was volunteered 
by one of the respondents, who said 
I don't necessarily believe that you can characterize 
the entire system (Civil Service) by the behavior or 
way of life of individuals however many they may be. 
We observe so much of the suggested treatment but I 
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do not believe that these behavioral characteristics 
depict the Civil Service as such.l 
This view ignores the fact that any formal organization has 
an image which derives from the attitude, behavior, and moti¬ 
vations of its members or the products and services it pro¬ 
vides to the public. The Nigerian public judges the Civil 
Service from the behavior of those who personify it and the 
quality of the service which they deliver to the public. It 
is true as Shakespeare notes that "the eyes see not itself 
but by reflection, by some other thing."2 The Nigerian Fed¬ 
eral Civil Service stands to benefit by correcting or improv¬ 
in'^ the attitudes, behaviors, and conduct of work which are 
subject to public criticisms. Presently, the attitude of 
the civil servants towards their organization is not satis¬ 
factory. This is evident in their role performance and or¬ 
ganizational loyalty. 
Comparative Performance of the Civil Service 
Under Civilian and Military Governments 
In the preceding chapters, we stressed the fact that 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service since independence in 
1960 has been a function of two distinct types of government 
—the independent parliamentary and the independent military. 
Our assessment of the operations of the administrative bur¬ 
eaucracy had been focused on these two periods. In our survey, 
^Comment made by a respondent in our survey. 
^Julius Caesar, Norman Sanders (ed.) (Maryland: Pen¬ 
guin Books, Inc., 1968), p. 11. 
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we felt a need to seek the civil servants' appraisal of the 
performances of the organization under the two types of 
government. Pointing to certain characteristics in the 
operation of the Federal Civil Service, we asked the sub¬ 
jects in our sample, "Do you think the Civil Service per¬ 
forms its functions better now (under the military govern¬ 
ment) than in the past (parliamentary government) as shown 
by these characteristics in its operation?" The first char¬ 
acteristic presented was "increase or decrease in corruption 
and nepotism." The responses show that the civil service 
under the military has not done much to reduce the prevalence 
of these twin evils. The system as seen now is infested with 
more corruption and nepotism than during the parliamentary 
government. A total of 11.3 percent saw the Civil Service 
as doing better now in ridding itself of these set-backs. 
Seventy-four and three-tenths percent returned a negative 
response while 14.4 percent of the respondents abstained from 
making any judgments. Significantly, a majority in each of 
the four groups of civil servants maintained that corruption 
and nepotism have become more rampant in the organization 
presently than what was the case when politicians were in 
office. 
For a directed and accelerated societal change to 
succeed, there must be sustained participation of individuals 
and groups who come to understand and accept the objectives 
and methods of a national development plan. The type of 
participation envisaged here includes arrangements by 
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government agencies to achieve widespread public involvement, 
support, and commitment of a significant portion of the 
people. Proponents of citizen participation contend that pub¬ 
lic participation in government enhances, among other things, 
the responsiveness of administrative decisions to the desires 
of the public. This is because the attitudes of the adminis¬ 
trators will be influenced and brought in line with that of 
the general public and their actions will fall within the 
public's zone of acceptance. In other words, it is argued 
that if administrators and the public come to share identi¬ 
cal value orientations, the administrators will advocate and 
pursue courses of action the public would if it were able 
to congregate and had the administrators' expertise and in¬ 
formation . 
Getting public support for government development 
programs requires careful analysis and sometimes subtle 
actions. It calls for full use of mass communications media 
in "a systematic and continuing program of public information 
and education designed to create an informed public opinion 
supporting national development action."2 Widespread 
^See, for example, Kenneth John Meier and Lloyd G. 
Nigro, "Representative Bureaucracy and Policy Preferences: 
A Study in the Attitudes of Federal Executives," Public 
Adminsitration Review, No. 4, July/August 1976, p. 458. 
2Saul M. Katz, Guide to Modernizing Administration 
for National Development (Pittsburgh: Graduate School of 
Public and International Affairs, 1965), p. 21. I am in¬ 
debted to this author for some of his ideas on "National 
Participation." 
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involvement means "self-help," an activation of the resource¬ 
fulness, skill, entreneurship and productive powers of the 
people in order to optimize the use of the country's human 
and physical resources. Groups and organizations should be 
involved democratically in national plan formulation and 
implementation as much as is appropriate. Besides, personal 
and group development plans that tie in with the national 
plan should be encouraged. For national commitment to be 
achieved, public support, widespread involvement and parti¬ 
cipation in decision-making must actively be encouraged. 
These are measures which would forestall the elitist nature 
of policies and public programs which administrators in 
Nigeria's Federal Civil Service help to formulate and imple¬ 
ment. The policy of the Federal Government is that 
(a development) plan has to be implemented at many 
levels—Federal, State, provincial, district and 
village--there must be cooperation and coordination 
among different layers to ensure proper and success¬ 
ful implementation. It is an important policy ob¬ 
jective that presence and authority of the Federal 
and State Governments be felt at all levels of con¬ 
tact with the population. The achievement of this 
will facilitate the effective implementation of 
the... Development Plan generally.^ 
As was discussed in the preceding chapters, the ex¬ 
tent of public participation in development efforts in Nigeria 
is small. 
The second characteristic which was raised in the 
^-Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Devel- 
opment Plan 1970-74 (Lagos : Federal Ministry of Information, 
1970), p. 94. 
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question on performance comparability was "citizen participa¬ 
tion." The answer regarding citizen participation was as 
follows: Of those who expressed their views, 46.9 percent 
said that there was no improved standard of citizen partici¬ 
pation in development during the military rule. Those who 
felt that the public has been actively involved with the 
Civil Service in development formed 3R.1 percent while 15.0 
percent failed to give any answers. An examination of the 
responses from each group of civil servants surveyed (Table 
27) shows that a majority of the senior management officials 
Question: Do you think the Civil Service performs its func¬ 
tions better now (under the military government) 
than in the past (parliamentary government) as 
shown by this characteristic in its operation? 
b) Citizen participation. 
TABLF 27 
PERCENT RESPONSES ON COMPARATIVE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY 

















Yes 10.5 24.4 1.3 1.9 38.1 
No 21.3 23.8 1.2 0.6 46.9 
No opinion 4.4 10.6 0.0 0.0 15.0 
36.2 58.8 2.5 2.5 100.0 
(21.3 percent) does not see greater public participation in 
development processes now than it was during the civilian rule. 
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This view is important. It is the top civil servants who 
help in formulatina policies and programs of development. 
It is they too who evaluate the performances and effect of 
the programs. Their job positions and job contents therefore 
afford them the opportunity of assessing the extent of pub¬ 
lic participation and inputs in policies and programs of 
development. Though some officials in the middle level 
management feel that there is comparative increase in public 
participation there is only a slim percentage difference 
(0.6) of opinion between the "yes" and "no" responses ob¬ 
tained from this group. The positive response should not 
be taken as reflecting a satisfactory situation. Besides, 
the 10.6 percent "no opinion" recorded seems to indicate an 
unfavorable response. It can be argued that if public par¬ 
ticipation in governmental and developmental affairs were 
pronounced, respondents would have had no qualms in stating 
so. The total percent "no response" answer would have there¬ 
fore been smaller. 
Thus from the information presented through these re¬ 
sponses we can conclude that the Civil Service has not en¬ 
hanced citizens' involvement in the management of public 
business. ^his situation is reminiscent of the colonial past 
when Nigerians were not given the opportunity of participat¬ 
ing in the administration of their country. It is signifi¬ 
cant in that it shows the Civil Service's failure to be re¬ 
oriented for the achievement of the new goals assigned to it 
by the political class (military rule). As long as the Civil 
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Service uses the colonial tactics which were suitable for 
the law and order maintenance goals in prosecuting the goals 
of economic and social development, so long will the achieve¬ 
ment of its objective continue to be difficult. Public par¬ 
ticipation is one of the corner-stones in the achievement of 
rapid and balanced economic and social growth. "The claims 
of rational planning are contradicted in a society that 
drastically limits rational, public discourse"-'- and large 
scale involvement of the citizenry. 
Some Factors Which Respondents See 
as Obstacles to Efficiency 
Before discussing the changes which respondents felt 
should be implemented to improve the standard of efficiency 
in the Civil Service it is important to address first what 
respondents see as some probable causes of inefficiency in 
the organization. So far our findings have shown that effi¬ 
ciency in the Civil Service has not improved since the coun¬ 
try's attainment of national independence. The civil ser¬ 
vants surveyed have stated that in terms of relative effi¬ 
ciency the Civil Service is a poor comparison to an expatri¬ 
ate-managed and controlled firm. It was essential to know 
what factors in the civil servants' judgments are responsible 
for the problem of inefficiency in their organization. Accord¬ 
ingly, we presented the civil servants with a list of six 
factors and asked them to indicate which of them they strongly 
-'-Andrew Arato, "Understanding Bureaucratic Centralism," 
Telos, No. 35, Spring 1978. 
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felt was undermining the efficiency of the administrative 
bureaucracy. In Table 28 the data present the views of the 
respondents. 
TABLE 28 
RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ON POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO 
EFFICIENCY IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 
Factors Yes No No Opinion 
Inadequate staff training 79.4 1.8 18.8 
Wrong attitude to work 90.6 9.4 0.0 
Civil Service methods/ 
procedure 61.2 12.5 26.3 
Office accomodation/ 
work environment 73.1 2.5 24.4 
Salary and incentive 
structure 13.8 27.4 58.8 
Defects in supervision/ 
staff control 81.3 1.9 16.8 
Our respondents overwhelmingly agreed that all but 
one of the factors listed contributed in large measure to 
inefficiency in the bureaucracy. On salary and incentive 
structure, a majority of the respondents preferred to reserve 
their opinions. Of the total who gave definite answers, 
only one-third admitted that salary or the entire incentive 
package constituted a problem. The other two-thirds felt 
it was not. The responses on this factor accurately re¬ 
flect the general opinion in Nigeria at least for 1975 and 
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1976. It was then that the Federal Government of Nigeria 
implemented the new salary and incentive structure recom¬ 
mended by both the Public Service Review Commission and the 
Review's Panel. 
The new salary scales were double and sometimes two 
and a half times the preceding ones. A new graduate entrant 
in the Civil Service who in 1973 and 1974 would have earned 
N1440 per annum was placed in the new salary structure on a 
salary of N3264 per annum. A new permanent secretary who 
could have earned N6,000 per annum in 1973 was catapulted 
to a salary of Ml2,696 per annum in 1975. Fringe benefits 
were equally generous. The senior management staff still 
maintain their entitlements to government housing at a rate 
not exceeding eight and a half percent of their annual in¬ 
come. They receive generous car maintenance allowances for 
their private cars which were initially paid for by the 
government. They are also given government chaffeur-driven 
cars which shuttle them from ministry to ministry while at 
work besides taking them from their homes to the offices and 
back daily. However, the onset of inflation, presently at the 
rate of forty percent, has weakened the purchasing power of 
the new salaries making the junior civil servants still worse 
off. A few comments on staff training and on defects in 
supervision and staff control will help to underscore the 
relevance of these two factors to the overall efficiency of 
the bureaucracy. The importance of the other factors listed 
in Table 28 has already been discussed. 
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Inadequate Staff Training. The fact that the Nigerian 
Federal Civil Service needs qualified, skilled and motivated 
people in the right places at the right time to achieve ob¬ 
jectives and to transform paper plans into actual achieve¬ 
ments cannot be denied. Staff training and sensible utili¬ 
zation is therefore vitally important for the Civil Service. 
The Public Service Review Commission in 1974 noted that the 
new public service which it advocated would need 
a new style of management and a new breed of manager. 
We need to train people who are result-oriented, who 
can recognize opportunities and meet objectives. We 
need a professional public service staffed by profes¬ 
sionals; men and women who know how to make resources 
productive.1 
Training for manpower development in the Civil Ser¬ 
vice should be appreciated as a continuing and integrated 
process which should embrace: assessment of training needs, 
designing the most relevant training effort to meet these 
needs, selecting the most appropriate persons to partici¬ 
pate in the training effort, conducting the training, plac¬ 
ing those trained already back in the organization in posi¬ 
tions where they can best apply and utilize the skills and 
knowledge acquired, and finally evaluating the worth of 
the training to determine employees' effectiveness on the 
job. 
Of particular relevance to the Nigerian situation is 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Public Service Review 
Commission: Main Report (Lagos: Federal Ministry of In¬ 
formation, 1974), p. 20. 
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the selection of the most appropriate persons to participate 
in the training effort. This is one of the areas in which 
nepotism and favoritism sometimes pervert official judgment. 
For a person to become an efficient and successful adminis¬ 
trator he or she must have a natural inclination and liking 
for the work involved. It is only then that knowledge ac¬ 
quired through training can be used in enhancing administra¬ 
tive efficiency. Therefore the choice or selection of an 
administrative candidate who will benefit from a particular 
training is crucial to the improvement of administrative 
efficiency. 
Another weakness in the training scheme of the Fed¬ 
eral Civil Service is the little attention that is paid to 
the development of clerical and executive officers. The 
Public Review Commission noted in its report that 
the low clerical out-put or the seeming poor per¬ 
formance by clerical officers could be traced part¬ 
ly to the fact that there are no induction courses 
for newly recruited clerks....No training program 
is arranged for them on the work they are expected 
to do and on the whole spectrum of clerical func¬ 
tions in the Service....Executive officers are also 
in the same predicament as are clerical officers.... 
As a principle of good personnel management, an employee 
should be given a job on which he or she can be most produc¬ 
tive. This means that the job should suit the skill and 
capability of an individual. If he has only little skill, 
training should increase his ability to do the job. It is 
therefore necessary that training of workers as a measure 
-^Ibid. , pp. 48-49 . 
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of manpower development should take into consideration the 
quality, the number as well as the proper use of those who 
are trained if the efficiency and productivity of the admin¬ 
istrative apparatus are to be ensured. 
Supervision and Staff Control. Productivity and effi¬ 
ciency can be enhanced through the leadership style which 
supervisors adopt at work places. What is needed is the 
recognition on the part of supervisors that people are dif¬ 
ferent and they have to be dealt with as such without pre¬ 
judicing organizational needs and objectives. 
Two patterns of supervision—the individual-centered 
approach and command-centered approach--have often been dis¬ 
cussed in literature on management of human resources. ^ 
Sometimes these approaches are referred to as people-oriented 
or democratic supervision and close or work-oriented super¬ 
vision respectively. In most work situations, the use of 
individual-centered approach to supervision is found to be 
more appropriate. With this approach workers can be moti¬ 
vated towards high efficiency. The diagnosis of their skills 
^See, for example, Wesley L. W7agner, "Leadership Style, 
Hierarchical Influence, and Supervisory Role Obligations," 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (March 1965); 
John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, Public Administration, 
fifth edition (New York: The Roland Press Company, 1967); 
Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd 0. Nigro, Modern Public Administra¬ 
tion (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973); Saul 
W. Gellerman, Management by Motivation (New York: American 
Management Association, 1968). 
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and aptitudes enables the organization to place them on jobs 
which they can perform well. Those who fail to measure up 
are helped in every way to overcome their deficiencies so 
that they can perform well. The approach permits flexibility 
on the part of the management, the supervisors and those 
supervised in that if one method does not produce desired 
results other methods in the same approach can be used until 
a worker is motivated to perform well. 
The theoretical considerations thus expounded can 
be applied to the mode of supervision and staff control in 
the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. It has already been 
noted that the organization relies on extensive rules and 
regulations--the do's and don1ts. The supervision and con¬ 
trol in the Civil Service are such that pressure the civil 
servants to perform their duties within the parameters of 
inflexible rules and regulations. In such a situation or¬ 
ganizational pressures^ are likely to produce some role 
strains^ on those supervised and controlled. The role 
strains in turn often prove dysfunctional to overall goal 
achievement in the Civil Service. 
People-oriented type of supervision and control will 
prove beneficial to the Civil Service. It will improve the 
^"Organizational pressures" may be defined as efforts 
on the part of management to ensure a level of performance 
consonant with organizational requirements. 
^"Role strain" is the felt difficulty in fulfilling 
role obligations. See, William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role 
Strain," American Socioloaical Review, Vol. 25 (August 1960), 
p. 483 . 
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rapport amonq the various employees so that role performance 
in the Civil Service will be viewed as a cooperative en¬ 
deavor the success of which would be advantageous to both 
the individuals and the organization. Workers will no doubt 
be more interested if they know what is expected of them and 
how what they do affects the achievement in the unit they 
belong. Their job will have meaning and generate in them 
pride and satisfaction. But in order to achieve this ideal 
the rules and regulations will have to be made flexible so 
that alternative methods of supervision may be used whenever 
it becomes necessary. The command-centered approach which 
features supervision within the guidelines of rules and re¬ 
gulations will however remain useful. Some employees, as 
Oellerman notes, "dislike ambiguity and prefer a clear-cut 
set of do's and don'ts to general guidelines that leave too 
much room for their own judgment.A mixed or flexible 
style of supervision and staff control will therefore be 
the most effective approach to sustained productivity and 
high efficiency in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. 
Respondents' Recommendations for Change 
Most of the respondents in our survey were of the 
opinion that the use of business techniques in managing pub¬ 
lic affairs could enhance efficiency and productivity in the 
Federal Civil Service. Four business techniques were sug¬ 
gested in the questionnaire and all four v/ere overwhelmingly 
■*■53111 Cellerman, Op. Cit. , p. 38. 
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approved. The techniaues and percentage opinions were as 
follows: Speed in the way things are done (94.4), involve¬ 
ment of all employees in the achievement of organizational 
goals (96.3), accountability (92.0), and process evaluation 
to determine the extent to which a policy or program is imple¬ 
mented according to its stated guidelines (95.8). 
On the organization structure which would best facili¬ 
tate administrative performance the respondents preferred 
decentralization to centralization. "A highly bureaucratic 
and centralized machinery is unable to make effective deci¬ 
sions for development."1 Centralized bureaucratic systems 
are seen as capable of generating "forms of appearance" of 
rationality crises in development. Among the elements of 
this crisis are, 
decreasino rates of growth with greater complexity, 
general periodic shortages, chronic disproportion- 
ality of sectors, lag of skills behind occupational 
structure,... low labor productivity, low quality 
products, and buyers' strike among others.2 
To counter some of these factors some "foreign elements" 
have been suggested as necessary to be introduced into the 
system. Among these counteractino forces is a scheme of 
decentralization of bureaucratic authority. Decentraliza¬ 
tion would speed decision-making and implementation. The 
government or its administrative arm is made accessible and 
■^Anthony H. Rweyemamu and Gordon Hyden, (eds.), A 
Decade of Public Administration in Africa (Nairobi: East 
African Literature Bureau, 1975), p. 151. 
2Andrew Arato, Telos, Op. Cit., p. 28. 
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available to the client in the rural areas. The field of¬ 
fice is more receptive to public inquiry than the central 
office. The good of the majority can be better served 
through decentralization than through centralization. 
Decentralization also increases accountability of the 
officials to whom authority is delegated. It also enhances 
their feelings of involvement in decision-making. Rational¬ 
ity is fostered by encouraging those who know most about 
the technical requirements of a decision to make it. Citi¬ 
zen participation is encouraged through decentralization 
because it provides administrators with information on the 
policies and activities preferred by the people. There is 
the other side to the arguments for decentralization which 
in turn justifies centralization of administrative functions. 
Decentralization can create problems of coordination when 
the system and machinery for doing so effectively do not 
exist. Centralization guarantees some efficiency, profes¬ 
sionalism and the use of advanced or expensive technologies, 
but decentralization demands competence at both ends. 
Another factor which can militate against the use of 
decentralization is the incidence of bureaucratic politics. 
This is the differing strains and stresses that can be put 
on the relationship of bureaucrats—among themselves and 
with their environment. In the Civil Service, the general¬ 
ist and specialist always have tension between themselves. 
The organizational arrangement which is used may increase 
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this tension by strenqtheninq the position of any of the two 
classes of officials. In the case of decentralization the 
power of the qeneralists is increased while the specialists 
have their hands strenqthened in a centralized structure. 
Besides, bureaucratic politics can come as a result of the 
separation of responsibility from power in an aqency. In 
this case, while one level has the responsibility for the 
function the other level maintains the power to perform the 
work. 
These advantaqes and disadvantaqes do not preclude 
the use of any of the orqanization structures by administra¬ 
tion officials. However, there are some major administra¬ 
tive factors which need to be considered when adoptinq any 
of the models. 1 We nov; consider these factors which can 
fruitfully apply in the Niqerian situation. 
First, since an orqanization's structure must often 
possess the capacity to work toward a wide and sometimes 
conflictinq set of qoals, administrators need to have clear 
knowledqe and consensus on what the aqency ' s qoals are be¬ 
fore decidinq on whether centralization or decentralization 
will best serve the purpose. A second condition which must 
be taken account of is what constitutes the production tech¬ 
niques. In a service orqanization like the Civil Service, 
^These factors are discussed by David 0. Porter and 
Euqene A. Olsen in "Some Critical Issues in Government Cen¬ 
tralization and Decentralization," Public Administration 
Review, No. 1 (January/February 1976), pp. 72-84. I am in¬ 
debted to the authors for the use of their splendid ideas. 
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the technical processes through which inputs are combined 
to bring about desired outputs are not well understood. 
Equally, there often is not a clear understanding of what 
the outputs are. The difficulty arising from this situa¬ 
tion centers around making clear subdivisions of tasks 
among units. Therefore the extent to which either of the 
two organization models which we have discussed can suit 
the administrative task considered depends on the degree 
to which the organization's production techniques are under¬ 
stood . 
The third criteria can be put in the form of a pro¬ 
position and explained further. The greater the routine 
nature of the performance process is, the more simple the 
organization structure can be because very little mutual 
coordination will be necessary. Conversely, the more the 
performance process is non-routinized, the greater the need 
for a more flexible organization structure which is com¬ 
prised of many small units. The reason for this is because 
a non-routinized process calls for a great deal of mutual 
coordination among workers. The knowledge of the complexity 
of coordination necessary for task performance will among 
other considerations dictate the pattern of organization 
which will be more useful. 
The nature of the social environment in which the 
agency is operating and the level within the organization 
being considered for decentralization are other factors to 
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be considered. In an administrative organization like the 
Civil Service the units which carry out the policies are 
those that are most suitable for decentralization. It will 
be unrealistic to decentralize the managerial or policy¬ 
making authority. Doing so would seriously undermine the 
control which ought to be exercised on the policy or pro¬ 
gram implementing units. However, the goal and the ultimate 
beneficiaries of government programs are fundamental factors 
in determining organizational structure and functions. 
The considerations which have thus been made have 
some implications on the capability of the Nigerian Federal 
Civil Service to deliver effectively on the development pro¬ 
grams. The inadequacy of the British model, especially the 
organization structure of the Civil Service, has been pointed 
out in earlier chapters of this work as a reason for the 
ineffectiveness of the administrative machinery to cope with 
development management. This work takes a position that any 
organizational pattern suitable for efficient discharge of 
the bureaucracy's functions and the realization of the de¬ 
velopment objectives of the Nigerian public is worth using 
at any juncture by the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. An 
administrative machinery for development cannot depend on 
using a fixed organizational structure to carry out quick 
and far reaching decisions which must affect the lives of 
millions of people living in different parts of the country. 
The structure must of necessity be flexible and dynamic. 
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This chapter has reported the findings of the survey 
conducted for this study. The main aim was to find out the 
civil servants' attitudes towards the Federal Civil Service 
which is the main machinery for planning and execution of 
Nigeria's development effort. In the concluding chapter we 
shall summarize our findings to see whether our hypothesis 
is proved or disproved. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary of the Study 
This study aimed at evaluating the orientation of the 
Nigerian Federal Civil Service which today emerges as the 
foremost legacy of the British colonial administration in 
Nigeria. In order to do this meaningfully, three methodo¬ 
logical porcedures were employed. Firstly, by attempting a 
descriptive history of the Nigerian Civil Service, the 
specific characteristics of the Colonial Civil Service which 
passed to the Nigerian Federal Civil Service at independence 
were noted. Secondly, we examined the role of the Nigerian 
Federal Civil Service to determine the effects, if any, of 
the Colonial Civil Service characteristics which it inherited 
at independence. Thirdly, a survey of the Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice was conducted in order to obtain the opinions of the 
civil servants on various issues pertaining to the organiza¬ 
tion in which they are members. 
The legacies which the Colonial Civil Service be¬ 
queathed to its Nigerian successor included inadequate num¬ 
bers of trained Nigerians, elitism in the policy-making 
function, inflexible rules and regulations, and the entire 
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procedural norms. Our examination of the role of the inde¬ 
pendent Nigerian Federal Civil Service in the economic and 
social development of the country revealed the enormous 
problems which have been encountered because of these legac¬ 
ies . 
The colonial segregation policy and the failure to 
employ a sufficient number of educated Nigerians in the 
Colonial Civil Service produced only few Nigerian civil ser¬ 
vants who could understand and handle the complexities of 
administration after independence. The effect of this was 
clearly evident when the First National Development Plan was 
prepared. Nigeria had to rely on and retain the services 
of expatriates who had no commitment to the progress and 
development of the country. 
In some former colonial states in Africa authoritar¬ 
ian rule is not unknown. Where such a situation prevails 
the tendency is re-inforced by the authoritarian legacy of 
colonial administration. In Nigeria, even though there are 
a number of egalitarian tribes, the authoritarian rule ten¬ 
dency is re-inforced in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service's 
policy-making process as a legacy of colonial administration. 
The situation is worsened by the fact that Nigerians tend to 
be subject citizens rather than participants. They do not 
make inputs into the policies that are developed by the 
elite civil servants. They show the tendency of accepting 
policies and programs without questioning their suitability. 
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As a result the elites in the Civil Service have become 
either insensitive to or ignorant of the needs and aspira¬ 
tions of the masses. The development policies and programs 
which are meant to serve the needs of the majority always end 
up satisfying the few. Elitism in policy and program for¬ 
mulation and implementation has therefore been identified as 
a potent reason for the lop-sided development in Nigeria, 
differential incomes, and poor standard of living among most 
Nigerians. 
The rules and regulations as well as the entire stock 
of procedural norms which were inherited from the Colonial 
Civil Service have remained unchanged in the Nigerian Feder¬ 
al Civil Service. The fact that those rules and operational 
procedures were designed to facilitate the achievement of 
goals which were entirely different from the present goals 
of economic and social development does not seem to be under¬ 
stood by the officials in the Nigerian Civil Service. The 
prosecution of the goals of development v/ithin the framework 
of these rules and procedures is equivalent to putting "a new 
wine in an old skin," to use the biblical expression. Our 
study has also shown that the present organizational struc¬ 
ture of the Civil Service remains the pattern which was inher¬ 
ited from the colonial government. Since economic and social 
development recruires quick and precise decision-making as 
well as implementation, the change of rules, regulations, 
procedural norms, and organizational structure v/ould increase 
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the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice . 
Nevertheless some other factors act as constraints 
on and facilitators respectively of the role of the Nigerian 
Civil Service. In our study we differentiate between factors 
in the Nigerian social setting and those in the immediate 
and operational environment of the Civil Service. Among 
the constraints on the social setting are corruption and un¬ 
disciplined politicians. It was noted that once the environ¬ 
ment in which the Civil Service exists becomes polluted by 
corruption the organization could not resist being influenced 
by what happens in the environment. Our findings suggest 
that the Nigerian Federal Civil Service was not as corrupt 
during the rule of the politicians as it is known to be 
during the military's. Reasons for this difference include 
the multifunctional role of the Civil Service under the mili¬ 
tary. The civil servants under the politicians kept to their 
traditional roles and did not get involved in political func¬ 
tions like the awarding of contracts and chairing of govern¬ 
ment corporations. Besides, the availability of large 
revenue from oil and the increase in the scale of economic 
and social development permit corruption of all sorts. During 
the military rule the Civil Service has received a boost in 
prestige and has come to be more relied on by the army. This 
phenomenon was noted in Chapter III. Some senior civil ser¬ 
vants sit in the Military Executive Council and contribute 
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to Cabinet deliberations. Besides the military being a separ¬ 
ate profession entirely does not know much about the mechanics 
of the government of a country, hence its reliance on the 
civil servants who have the control of data and information 
on matters concerning the administration of the country. The 
unfortuante consequence of this situation is that some civil 
servants have abused the trust reposed in them and have be¬ 
come increasingly more corrupt. Besides, the Civil Service's 
standard of operational accountability, known to be high 
during the civilian rule, has dropped very low under military 
administration. See Chapter IV for details. 
In the immediate and operational setting of the Civil 
Service the dismissal and retirement of thousands of civil 
servants of various grades was noted to have affected the 
manpower situation in the Civil Service. The measure was 
seen to have been counter-productive in that it failed to 
revitalize the service and induced the civil servants to be 
over cautious in taking actions which would otherwise en¬ 
hance the effectiveness of the service. It therefore wor¬ 
sened the low morale, lack of enthusiasm and dedication with 
which the Civil Service was already plagued. 
In a comparative setting, the support which the Cabi¬ 
net under the politicians gave to the Civil Service was con¬ 
trasted with the support which the orgnaization receives 
from the military administration. It was found that the post 
independence Cabinet, because of being a coalition government, 
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was "an enforced association of incompatibles." There was 
so much rivalry within the Cabinet and between the parties 
represented in the Cabinet that the Cabinet could hardly 
develop a coherent policy. Since the political parties re¬ 
presented in the Federal Government were regionally based, 
a senior civil servant who did not come from the same region 
as the political head of his ministry was never relied on. 
His advice was never taken seriously. In such cases the 
Minister resorted to making his own decisions, some of which 
though politically advantageous to him did not advance the 
role of the Civil Service or the progress of the country. 
However, our study observed that during the military 
rule, a new pattern of cooperation has emerged between the 
military Cabinet and the Civil Service. By having some 
senior civil servants to sit in the military executive body 
and to contribute to Cabinet discussions, the Cabinet is 
well informed before taking any decisions. The similarity 
of backgrounds (in training and elite status) and homogen¬ 
eity of goals (economic and social development) of the mili¬ 
tary and the Civil Service have helped in forging a better 
relationship between the two groups. The top senior civil 
servants have therefore used this situation to play their 
traditional roles better than they did under the politicians. 
Summary of Survey Findings 
In Chapter I of this work we set out with an assumption 
that the Nigerian Federal Civil Service has not been given 
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an orientation different from the one it inherited from the 
Colonial Civil Service. Consequently, this lack of new 
orientation has hampered its effectiveness in discharging 
its functions in the economic and social development of the 
country. To test the validity of this assumption we admin¬ 
istered a questionnaire survey to the Nigerian Federal Civil 
Service to obtain the civil servants' opinions on (a) the 
efficiency of the Civil Service, (b) their identification 
with the Civil Service, (c) comparative performance of the 
Civil Service during the civilian and military rules, (d) 
obstacles to efficiency and goal attainment, and finally 
(e) the changes the civil servants would like to see imple¬ 
mented in the organization. 
We now summarize the survey findings. On the effi¬ 
ciency of the Civil Service the opinions which v/ere expressed 
were generally unfavorable. The civil servants felt strongly 
that since independence the Nigerian Federal Civil Service 
has not done much to improve efficiency and economy in the 
organization. That there is rigid adherence to rules and 
regulations and not much encouragement is given to the use 
of initiative and judgment on the suitability of rules to 
various situations. 
The Colonial Civil Service through its discriminatory 
practice against Nigerians had made Nigerians to regard gov¬ 
ernment institutions as oppressive and unworthy of their 
loyalty. Our survey findings indicated that this attitude 
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still persists in the indigenous Civil Service. The British 
colonial administrators identified with the Colonial Civil 
Service because through it they were serving the interest 
of their country. Unfortunately, Nigerian civil servants 
have not yet realized that their services in the Federal 
Civil Service are for themselves and their country. There 
is that absence of commitment to public interest. We found 
that only the senior civil servants had strong identifica¬ 
tion with the Civil Service. However, their identification 
was of the instrumental type. They were committed to the 
Civil Service because of the benefits which they were enjoy¬ 
ing—high salary scales, status, and other benefits not 
available to others in the organization. Civil servants in 
the other grades indicated no strong identification with 
their organization. Their responses showed that they were 
there in the organization because of what they were presently 
getting from it and would leave it whenever they could get 
better benefits in other organizations. 
It was evident that identification of the expressive 
kind was low. The civil servants did not think highly of 
the organization as providing them with job satisfaction, 
opportunity to develop their country, and a forum from which 
they could serve the public interest. Identification on the 
expressive plane is crucial to the effectiveness of every 
civil servant in his contribution towards the achievement of 
the goals of economic and social development. The low level 
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or absence of this type of loyalty will continue to hamper 
the effectiveness of the Civil Service. 
The survey revealed that the performances of the Civil 
Service in reducing corruption and nepotism as well as getting 
Nigerian citizens to participate in the functions of the or- 
aanization are lower under military regimes than in the 
civilian regime. The increase in corruption and nepotism 
under the Civil Service results in waste and improper use 
of resources (human as well as material). One way of achiev¬ 
ing effectiveness is through the proper use of resources. 
As long as the Civil Service continues to dissipate the re¬ 
sources available for economic and social development, 
whether through misuse of funds or unreasonable patronage, 
so long will efficiency and effectiveness continue to elude 
it. 
To some degree the decrease in the level of public par¬ 
ticipation in economic and social development can be attri¬ 
buted to the presence of military rule. Though there was 
no large scale participation during the civilian rule, Niger¬ 
ian citizens were free to debate, protest, and to put forth 
their views. The politicians could debate on several issues 
in the legislatures and the newspapers were free to publish 
public opinion. Most of these actions have been banned by 
the military administration. The military rules by decrees 
which are not subject to debate. 
In identifying some obstacles to efficiency the civil 
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servants overwhelmingly agreed that wrong attitude to work 
was the most outstanding. This is the factor which has often 
drawn the heaviest criticism from the Nigerian public. Other 
causes were also identified. They included defects in super¬ 
vision and staff control, inadeguate staff training, poor 
office accommodation and work environment, and Civil Service 
methods and procedures. 
The civil servants surveyed would like to see some 
changes in the organization. A good many of them felt that 
the application of corporate techniques in managing public 
business would enhance the efficiency of the Civil Service. 
They were also of the opinion that decentralization of the 
functions of the Federal Civil Service would increase the 
functional impact and efficiency of the system. In fact, 
through decentralization, the advantages of the changes sug¬ 
gested by the civil servants would be realized. 
All these findings point to the fact that the Federal 
Civil Service in its present form has not been given an 
orientation which is appropriate for the management of econom¬ 
ic and social development. There must be an overhauling of 
the procedural norms so that quick business-like methods can 
be used for the achievement of quick and better results. The 
Civil Service is for Nigeria and is manned by Nigerians. As 
such, attitudes towards it must change. The civil servants 
are the ones to start the process. However, it must be noted 
that the civil servants do not exist in a vacuum. They follow 
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the ideological and political trends and their behaviors are 
influenced by the environment in which they operate. The 
instrumental type of identification has to be replaced by 
the expressive one. The organization must be seen as one 
which gives great opportunity for every civil servant to 
contribute towards the development of his or her country. 
And, that opportunity must be used to the fullest. When this 
is done the public which is served by the civil servant will 
change its attitude towards the civil servants and the or¬ 
ganization in which they are members. 
Since our findings have indicated that a new orienta¬ 
tion— (chancres in attitude towards work in the Civil Service, 
use of quick business-like procedures, positive identifica¬ 
tion with the organization, etc.)--is desirable in the Civil 
Service we can safely say that the hypothesis in this study 
has been validated. 
Conclusion 
Based on our findings in this study, it is necessary 
to conclude by proposing a paradigm against which the basic 
re-orientation of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service should 
take place. This model will identify some conditions which 
ought to be met and some situations which have to prevail be¬ 
fore our inherited Civil Service can be seen to be satisfac¬ 
torily geared to prosecuting the functions involved in the 
attainment of the economic and social goals of a developing 
country. 
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However, it is important to note that the administra¬ 
tive capacity of any country will to a great extent be related 
to the history, culture, social structure, and value systems 
prevalent in the state. This observation has made Irving 
Swerdlow to state that, 
It is impossible to take an institution out of one 
society and fit it unchanged into another society. 
To do this invites failure, even ensures it. Insti¬ 
tution building requires innovation and adaptation, 
the discovery of changes that are necessary for 
operation in a different society, with different 
cultural, social and political value 
tivity of the Civil Service was ensured by the development 
of an elite of expatriates, chosen by highly selective methods 
of recruitment and blooded in the atmosphere of a Spartan 
military caste. Today, the administration of economic and 
social development in the new states requires not only effi¬ 
ciency and effectiveness on the part of the Civil Service 
but also dynamic and innovative actions. As a first step, 
administrative bureaucracies saddled with the task of prose¬ 
cuting the new goals should be staffed by people whose quali¬ 
fications and training enable them to perform satisfactorily. 
The training should encompass pre-entry education, in-service 
training, on-the-job training and general orientation in terms 
of values, work attitudes, and service regulations which guide 
daily activities of the civil servants. The utility of the 
Development (New York: Praegar Publishers, 1975), p. 17. 
Under the colonial regime, the efficiency and produc- 
^Irving Swerdlow, The Public Administration of Economic 
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qualifications and training obtained by the civil servants 
should be enhanced through the use of a judicious personnel 
deployment policy to foster the development of necessary 
knowledge, skills, and experience. 
Secondly, the Civil Service should modify its struc¬ 
tural legacy. The structure of the colonial Civil Service 
was strictly Weberian, that is, composed of layers of ad¬ 
ministrative posts arranged hierarchically. This suited 
the administrative actions designed for the maintenance of 
law and order. But administrative actions relevant to de¬ 
velopment include the formulation and execution of plans, 
policies, programs and projects dealing with substantive 
problems of economic, social and technical change, in accord 
with culturally and politically determined norms and goals. 
To successfully implement these administrative actions 
calls for congenial administrative behavior on the part of 
the civil servants. Literature on organizations have demon¬ 
strated that organizational structures do influence the be¬ 
havior s^ of organization members, thereby giving rise to such 
attributes as effectiveness,^ commitment, involvement or 
^Anthony Downs, Op. Cit., pp. 51-52. The discussion 
centers on the use of a hierarchical authority structure in 
a bureau in settling conflicts. Also see, James D. Thompson, 
"Organizational Management of Conflict," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, March, 1960. 
^See, H. J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communi¬ 
cation Patterns on Group Performance," Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, Vol. 46, 1951, pp. 38-50; also, H. 
Guetzkow and H. Simon, "The Impact of Certain Communication 
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organizational identification,-*- and compliance.2 If the 
Civil Service wants to enhance its mode of operation through 
influencing the administrative behavior of its members, it 
must consider among other measures the modification of the 
colonial structure of the Civil Service it inherited. 
Three different structures are distinguishable in re¬ 
lation to the Civil Service. There is what may be called 
the Organization of Government, the division into Ministries 
and/or Departments, the apportionment by the Head of Govern¬ 
ment of the functions of government among his colleagues— 
Ministers, Commissioners or whatever other names they may 
bear. This is partly determined by a country's Constitution, 
partly by the ordinary law of the land, partly by the fancies 
of the particular Head of Government. Another structure of 
the Civil Service which may be considered is the organization 
of the individual Ministry or Department for the performance 
of the functions assigned to it by the Head of Government. 
This involves the apportionment of the tasks between the 
different classes of staff employed to carry them out. The 
Nets Upon Organization and Performance in Task Oriented Groups," 
Management Science, Vol. I, 1955, pp. 233-250; also, Rocco 
Carzo, "Some Effects of Organization Structure on Group Ef¬ 
fectiveness," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 7, March 
1963, pp. 393-424. 
•*-See, Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New 
York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 102-103. Mechanisms of 
organizational influence are discussed in these pages. 
2Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex 
Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1975). 
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third kind of structure in relation to the Civil Service is 
the pay or grading structure. 
The model proposed does not suggest a preference of 
one organizational structure over the other. What I am 
stressing is the fact that a developing country should not 
blindly settle for the structure of the Civil Service which 
she inherited from the colonial administration without find¬ 
ing out whether the particular structure helps to develop 
a pattern of administrative behavior and operational mode 
that will facilitate the achievement of her goals. To the 
extent that the crucial task of development must be success¬ 
fully managed, the Civil Service in a developing nation must 
be flexible, innovative, sensitive, imaginative, knowledge¬ 
able, relevant and humane. These gualities are essential 
for the creditable performance of its task and for the psy¬ 
chological well-being of the individuals manning the Service. 
Whether these reguirements can be satisfied depends greatly 
on the structure of the Civil Service. 
Thirdly, the Civil Service in the new states must have 
or develop good relationship with the environment in which it 
operates. Environment must be considered both as a "task" 
environment, immediate and operational, and a "contextual" 
environment, more remote and general.1 
Present in the "task" environment are other govern¬ 
mental and non-governmental bodies which interact with the 
■'■Irving Swerdlow, Op. Cit. , p. 367. 
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Civil Service thereby affecting its inputs, processes or its 
outputs. In the "contextual" environment are to be found 
numerous variables which differ in scope, intensity, and 
visibility. The civil unrest, the political climate, con¬ 
flicts in the society, culture, values, and even the avail¬ 
ability of schools from where manpower can be recruited into 
the Civil Service are but few in the environmental struc¬ 
tures from which the Civil Service in an emergent state 
cannot extricate itself. These variables, among others must 
be taken into account when examining the orientation of a 
Civil Service in any developing nation. 
Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that proper orien¬ 
tation will not take place in the Civil Service unless ad¬ 
ministrative bureaucracy is encouraged by the direct impact 
of a trustful, articulate, participant citizenry on the 
Civil Service. Noting the importance of this support for 
the bureaucracy, Mere Fainsod states that, 
To function effectively... administrators must enjoy 
political support....The most favorable setting for 
progress in developing administration exists where a 
politically influential and dynamic modernizing elite 
strongly desires development and successfully projects 
this attitude into both the bureaucracy and the popu¬ 
lation at large.1 
It is the top civil servant who today, defines public 
interest and helps in the development of public policies some 
of which have to translate conflicting sectional interest into 
•^Mere Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Adminis¬ 
tration," Development Administration, Concepts and Problems, 
Irving Swerdlow (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1963), p. 1. 
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public interest. These functions among others underscore 
the necessity for the Civil Service to gear its perspectives 
towards a preparedness to interact freely with the public 
whose confidence and support it has to court, win, and re¬ 
tain. 
This model presents only a few of those ingredients 
that would inject sound administrative capability into the 
Civil Service. In the study, I have presented other related 
matters which I feel are salient areas to be recognized when 
tuning up the administrative apparatus for the development 
actions it has to undertake. Nevertheless, looking back on 
the model which I have proposed, it is my contention that a 
Civil Service in a developing nation which conforms to the 
orientation suggested by the guidelines is at least prepared 
for the task of development. 
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2. Birth Place 
a) State of Origin_ 
b) Ethnic Origin  
4. Sex 
Educational qualification: a) Higher Education  
b) Secondary c) Technical d) Others 
What position do you now hold?  
How did you get the position?  
How did you first learn of your first position? 
through a) Relative c) Advertisement  
b) Friend d) Others 





If yes name them (i) 
(iii ) 
Suppose that you were advising an intelligent young man 
on his career. What sort of career would you advise 
him to follow? 
a) Higher Education 
b) Farming 
c) Private Sector 
d) Other 
11. What is the mission and function of the organization in 
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which you are now?  
12. What part does your post play in fulfilling the goals 
of the organization?  
13. Do you think your formal training prepared you for the 
responsibilities you are now called upon to shoulder? 
Y e s No Don ' t Know  
14. Would you leave your present job if you were offered a 
position by a large and well-established firm under any 
of the following conditions: 
a) at a lower salary  
b) at the same salary  
c) at a higher salary  
15. Here are some descriptions of Civil Servants. Who among 
these do you think the Civil Service will promote sooner 
a) One who follows the rules and regulations faith 
fully. 
b) One who interprets the rules and regulations 
using his own initiative. 
c) One who uses his own initiative only. 
16. What in particular do you like about the Federal Civil 
Service? Name in order of preference putting 1 against 
first choice, 2 against second and so on. 
 Provides adequate benefits. 
 Provides opportunity for upward mobility. 
 Provides intrinsic job satisfaction. 
 Provides opportunity to help develop Nigeria. 
 Provides services for people. 
Any Other? Please name.  
17. The Federal Civil Service is seen to be an important in¬ 
stitution in our society. What do you think are the 
important changes that should be made?  
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18. Please indicate your choice by putting a (X) against 
any of the two statements. 
 All things considered I will like to work in the 
Federal Civil Service. 
 All things considered I will like to work for busi¬ 
ness enterprise. 
19. My choice is based on one of the following appeal factors. 
Please rank in order of importance using 1, 2, 3, etc. 
 Major Court of Study. 
 Member of family or friend working for the particu¬ 
lar establishment. 
 Opportunity to serve the public. 
 Adequate benefits and promotion chances. 
 Provision for job security. 
 Room for initiative. 
 Prestige Reasons 
Please give your answer to the following statements: 
20. Civil Servants are not very ambitious or pushfull. 
Yes No No opinion  
21. When I think of a Civil Servant, I think of one who is 
an expert in creating red tape. 
Yes No No opinion  
22. "Progressive" and "innovative" are words which can be 
aptly used to describe the Federal Civil Service. 
Yes No No opinion  
23. The efficiency in the Federal Civil Service can be in¬ 
creased substantially by applying business techniques 
to public's business (business techniques here include): 
a) Speed in doing things Yes No  
b) Involvement of all employees in realizing the goals 
of the organization. Yes No  
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c) Accountability Yes No 
d) Evaluation Yes No 
e) Others Yes No 
f) Yes No 
g) Yes No 
24. People who work in the Federal Civil Service are honest 
and feel a strong sense of duty to the Public. 
Yes No No opinion  
25. Centralization ( ) Decentralization ( ) of the 
activities of the Civil Service will make for greater 
efficiency. 
26. Since independence the Federal Civil Service has empha¬ 
sized and practiced efficiency and economy. 
Yes No No opinion 
27. In terms of relative efficiency please compare the 
Federal Civil Service with the following: 
Expatriate Controlled Firms 










1. Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice more efficient 
than 
2. Federal Civil Ser¬ 
vice as efficient 
as 





28. Which of these do you see as possible obstacles to effi¬ 
ciency in the Federal Civil Service? 
a) Inadequate training of staff  
b) Wrong attitude to work  
c) Civil Service methods and procedures  
d) Office accommodation and general work 
environment  
e) Civil Service salary and incentive structure  
f) Defects in supervision and control of staff  
29. To what extent has the Civil Service used procedures to 
stimulate and expand public opinion in support of de¬ 
velopment objectives and activities? 
a) To a great extent  
b) To a very small extent  
c) None at all  
d) No opinion  
30. To what extent has the Civil Service adopted procedures 
to achieve widespread involvement of individuals and 
groups in development action? 
To a great extent  
To a very little extent  
None at all  
No opinion  
Is there a full-time, permanent, professional, central 
formulation agency that reports directly to the chief 




32. Do you think the Civil Service performs its functions 
better now than in the past as shown by these character¬ 
istics in its operation? 
Yes No 
a) Increase in corruption and nepotism     
b) Citizen participation     
c) Clear departmental guidelines     
d) Formal training of Civil Servants     
e) Public sympathy     
f) Use of colonial policies, rules and 
regulations of the Civil Service     
g) Others     
h)     
33. What treatment would you expect from Civil Servants? 
NO 
Yes No Opinion 
a) Polite and interested      
b) Polite but uninterested      
c) No interest      
d) Rude and hostile      
e) Sympathetic if given or 
promised favours      




































02 .. 804 834 864 894 924 954 984 + 30 
03 .. 900 936 972 1,014 1,056 1,098 1,140 + 36/42 
04 .. 1,164 1,206 1,248 1,290 1,332 -1,374 1,416 + 42 
05 .. 1,440 1,512 1,584 1,656 1,728 1,800 1,872 + 72 
06 .. 1,908 2,004 2,100 2,196 2,292 2.388 2,484 + 96 
07 .. 2,496 2,616 2,736 2,856 2,976 3,096 3,216 + 120 
08 .. 3,264 3,414 3,564 3,714 3,864 4,014 4,164 ■ + 150 
09 .. 4,368 4,530 4,692 4,854 5,016 5,178 5,340 + 162 
10 .. 5,460 5,622 5,784 5,946 6,108 6,270 6,432 + 162 
11 6,444 6,624 6,804 6,984 — — — + 180 
12 .. 7,104 7,320 7,536 7,752 — — — 4- 216 
13 .. 7,764 8,084 8,404 8,724 — — — + 320 
14 .. 8,868 9,188 9,508 9,828 — — — + 320 
15'.. 9,996 10,512 11,028 — — — — + 516 ’ 
16 .. 11,268 11,844 12,420 — — — — + 576 
17 .. 12,696 13,332 13,968 — — — — + 636 
SOURCE : Federal Republic of Nigeria : Government Views 
on the Report of the Public S ervice Review Panel (Lagos : 
Federal Ministry of Information, September 1975), p. .30. 














Following the recent decision of the Federal Military Government on the abolition of vehicle basic 
allowance in both the Public raid Frivato Sectors, the following salary scales have been approved with effect 
from 1st April, 1979 for the Public Service: 
Grade Level S t c p Incremental Ratos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
01 846 870 894 918 942 966 996 + 24/30 
02 942 972 1002 1032 1062 1092 1122 ' + 30 
03 1044 1080 1116 1158 1200 1242 1284 . + 36/42 
04 1320 1362 1404 1446 1488 1530 1572 + 42 ■ 
05 1626 1693 1770 1842 1914 , 1986 2058 t 72 . ' 
06 2142 2238 2334 2430 2526 2622 2718 + 96 
07 2832 2952 2072 3192 3312 3432 3552 + 120 
oa 3564 371 4 3864 4014 4164 4314 4464 + 150 
09 4668 4830 4992 5154 » 5316 5478 5640 + 162 ' 
10 5760 5922 6084 6246 6408 6570 6732 + 162» 
11 6744 6924 7104 728^ - - — + 180 
1 2 7404 7620 7836 8052 - — + 216 
13 8064 8384 8704 9024 - - - + 320 
1 4 9168 9488 9808 10128 - + 320 
15 10296 1081 2 11328 - - - + 516 
16 11568 12144 12720 - — + 5-;>6 

















POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE GROUPS: NIGERIA, 1963 
thou sends 
AREA AND ÂGE GROUPS (IN YEARS) 
SEX 0-4 5 - 9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+ ALL AGES 
NIGERIA T 9,549 8,439 5,937 5,251 6,923 5,571 4,326 2,473 2,410 1,168 1,217 463 786 273 314 564 55,670 
M 4,710 4,361 3,255 2,501 3,154 2,606 2,111 1,340 1,309 682 683 277 447 162 182 331 28,112 
F 4,839 4,078 2,682 2,750 3,769 2,964 2,215 1,138 1,101 486 534 186 339 111 132 233 27,558 
NORTH T 5,397 4,596 3,227 3,243 3,559 2,661 2,340 1,113 1,273 469 684 204 428 114 176 325 29,809 
M 2,696 2,432 1,805 1,376 ;,556 1,277 1,170 645 704 293 391 131 246 72 103 189 15,086 
F 2,701 2,164 1,422 1,867 2,000 1,384 1,171 467 569 176 293 72 182 42 73 • 136 14,723 
EAST T 2,292 2,062 1,323 852 1,503 1,290 '872 642 514 330 228 117 155 64 52 97 12,394 
M 1,099 1,031 707 473 669 560 398 319 270 185 126 67 88 38 31 61 6,121 
F 1,193 1,031 616 379 834 730 474 323 244 145 102 50 67 27 21 37 6,273 
WEST* T 1,355 1,304 1,075 931 1,411 1,271 884 547 485 268 234 103 154 70 67 106 10,266 
M 668 662 577 520 70! 601 433 265 262 150 128 57 87 39 38 61 5,268 
F 687 642 498 411 710 670 451 262 223 118 106 46 67 31 29 45 4,998 
MID-WEST T 411 399 242 164 341 263 176 141 112 83 57 33 42 21 16 32 2,536 
M 200 200 132 96 155 114 80 69 56 44 30 18 23 12 9 19 1,258 
F 211 200 110 68 185 149 96 72 55 39 27 15 20 9 7 14 1,277 
LAGOS T 94 78 70 61 109 86 52 37 27 17 13 6 6 3 2 3 665 
M 47 37 34 36 72 54 31 23 16 10 7 3 3 1 1 1 378 
F 47 41 36 25 37 32 22 14 . 11 7 6 3 3 1 1 2 288 
Source :• Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 
Notes !" Figures may not add up to totals because of rounding-off errors, 












P. 0. Box 6908 
Lagos. 
February 19, 1976 





PERMISSION TO SURVEY FEDERAL CIVIL SERVANTS 
Reference my letter of July 14, 1975 and a reply from 
your office ref. No. 58341/T.2/107 dated August 1, 1975. 
2. I regret that because of some problems and setbacks 
which came my way towards the latter part of 1975 I could 
not make out and send to you the guestionnaire which I in¬ 
tend to use in the proposed survey as requested by you. I 
am pleased that the questionnaire is now ready and is en¬ 
closed here for your kind consideration. 
3. The data which I intend to gather are to enable me to 
complete a doctoral dissertation on Bureaucracy in Develop¬ 
ment: The Case of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. I 
shall be grateful too if you will kindly permit me to have 
a look at some documents like: 
(a) General Orders (G.O.) 
(b) Federal Government Budgets 1960-1975 
(c) Reports of Commissions on the Civil Service and 
the Government White Papers. 
(d) Documents on the Structure and Functioning of 
the Executive Ministries and Departments. 
(e) And any other documents which you feel can help 
in the study and which I can be permitted to see. 
4. Finally, Sir, I wish to assure you once again that my 
study will in no way betray my country or portray any part 
of her endeavours in a bad way. The information and data which 
I seek are purely for academic purposes. They will help in 
ascertaining the relevance of some inherited aspects of the 











Civil Service Administration 
LAGOS 
• DIVISION 
P.M.B. No  
TViîïffcantr- —  
TfSsgtrtoïc   
5Î<0'ÎG/25Î 
îv 
m Ref. No.. 
59320/6 
Date.. 
Sth Karch, 1976 
Er. E. A. Ikcivak, 
P. Box 6903, 
Bear -Sir, 
Permission, to Survey Federal Civil Servants 
I am directed to refer to your letter dated 19th February, 
1976 and to inform you that your requests are noted and that 
if you call here at any time, you will be given any assistance 
within, our reach. 
Tours fafihfully, 
(J. 0. Adebayo) 
for Secretary to the Federal 
Military Government. 
279 
